A/S BRIMMER MEETS WITH USYG FOR FIELD SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000430 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 TAGS: PHUM PREL MARR MASS SO SUBJECT: A/S BRIMMER MEETS WITH USYG FOR FIELD SUPPORT MALCORRA ¶1. (C) Summary. Assistant Secretary Brimmer paid a courtesy call on UN Undersecretary-General Susana Malcorra, head of the UN's Department of Field Support (DFS) on April 16. Malcorra briefed on difficulties faced by UN operations, ongoing efforts on reform, and the importance of U.S. support. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In an introductory meeting on April 16, Malcorra briefed A/S Brimmer on DFS' current efforts on reform. Malcorra described an ongoing "new horizons" study by DPKO and DFS, whose objective was to provide a new impetus for reform, as the peacekeeping landscape was now considerably different than in 2000, when the Brahimi Report was issued. There was ample scope for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of current and future operations. Before turning to practical examples, however, she stressed the importance of creating a climate in the membership more conducive to discussing peacekeeping reform. In that regard, it was critical to listen and be sensitive to the concerns of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The relationship between Security Council members and TCCs required more attention, as the dynamic of "some decide and others deploy" is not sustainable in their view. ¶3. (C) Turning to the specific operational issues, Malcorra lamented that it was extremely difficult to mobilize and deploy a peacekeeping operation on short notice, because existing force generation realities and administrative and logistics support practices and processes were "cumbersome, long, and difficult." Malcorra added that the UN "deploys size, not flexibility." The UN lack of enabling assets, such as equipment and transport capacity, has resulted in peacekeeping forces without sufficient deterrence ability that can only provide limited geographic coverage. ¶4. (C) In order to be able to get peacekeepers on the ground when needed, Malcorra believed that preparations needed to commence several months in advance of the adoption of a mandate. This is difficult to do now, because of limited authority and resources to commit prior to the formal establishment of a mission, and because of the lack of flexibility to manage peacekeeping resources globally, moving them between missions as needed. While each mission has unique features to it, certain requirements continually recur, such as the need for transportation and aviation assets. Rather than replicating these in each mission, it could be useful to look at providing such services on a regional basis, across several missions. Speed of deployment and savings through economies of scale could be achieved, but it would only be doable with U.S. support at the UN to effect this culture shift and change rules and regulations, where required. She stressed that buy-in from the USG would be essential for getting "greater latitude without the loss of accountability." ¶5. (C) DFS would move prudently on these ideas, first sounding out key countries, before actually putting forward formal proposals. To that end, DFS is currently working on a short non-paper, which will be shared with Member States in June. Formal proposals for submission at next year's UNGA session will gradually be worked up on the basis of initial reactions and ongoing dialogue with Member States. ¶6. (C) On Somalia, Malcorra raised the need for the USG and UN to conclude the letter of agreement (607 agreement) necessary to secure the bridging arrangements in advance of putting a UN logistical support contract in place. At the same time, she highlighted the need for continued bilateral support to AMISOM troop contributors. ¶7. (C) A/S Brimmer asked what could be done to improve the process of assembling and supporting senior mission leadership, particularly the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Malcorra acknowledged that there was room for improvement in the appointments process, particularly to take into account the need for adequate management capacity in the senior mission ranks for running billion plus dollar operations that were equivalent to starting up a major corporation. If it was not possible to find the "superman" or "wonderwoman" who could politically manage the peace process concurrently with properly managing the mission, it was essential to provide him/her with a strong Deputy, who would act as a COO of sorts. One could not afford to look at each vacancy in isolation of the capabilities of the team as a whole. ¶8. (C) Turning to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers, Malcorra said that due to the efforts of her predecessor, Jane Holl Lute, there was now a recognition of the problem among the membership and that it was now compulsory for all peacekeepers to receive training on SEA prior to deployment. Conduct and Discipline Teams in all missions now also help to provide additional support in the missions. These were just a few examples of a great deal that has been done in recent years. Nonetheless, more work was required. While the UN has a zero-tolerance policy, it doesn't possess the authority to enforce it, as the discipline of military personnel rests with the contributing countries, according their respective systems for military justice. There remained disparities in each TCCs vigilance and follow-up, as well as in their own perceptions of the magnitude and seriousness of the problem. They are especially sensitive to being told to take the problem more seriously by countries that do not themselves actually contribute troops to UNPKOs. ¶9. (C) A/S Brimmer noted this was just the "beginning of an ongoing conversation" and looked forward to the further exchange of ideas. Malcorra said she was pleased that the USG viewed the UN as a partner and expressed her optimism about sharing a productive working relationship. ¶10. (C) A/S Brimmer approved this cable. Rice