GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH GEORGIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000423

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH GEORGIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER VASHADZE

REF: A. TBILISI 670

B. USUN 326

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Georgian Foreign Minister Vashadze outlined
for Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo the elements Georgia would
like to see in a new UN mandate. He acknowledged that the
eventual mandate would be something less robust that the
Georgian proposed elements, but suggested that it was
important to start with a "maximalist" position. Ambassador
Rice encouraged the Foreign Minister to be clear with the
United States on tradeoffs that Georgia would be willing to
make in the negotiations in order to keep a UN mission on the
ground. Vashadze admitted that UNOMIG currently has minimal
utility as a security presence, but that it was important
both symbolically and as a cornerstone for the other
international actors. He did not want to consider whether he
would need to make a tradeoff on the name of the mission in
order to keep it, but suggested that Tbilisi would not accept
such a compromise. The Foreign Minister also confirmed that
Georgia would not file a brief with the International Court
of Justice related to Kosovo's declaration of independence.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze and Permrep
Alexander Lomaia discussed Georgian preferences for a new UN
mandate in Georgia with Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo on April

16. At the outset of the meeting, Vashadze acknowledged that
the Georgian Non-Paper (Ref A) outlining their desired
elements for a UN mission in Georgia was a "wish list", and
that he realized a new mandate would not contain all of the
elements in the Non-Paper. "The more we ask for, the more we
get", he said, and so he believed it was important to start
with a maximalist position with the expectation that Russia
would adopt a similar approach. He asked Ambassador Rice to
"champion" the Georgian paper in New York.


3. (C) Vashadze said that the top priority for Georgia in a
resolution would be a clear reference to Georgia's
territorial integrity, or as a fallback, mention of all other
resolutions on Georgia, including Resolution 1808. Another
important element for Georgia would be a strong monitoring
mission within defined security zones. Vashadze said the 6
km zones outlined in the UN Non-Paper (Ref B) were
insufficient, and instead should be at least as expansive as
the current zones, but would ideally be more expansive in
some places. Executive policing is important in
ethnic-Georgia populated areas in Abkhazia due to human
rights concerns, though he acknowledged it would be hard to
get Russian agreement for this. On territorial integrity,
Vashadze said that keeping the same name for UNOMIG was very
important to Georgia, as well as keeping one mission on both
sides of the administrative boundary and keeping the debate
under the agenda item, "The Situation in Georgia". Georgia
would not want the representatives of the de facto
authorities invited to New York either formally or for an
informal, "Arria-style" meeting. An invitation to New York
would be a blow to Geneva and a reward to the separatists for
blocking progress in the Geneva talks. Russia, he said,
"wants to move everything to New York, where Georgia does not
have any say." He added that he thought Russia did not like
the Geneva talks because of the presence of the U.S. as a
co-equal participant, which he thought was "humiliating" to
Russia.


4. (C) Ambassador Rice told Vashadze that the U.S. was
approaching the upcoming negotiations with a commitment to
preserve Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, not
only in the written documents, but in practice. She
reinforced that as a friend of Georgia, she would be frank
and straightforward with her assessment of the situation in
New York. Russia's veto in the Security Council, Rice said,
gives Russia leverage in the negotiations. She thought it
unlikely that a more robust mission could be achieved without
making a tradeoff on some of the issues that Vashadze had
mentioned. Rice reminded the Foreign Minister a tradeoff on
an Arria-format meeting had not been necessary in February,
but only because that mandate was essentially a technical
rollover. In order for the U.S. to negotiate with Russia on
a new mandate, Rice said she would need to know where Georgia
sees the tradeoffs. Ambassador DiCarlo reinforced that we
would have to consider tradeoffs on the name of the mission
and a reference to territorial integrity in the resolution,
if the goal was to keep a UNOMIG on the ground.


5. (C) In response, Vashadze said that UNOMIG, in and of
itself, "adds nothing to conflict resolution and Georgian
security." He would be "perfectly happy," he said if the

USUN NEW Y 00000423 002 OF 002


mandate were to be extended with the language on territorial
integrity, a reference to the Geneva talks and to the August
12 and September 8 cease-fire agreements, and if the name of
the mission were to remain, "UNOMIG". He believed UNOMIG was
important "as the corner stone of the international
presence," and because a change to the presence would send a
signal about a change in status. Even if UNOMIG were not to
remain on the ground, he believed the EU could remain.
Vashadze said he had received assurances from the Foreign
Ministers of Spain, Poland and the Baltic states that they
would support keeping the EU Monitoring Mission on the
ground. As for whether he would want to make a tradeoff on
the name in order to keep a UN presence, Vashadze said,
"Let's wait until we get there," adding that he could
envision the parliament or the public accepting that tradeoff.


6. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that she understood Secretary
Clinton and the Foreign Minister had discussed during their
April 15 meeting whether Georgia would file a brief with the
International Court of Justice in favor of Serbia's position
on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence. The
Foreign Minister said that subsequent to his conversation
with the Secretary, he had directed the Foreign Ministry not
to file a brief in the ICJ case. Ambassador Rice thanked him
for this decision.
Rice