GEORGIA: QUAD AMBASSADORS DELIVER NON-PAPER TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: QUAD AMBASSADORS DELIVER NON-PAPER TO U/SYG LE ROY REF: A. DICARLO-BRIMMER EMAIL OF 4/23/2009 ¶B. SECSTATE 39134 ¶C. USUN 326 Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Permreps/Deputy Permreps of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Quad) delivered Ref A non-paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and SRSG for Georgia Johan Verbeke on April 24. The Ambassadors argued for robust and ambitious recommendations that could provide a solid basis for negotiations with Russia on a meaningful UN mandate. Le Roy and Verbeke said that they agreed in large part with the non-paper's content, but they thought the 15 kilometer security and restricted weapons zones were unrealistic. Verbeke thought that the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements should not be the basis of a new mandate, since they were being interpreted differently by the parties. Verbeke and Le Roy agreed that a UN new mandate should have a new security regime as its basis. Le Roy and Verbeke did not believe it was within their UN mandate to provide recommendations on the situation in South Ossetia, but allowed that the report would provide a "hook" for the Security Council to include South Ossetia within a new mandate. END SUMMARY. -------------- QUAD Ambassadors Deliver Non-Paper -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassadors DiCarlo (U.S.),Ripert (France),Mattusek (Germany) and Parham (U.K.) delivered Ref A Quad-agreed Non-Paper to U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Georgia Johan Verbeke on April 24. In delivering the non-paper, all Ambassadors made the point that the Secretary-General's report on Georgia due to be released on May 15 needs to provide a solid basis for the Council to fashion a strong and meaningful mandate, and therefore the SYG should propose an ambitious security regime to include symmetrical security zones that apply to all forces. Additionally the Ambassadors pointed out that a strong UN mandate should be based upon the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements. ¶3. (C) U/SYG Le Roy said that in general terms, the UN was in agreement with the concepts outlined in the Quad non-paper. SRSG Verbeke agreed, saying "80-90%" of the Quad draft was the UN's "common thinking." Le Roy said the Secretary-General would be hosting an internal meeting to discuss the report's recommendations later on April 24. The report would be completed within the following week, edited and finalized by May 7, and distributed by May 15. Verbeke added that the report would include only one option, so as to provide a strong starting point for the Council's deliberations. -------------- Security Zones -------------- ¶4. (C) LeRoy questioned the width of the Quad-proposed symmetrical 15 km security zones and 15 km restricted weapons zones, saying he could not see a justification for increasing the size of the zones beyond what had existed in the prior security regime. According to LeRoy, Russia had argued for an asymmetric 0 km zone in Abkhazia, which he thought unreasonable, so the SYG would need to propose something in between the two options. Verbeke acknowledged it was a "fair ambition" to propose 30 km zones on both sides of the cease-fire line, but agreed with LeRoy that it would be a non-starter with Russia. He cautioned that if the UN were to propose such a regime, Russia might reject the report entirely as biased and one-sided. In this case, Verbeke said, "you will be starting the negotiation with 0 km rather than something more reasonable." He pointed out that the 6 km security and restricted weapons zones he had included in his draft non-paper (Ref C) were based on advice from his military advisors as to the required dimensions for a separation of forces regime. ¶5. (C) Verbeke suggested one way around the disagreement might be for the report to make no recommendation at all as to the width of the zones, while otherwise describing their purpose and limitations they would impose on forces. In this way, the Council could have a free hand to negotiate the width of the zones in consultation with military advisors. Ambassador Ripert said that he thought it essential to have a clear recommendation in the report about the width of the zones, and wondered whether the report might skirt the issue USUN NEW Y 00000435 002 OF 002 of width by referring to dimensions outlined in other agreements, such as the former Moscow agreement. Verbeke said he did not think it wise to refer to the Moscow Agreement, since all sides had repudiated it. He pointed out that his proposal of 6 km zones had actually been based on the 2005 Gali Protocol (see Security Council document S/2005/453, paragraph 4). Verbeke thought a different option would be to recommend an additional "transparency zone" beyond the security and restricted weapons zones, as had been outlined in the UN non-paper. There would be no limitations on forces within these zones, but the parties would be required to report on the activities of their forces and would be subject to monitoring. Verbeke pointed out, however, that Russia had unequivocally rejected the transparency zones in its response to the non-paper. He said he was still considering whether to propose omiting a reference in the report to the width of the zones. -------------- August 12 and September 8 Agreements -------------- ¶6. (C) Verbeke argued against having the August 12 cease-fire agreement and September 8 implementing clarification serve as the basis of a new mandate. Russia and the West could not agree on what the August 12 and September 8 agreements mean today, he said, so "on day one of a mandate" its terms would be disputed and "nobody would respect it." He thought a new mandate based on a new security regime would be the only way to get a meaningful mission respected by all forces. Verbeke said the report would clearly state that relevant Security Council resolutions have not been respected by any party since August 2008, and to the contrary, "infringement has increased." He thought it unwise for the Council to adopt a mandate that it already knew would be interpreted differently by the parties. -------------- "Hooks" for South Ossetia, EU -------------- ¶7. (C) Verbeke also understood the Quad desire to have a "hook" in the report that could serve as a future basis to expand the scope of the UN mandate to South Ossetia. However, he said (and LeRoy nodded in agreement),the UN could not substitute itself for the OSCE in South Ossetia, and it was not in the SYG"s existing mandate to report on, or make recommendations about, the situation there. He said the "Observations" section of the report would offer a context for its recommendations by reviewing the situation in Georgia since August 2008, and would make the point that the August 2008 conflict began in South Ossetia. Verbeke also understood the importance to the EU of a "hook" in the report to support continuation of the EU Monitoring Mission, and said the report would reference the role of the EUMM. Rice