AMB. RICE TALKS AFRICA WITH FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000425

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER UNSC KPKO SO SU ER DJ
SUBJECT: AMB. RICE TALKS AFRICA WITH FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR

Classified By: Amb. Susan Rice, for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Rice discussed a range of African
issues with Bruno Joubert, French President Sarkozy's chief
diplomatic advisor on Africa, in a meeting on April 16.
Joubert said that the international community should continue
to support Qatar-brokered peace talks on Darfur for a few
more months before giving up hope of an agreement. On
Somalia, he said the international community "should not
meddle" and advocated a transfer of responsibilities from
AMISOM to Somali security forces. France was not likely to
make a donation at the April 23 UN donors' conference on
Somalia, he said, but would provide confidential support
(protect) to Djibouti to train 500 Somali troops. The two
also discussed the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute and rumors
on Gabon. End summary.

Sudan


2. (C) Bruno Joubert, diplomatic advisor to the French
Presidency on African affairs, paid a call on Amb. Rice on
Thursday, April 16. He said that he had met U.S. Special
Envoy to Sudan Gen. Scott Gration during his recent trip to
Washington, and asked for Amb. Rice's views on U.S. policy
toward Sudan. Rice said that in her experience, Khartoum had
never taken difficult decisions without external pressure,
and that it would be important to combine such pressure with
incentives to maximize the chance of success. She warned
that it was important not to allow heated rhetoric to get
ahead of our policy, and expressed concern that the regime in
Sudan may have become accustomed to threats that were never
implemented. Joubert and Rice agreed on the need for a more
thoughtful, comprehensive approach to Sudan.


3. (C) Joubert said that he expected Khartoum to "use every
dirty trick" to try to derail the 2011 referendum on southern
Sudanese independence, and that the southerners themselves
might not be ready for independence due to ongoing disputes
over the census. He and Rice agreed that, should conflict
break out again between north and south, the southerners
might use scorched earth tactics to deny northerners the
benefit of southern oilfields. Joubert said that President
Sarkozy had hoped Qatari-led mediation efforts on Darfur
would "radically change for Khartoum what Sudanese unity
means," perhaps making it easier for the south to remain
within a united Sudan. Joubert said that France was ready
for southern independence but feared the consequences of
Sudanese disintegration, and saw independence as "not
preferable" for this reason. He admitted that ICC action had
made progress on a Darfur peace deal more difficult, but said
France had faith in Qatar's intentions and would continue to
support its efforts for the time being. If three months
passed without a deal, the international community would know
the process was dead, he said.


4. (C) Joubert said that if the north anticipated a
conventional military conflict with the south over
independence, it might be motivated to seek a peace agreement
on Darfur to avoid fighting on two fronts. He speculated
that Khartoum's failure to move in this direction could mean
that it anticipated confronting the south through
non-traditional means, either by arming janjaweed-type
militias or by seeking to instigate conflict among southern
tribes. Amb. Rice commented that the regime might simply be
acting illogically in the wake of the ICC decision. Joubert
said that Sudanese intelligence chief Sala Gosh -- a key
player who "saved Khartoum" during the Omdurman attack --
would soon visit Paris, and that he was interested in
pursuing talks with Gosh. In previous conversations, Gosh
had intimated that he might turn against his NCP colleagues
if ever forced to choose between the regime and himself,
Joubert said.

Somalia


5. (C) Joubert said he believed strongly that the
international community "should not meddle" in Somalia, and
that he had been "fiercely against" the previous U.S.
administration's push for a UNPKO in Somalia. He said that
the solution was to transfer authority from the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to Somali security forces.
Pressed by Amb. Rice, he admitted that the international
community would need to continue to support AMISOM until
Somali forces were ready, though he claimed that the
administration of new Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
President Sharif was not enthusiastic about AMISOM's
presence. Joubert said that France would likely not be
making any bilateral pledges at the April 23 UN donors
conference on Somalia, but that it would quietly provide
support to the Djiboutian government to train some 500 Somali
troops. (Note: Joubert asked that this information be

USUN NEW Y 00000425 002 OF 002


treated as confidential, as Djibouti did not want France's
role to become known. End note.) He also predicted that the
EU would make a donation of approximately 110 million euro to
the AMISOM trust fund, with another 40 million euro for
Somali security forces.


6. (C) Amb. Rice briefed Joubert on U.S. concerns over
Somalia becoming a terrorist training center and said she
hoped to work towards a strategy that would focus not only on
striking terrorists, but also on securing Somalia's borders
and dealing with the near-complete lack of Somali government
capacity. Even that, she said, might not help us in
combating the scourge of piracy, as it emanated chiefly from
the regions of Somaliland and Puntland, which were relatively
prosperous and stable compared to southern Somalia.

Djibouti/Eritrea


7. (C) Joubert admitted to having a "Djibouti problem" --
France's forces were required to support the Djiboutians
under a mutual defense treaty, but France was eager to see a
reduction in tensions in order not to have its forces "out in
the middle of the desert forever." He was hopeful that the
approximately 100 million euro aid package for Eritrea
recently announced by the European Commission might bring
Eritrea to the table. Amb. Rice said that she had spent more
hours with Isaias than she cared to count, and that given
Eritrea's track record, such an aid package amounted to
nothing more than a reward for bad behavior. Unless Eritrea
pays a price for its destructive behavior in the Horn, it
will continue, she said. The silver lining of the Isaias
regime, Amb. Rice said, is that, due to its totalitarian
nature, the only thing needed to change Eritrean policy is to
change Isaias's mind. Joubert assured Rice that France would
have no problem getting tougher on Isaias if the U.S. had a
plan that would work.

Gabon succession


8. (C) Finally, Joubert related a rumor (which he said French
authorities were still trying to confirm) that Gabonese
President Omar Bongo had suffered a serious stroke.
According to Joubert, France did not fear violence, but
worried at a lack of institutional readiness for democratic
rule, and the weak public support currently enjoyed by
Bongo's son, and presumptive heir, Ali.

Rice