AMB. RICE TALKS AFRICA WITH FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000425 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER UNSC KPKO SO SU ER DJ SUBJECT: AMB. RICE TALKS AFRICA WITH FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR Classified By: Amb. Susan Rice, for reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Rice discussed a range of African issues with Bruno Joubert, French President Sarkozy's chief diplomatic advisor on Africa, in a meeting on April 16. Joubert said that the international community should continue to support Qatar-brokered peace talks on Darfur for a few more months before giving up hope of an agreement. On Somalia, he said the international community "should not meddle" and advocated a transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces. France was not likely to make a donation at the April 23 UN donors' conference on Somalia, he said, but would provide confidential support (protect) to Djibouti to train 500 Somali troops. The two also discussed the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute and rumors on Gabon. End summary. Sudan ¶2. (C) Bruno Joubert, diplomatic advisor to the French Presidency on African affairs, paid a call on Amb. Rice on Thursday, April 16. He said that he had met U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Gen. Scott Gration during his recent trip to Washington, and asked for Amb. Rice's views on U.S. policy toward Sudan. Rice said that in her experience, Khartoum had never taken difficult decisions without external pressure, and that it would be important to combine such pressure with incentives to maximize the chance of success. She warned that it was important not to allow heated rhetoric to get ahead of our policy, and expressed concern that the regime in Sudan may have become accustomed to threats that were never implemented. Joubert and Rice agreed on the need for a more thoughtful, comprehensive approach to Sudan. ¶3. (C) Joubert said that he expected Khartoum to "use every dirty trick" to try to derail the 2011 referendum on southern Sudanese independence, and that the southerners themselves might not be ready for independence due to ongoing disputes over the census. He and Rice agreed that, should conflict break out again between north and south, the southerners might use scorched earth tactics to deny northerners the benefit of southern oilfields. Joubert said that President Sarkozy had hoped Qatari-led mediation efforts on Darfur would "radically change for Khartoum what Sudanese unity means," perhaps making it easier for the south to remain within a united Sudan. Joubert said that France was ready for southern independence but feared the consequences of Sudanese disintegration, and saw independence as "not preferable" for this reason. He admitted that ICC action had made progress on a Darfur peace deal more difficult, but said France had faith in Qatar's intentions and would continue to support its efforts for the time being. If three months passed without a deal, the international community would know the process was dead, he said. ¶4. (C) Joubert said that if the north anticipated a conventional military conflict with the south over independence, it might be motivated to seek a peace agreement on Darfur to avoid fighting on two fronts. He speculated that Khartoum's failure to move in this direction could mean that it anticipated confronting the south through non-traditional means, either by arming janjaweed-type militias or by seeking to instigate conflict among southern tribes. Amb. Rice commented that the regime might simply be acting illogically in the wake of the ICC decision. Joubert said that Sudanese intelligence chief Sala Gosh -- a key player who "saved Khartoum" during the Omdurman attack -- would soon visit Paris, and that he was interested in pursuing talks with Gosh. In previous conversations, Gosh had intimated that he might turn against his NCP colleagues if ever forced to choose between the regime and himself, Joubert said. Somalia ¶5. (C) Joubert said he believed strongly that the international community "should not meddle" in Somalia, and that he had been "fiercely against" the previous U.S. administration's push for a UNPKO in Somalia. He said that the solution was to transfer authority from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to Somali security forces. Pressed by Amb. Rice, he admitted that the international community would need to continue to support AMISOM until Somali forces were ready, though he claimed that the administration of new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Sharif was not enthusiastic about AMISOM's presence. Joubert said that France would likely not be making any bilateral pledges at the April 23 UN donors conference on Somalia, but that it would quietly provide support to the Djiboutian government to train some 500 Somali troops. (Note: Joubert asked that this information be USUN NEW Y 00000425 002 OF 002 treated as confidential, as Djibouti did not want France's role to become known. End note.) He also predicted that the EU would make a donation of approximately 110 million euro to the AMISOM trust fund, with another 40 million euro for Somali security forces. ¶6. (C) Amb. Rice briefed Joubert on U.S. concerns over Somalia becoming a terrorist training center and said she hoped to work towards a strategy that would focus not only on striking terrorists, but also on securing Somalia's borders and dealing with the near-complete lack of Somali government capacity. Even that, she said, might not help us in combating the scourge of piracy, as it emanated chiefly from the regions of Somaliland and Puntland, which were relatively prosperous and stable compared to southern Somalia. Djibouti/Eritrea ¶7. (C) Joubert admitted to having a "Djibouti problem" -- France's forces were required to support the Djiboutians under a mutual defense treaty, but France was eager to see a reduction in tensions in order not to have its forces "out in the middle of the desert forever." He was hopeful that the approximately 100 million euro aid package for Eritrea recently announced by the European Commission might bring Eritrea to the table. Amb. Rice said that she had spent more hours with Isaias than she cared to count, and that given Eritrea's track record, such an aid package amounted to nothing more than a reward for bad behavior. Unless Eritrea pays a price for its destructive behavior in the Horn, it will continue, she said. The silver lining of the Isaias regime, Amb. Rice said, is that, due to its totalitarian nature, the only thing needed to change Eritrean policy is to change Isaias's mind. Joubert assured Rice that France would have no problem getting tougher on Isaias if the U.S. had a plan that would work. Gabon succession ¶8. (C) Finally, Joubert related a rumor (which he said French authorities were still trying to confirm) that Gabonese President Omar Bongo had suffered a serious stroke. According to Joubert, France did not fear violence, but worried at a lack of institutional readiness for democratic rule, and the weak public support currently enjoyed by Bongo's son, and presumptive heir, Ali. Rice