U/SYG LE ROY DISCUSSES ICC INDICTMENT WITH P-3

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000043 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: PREL UNSC PHUM SU FR UK SUBJECT: U/SYG LE ROY DISCUSSES ICC INDICTMENT WITH P-3 REF: LONDON 000157 Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: U/SYG Le Roy met with UK-France-U.S. (P-3) ambassadors on January 21 to discuss the International Criminal Court's (ICC) pending decision to issue an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Bashir. The P-3 ambassadors confirmed that their countries' positions on Article 16 had not changed and stressed the need for close coordination between the UN and P-3 in the aftermath of the ICC decision. They also discussed the effect an indictment could have on Bashir's hold on power and the potential effect on the peace process, as well as how official contact with Bashir should be handled after the ICC issues its decision. Le Roy highlighted UN concern over potential violence. End Summary. U/SYG Le Roy calls P-3 Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) UN Under Secretary General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy convened a meeting with P-3 Ambassadors Jean-Maurice Ripert, John Sawers, and Rosemary DiCarlo to discuss UN concerns with potential violence in Sudan that could occur in the aftermath of the ICC decision and to solicit P-3 views. U/SYG Le Roy described recent fighting in Southern Darfur around Muhajiryah between rebel groups Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and noted that janjaweed forces have been reinforced in Western Darfur around El Geneina. Le Roy said that if violence occurs between JEM and the janjaweed, it would spiral out of control quickly. P-3 ambassadors agreed that no one can accurately predict what the reaction will be on the ground to the ICC decision, and the UN must be prepared for the worst. However, P-3 ambassadors indicated that resulting violence likely would be sporadic as opposed to GOS organized attacks on UN installations. Sawers said that Mark Malloch Brown would attend the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis January 26 - February 3 and speak with Bashir on the margins to urge that the GOS maintain calm in its reaction to an ICC decision. Article 16 -------------- ¶3. (C) All P-3 ambassadors confirmed that their countries' respective positions with regard to Article 16 had not changed, and there had been no progress on the ground in Sudan that would justify an Article 16 resolution. U/SYG Le Roy said that Chinese pressure had been increasing, including a call from the Chinese Prime Minister to Secretary General Ban, and additional calls the Chinese will make to P-3 capitals. Ripert noted that the Sudanese Perm Rep had met with him last week and seemed to genuinely listen to what Ripert said, and to be grasping for what he should report back to Khartoum. Le Roy noted that the upcoming AU Summit in Addis could result in further calls for an Article 16 resolution and that the Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP) has been providing information to the ICC in the hope of obtaining a postponement of the ICC decision. Bashir's Future -------------- ¶4. (C) Ripert defined the key unknown element as being whether Bashir can remain in charge after the ICC issues its decision. DiCarlo noted that Special Envoy Williamson had observed during his meetings in Sudan that there were many members of the ruling elite who would be happy to see Bashir leave, but noted that if Bashir falls from power, this could have both positive and negative implications. Sawers asked whether the UN had developed a policy regarding official contact with Bashir after issuance of an arrest warrant. U/SYG Le Roy responded that, clearly, Secretary General Ban would not meet with Bashir subsequent to the ICC decision, but that the UN Office of Legal Affairs was looking into the extent to which other UN officials might be able to meet with Bashir. Le Roy noted that, with two peacekeeping missions in Sudan, the UN would need to engage with Bashir at some level. While Le Roy said that the UN would not request to meet with Bashir, if Bashir were to request a meeting with UN, the UN would need to be able to respond. ¶5. (C) P-3 ambassadors also briefly discussed the impact that the ICC decision could have on the peace process, in terms of whether Bashir would be seen as having legitimate authority to be a signatory to a future Darfur peace agreement. Le Roy said that the joint UN/AU mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassole, met with the JEM in London and may have a framework agreement to present in Doha between the GOS and JEM by the end of January. Ripert noted that if Bashir USUN NEW Y 00000043 002 OF 002 loses power, this could be detrimental to the peace process. Wolff