GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH GEORGIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000423 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VASHADZE REF: A. TBILISI 670 ¶B. USUN 326 Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Georgian Foreign Minister Vashadze outlined for Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo the elements Georgia would like to see in a new UN mandate. He acknowledged that the eventual mandate would be something less robust that the Georgian proposed elements, but suggested that it was important to start with a "maximalist" position. Ambassador Rice encouraged the Foreign Minister to be clear with the United States on tradeoffs that Georgia would be willing to make in the negotiations in order to keep a UN mission on the ground. Vashadze admitted that UNOMIG currently has minimal utility as a security presence, but that it was important both symbolically and as a cornerstone for the other international actors. He did not want to consider whether he would need to make a tradeoff on the name of the mission in order to keep it, but suggested that Tbilisi would not accept such a compromise. The Foreign Minister also confirmed that Georgia would not file a brief with the International Court of Justice related to Kosovo's declaration of independence. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze and Permrep Alexander Lomaia discussed Georgian preferences for a new UN mandate in Georgia with Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo on April ¶16. At the outset of the meeting, Vashadze acknowledged that the Georgian Non-Paper (Ref A) outlining their desired elements for a UN mission in Georgia was a "wish list", and that he realized a new mandate would not contain all of the elements in the Non-Paper. "The more we ask for, the more we get", he said, and so he believed it was important to start with a maximalist position with the expectation that Russia would adopt a similar approach. He asked Ambassador Rice to "champion" the Georgian paper in New York. ¶3. (C) Vashadze said that the top priority for Georgia in a resolution would be a clear reference to Georgia's territorial integrity, or as a fallback, mention of all other resolutions on Georgia, including Resolution 1808. Another important element for Georgia would be a strong monitoring mission within defined security zones. Vashadze said the 6 km zones outlined in the UN Non-Paper (Ref B) were insufficient, and instead should be at least as expansive as the current zones, but would ideally be more expansive in some places. Executive policing is important in ethnic-Georgia populated areas in Abkhazia due to human rights concerns, though he acknowledged it would be hard to get Russian agreement for this. On territorial integrity, Vashadze said that keeping the same name for UNOMIG was very important to Georgia, as well as keeping one mission on both sides of the administrative boundary and keeping the debate under the agenda item, "The Situation in Georgia". Georgia would not want the representatives of the de facto authorities invited to New York either formally or for an informal, "Arria-style" meeting. An invitation to New York would be a blow to Geneva and a reward to the separatists for blocking progress in the Geneva talks. Russia, he said, "wants to move everything to New York, where Georgia does not have any say." He added that he thought Russia did not like the Geneva talks because of the presence of the U.S. as a co-equal participant, which he thought was "humiliating" to Russia. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Rice told Vashadze that the U.S. was approaching the upcoming negotiations with a commitment to preserve Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, not only in the written documents, but in practice. She reinforced that as a friend of Georgia, she would be frank and straightforward with her assessment of the situation in New York. Russia's veto in the Security Council, Rice said, gives Russia leverage in the negotiations. She thought it unlikely that a more robust mission could be achieved without making a tradeoff on some of the issues that Vashadze had mentioned. Rice reminded the Foreign Minister a tradeoff on an Arria-format meeting had not been necessary in February, but only because that mandate was essentially a technical rollover. In order for the U.S. to negotiate with Russia on a new mandate, Rice said she would need to know where Georgia sees the tradeoffs. Ambassador DiCarlo reinforced that we would have to consider tradeoffs on the name of the mission and a reference to territorial integrity in the resolution, if the goal was to keep a UNOMIG on the ground. ¶5. (C) In response, Vashadze said that UNOMIG, in and of itself, "adds nothing to conflict resolution and Georgian security." He would be "perfectly happy," he said if the USUN NEW Y 00000423 002 OF 002 mandate were to be extended with the language on territorial integrity, a reference to the Geneva talks and to the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements, and if the name of the mission were to remain, "UNOMIG". He believed UNOMIG was important "as the corner stone of the international presence," and because a change to the presence would send a signal about a change in status. Even if UNOMIG were not to remain on the ground, he believed the EU could remain. Vashadze said he had received assurances from the Foreign Ministers of Spain, Poland and the Baltic states that they would support keeping the EU Monitoring Mission on the ground. As for whether he would want to make a tradeoff on the name in order to keep a UN presence, Vashadze said, "Let's wait until we get there," adding that he could envision the parliament or the public accepting that tradeoff. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that she understood Secretary Clinton and the Foreign Minister had discussed during their April 15 meeting whether Georgia would file a brief with the International Court of Justice in favor of Serbia's position on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence. The Foreign Minister said that subsequent to his conversation with the Secretary, he had directed the Foreign Ministry not to file a brief in the ICJ case. Ambassador Rice thanked him for this decision. Rice