NEW UN WOMEN'S MECHANISM PROPOSED

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000418 DEPT FOR IO/RHS, IO/EDA, L/HRR, S/GWI SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SOCI PHUM UN KWMN SUBJECT: NEW UN WOMEN'S MECHANISM PROPOSED REF: 2008 USUN 822 ¶1. (SBU) Summary and action request. Members of the General Assembly voiced measured support for continuing deliberations on the creation of a new "entity" to deal with women's empowerment and gender equality that would be a hybrid between a full-fledged Fund (such as UNICEF or UNDP) and an office within the UN Secretariat. The details of this so-called "composite" entity will be fleshed out in coming months in consultations among states, facilitated by the permanent representatives of Spain and Namibia, with the aim of making a decision on establishment of the new agency by September ¶2009. The U.S. has an opportunity to significantly shape the discussions on the size, functions, command structure and budget of this proposed new entity. Action requested in para 19 below on points to pursue. End Summary. THREE OUT OF FOUR PROPOSALS JETTISONED ¶2. (SBU) The four proposals described in reftel for the general parameters of strengthening the UN's ability to deal with gender were further elaborated in a March 5 paper and discussed at a General Assembly meeting March 30. None of the first three options (1-status quo, 2-Fund/Programme, 3-Department of the Secretariat) were supported by any of the member states. The Status Quo is seen as ineffective, being fraught with historical rivalries and infighting that have hampered effective cooperation between the existing Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW),the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI),the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the training institute located in the Dominican Republic, INSTRAW. While the Status Quo, on paper, looks like it should be capable of handling women's issues, in reality the deep-seated tradition of jealously guarding turf has led to a fragmented, leaderless and weak set of mechanisms for dealing with women's issues, which has been incapable of holding the UN system or member states accountable for advancing or empowering women. ¶3. (SBU) The second option, creation of a Fund or Programme which would resemble the major development agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP or UNFPA, initially had the support of a number of women's groups in the U.S. and Europe when the issue of reforming the UN's "gender architecture" was first broached more than two years ago. The head of such an agency would sit on the UN's Chief Executives Board (CEB) 
with equivalent rank (Under-Secretary-General) to the heads of UNDP, UNICEF, etc. There was little enthusiasm in the previous administration for creation of a 'UNICEF for women', which was seen as potentially being too costly and large. An autonomous agency head, furthermore, would have little bureaucratic power to influence or hold accountable other agency heads to fulfill their gender mainstreaming obligations. Consequently, the tide among developed countries and NGOs has now turned away from seeking a Fund/Programme, even though the majority of states want an enhanced UN gender presence "in the field", where a Fund/Programme would excel. The "composite entity" (the fourth and last option in the paper),would keep most of the benefits of creation of a Fund/Programme. However, it runs the risk of being constrained by the General Assembly from taking a far-reaching and pro-active stance towards women's issues. ¶4. (SBU) No support has ever been voiced for option 3 - creation of a Department within the Secretariat. The UN secretariat now has two offices (DAW and OSAGI) within the Department on Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) which have lackluster performance and contribute to the infighting that plagues the current arrangements. This option has several major flaws -- it would have almost no presence in the field where progress on women's status needs to be made, and the head of a department would have little authority over heads of autonomous Funds and Programmes. QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT COMPOSITE ENTITY ¶5. (U) During the GA discussion on March 30, which spilled over to April 1, delegations almost unanimously stated that the Composite Entity was the most viable, while pointing out that the Secretariat's background papers did not provide adequate detailed information about an entity which would have no institutional precedent. They raised relevant questions about the size and budget of the composite entity, as well as the nature of intergovernmental oversight, and its relationship to other parts of the UN system. The Secretariat asked that the GA make a decision on the new gender entity before the end of the 63rd GA (i.e., September 2009),so that the entity could be established in time for the fifteen anniversary of the Beijing World Conference on Women. ¶6. (U) Mexico, in one of the best statements of the session, asked for clarification of lines of authority, since the paper proposes that the Composite Entity will report both to an Executive Board and to the Secretary-General (SYG),and asked about the composition of the Executive Board. They noted that only changes that are strictly necessary should be made, that most new posts should be in the field rather than headquarters, that the current structure should be rationalized within existing resources, that assessed budget growth should be avoided, that voluntary contributions should form the bulk of the budget, and that the command structure should be clear and simple. ¶7. (U) Canada, stressing that the new entity should show leadership and have authority over the UN system, said the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities (TCPR) must be brought into the discussions of the new entity, so that gender will be mainstreamed into all the UN's work, and the new entity will hold the rest of the system accountable. Canada also suggested that the new entity's Executive Board should become a third part of the dual UNDP/UNFPA joint executive board. ¶8. (U) Japan asked how the new entity would avoid duplication on the ground with the gender activities of UNDP, UNFPA, and others; and how to responsibilities would be divided between DAW, OSAGI, UNIFEM and INSTRAW. Japan advised looking into existing redundancies between those offices, and finding synergies between the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the proposed Executive Board. They advocated seeking voluntary funding and avoiding unnecessary financial expenses. Korea raised similar points, asking for an organizational diagram and cost proposals. ¶9. (U) The Nordics and UK stated they would make voluntary contributions to the new entity. The Nordics stressed that all UN entities should be accountable to the new entity, that the entity's "normative" work should be universal in scope, but that operational work should be geared towards developing countries. Cuba, speaking on behalf of the G-77 and NAM, said no "artificial deadline" should be set (i.e., September 2009),that progress must be seen on the other components of the System-Wide Coherence (SWC) process (i.e., Governance and Financing) leading to a single, comprehensive decision, and that development priorities should be guided by each country. Other developing countries who spoke left some room for reaching a decision on gender architecture, as long as some progress was seen on the other SWC priorities. Russia harshly criticized the Secretariat for presenting a skewed paper in which the Composite Entity was the only viable option, and costs for "unwarranted" new posts at headquarters and in the field were not indicated. Russia also insisted on a package decision on the entire SWC. ¶10. (U) The U.S., reiterating the importance of gender issues, concurred with the questions raised by Mexico, Japan and Korea, acknowledged that, of the options presented by the Secretariat, the Composite Option seemed the most feasible, that we need balance between taking a quick decision and a well-thought-out decision, that the new entity should be relevant to developed countries as well as to the developing world, and that we were ready to continue discussions on modalities and details of the new entity. - FLAW IN THE SECRETARIAT'S ANALYSIS ¶11. (SBU) An underlying assumption in the secretariat's paper .Is that "normative" functions cannot be performed by a Fund/Programme, and must be housed within the UN Secretariat. The normative function of writing reports is seen by DAW, and to a lesser degree by OSAGI, as their prerogative. These Secretariat units resent UNIFEM encroaching on this function by preparing reports such as "Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009: Who Answers to Women?" However, UNDP, through its annual Human Development Report, UNICEF, through its annual report on the "State of the World's Children", and UNFPA, through its reporting for the Commission on Population and Development, and their numerous other reports, demonstrate strong normative and policy activity. POTENTIAL PITFALLS ¶12. (SBU) Funding for the composite entity would come from both assessed and voluntary contributions. Assessed contributions provide non-donor countries a larger voice, since the Fifth Committee and the Committee on Program Coordination (CPC) (where Cuba, Egypt and some other developing countries have a strong presence) have a hand in defining spending priorities for offices that are financed through assessments. This holds true even when an office is only partially funded through assessments, such as the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Committees of the General Assembly spent months arguing over the documents laying out the spending priorities and mandates of OHCHR for the current biennium budget. Handing authority over spending to the CPC and Fifth Committee may result in the new entity being hampered from taking a strong stance on some women's issues which certain countries may perceive as threatening to their interests. Whether the assessed budget of a new entity will be higher or lower than the present budget for DAW and OSAGI will depend on how large the Secretariat component of the new entity will be. ¶13. (SBU) The UN system does not have a clear chain of command. While the SYG has authority over the Secretariat, he does not have any oversight role over autonomous parts of the UN system, such as Funds/Programmes and specialized agencies. Kofi Annan took several steps to try to impose coordination upon the system, including creation of the Chief Executives Board (CEB),and of several high-level working groups. The new entity will need to have some power to influence the rest of the system, since all UN agencies are required by GA and ECOSOC resolutions, the Beijing Declaration, and CSW outcomes, to mainstream gender in their mandated activities. The head of the new entity should be in a position to hold other agencies accountable for incorporating a gender perspective in their work. The new head will need to be on a par with other agency heads who hold the rank of Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG),be a member of the CEB, and be able to speak to the entire UN system on behalf of the SYG. Choosing the right person for the new U/SYG post will be key to assuring a strong, forceful, well-coordinated agency. The current Special Adviser on Gender Issues is only an Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG),and therefore not able to direct U/SYGs, and the current Executive Director of UNIFEM, also an A/SYG, does not sit on the CEB. Newer UN bodies such as UNAIDS, UNEP, OCHA or OHCHR might present some lessons to be learned about their bureaucratic structure's strengths and weaknesses. 14 (SBU) Any new gender entity will never be large enough to meet all the needs of all the world's women, and must therefore work with other agencies. The new agency must not become excuse for the rest of the UN system to marginalize or compartmentalize women's and gender issues. The tasks of the new entity should include not only running projects for women, but also providing gender advisers to UN Country Teams who can work with other agencies in the field to ensure they know how to address gender issues. ¶15. (SBU) The composition of the Executive Board could also inadvertently lead to marginalization of gender issues, if it were to attact only officials from ministries of women's affairs. It will be important for the Board to include experts from ministries of economic development and finance, so that decisions will be backed up by ownership of the ministries with money and influence. ¶16. (SBU) Some options have not been addressed by the Secretariat, but might have some merit. For example, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) already undertakes many activities related to women and gender, beyond their core focus on reproductive health. Expansion of the mandate of UNFPA to include other gender issues might position UNFPA to become the UN system's leader on women's issues, and prevent the need to create an entirely new entity. Another option might be to eliminate most of DAW and OSAGI, retaining two or three staff to serve as a technical secretariat for CSW; elevate the dynamic new head of UNIFEM to U/SYG rank and seat her on the CEB; transfer all reporting writing, normative and analytical functions to UNIFEM; and find an alternative UN function for the tiny office in Dominican Republic currently occupied by INSTRAW. ¶17. (SBU) A coalition of 300 women's organizations and human rights NGOs, calling itself Gender Equality Architecture Reform (GEAR),has shared the results of its analysis and research with the UN and interested member states, to help provide momentum for the creation of a new gender entity. USUN has been in close touch with Charlotte Bunch and June Zeitlin, the spokespersons for the GEAR coalition. FORMULATION OF U.S. POSITION ¶18. (SBU) The U.S. needs to formulate a position on the preferred shape of the new entity, as informal negotiations are going to continue throughout the spring and summer. Issues to address include: - the functions of the new entity; - its relationship with rest of UN system; - the level and capabilities of the head of the new entity; - the composition of the Executive Board and whether it should be added to the existing joint UNDP/UNFPA Board; - whether we would prefer a Fund/Programme instead of a Composite entity; - whether the US will express an intention to provide voluntary funding for the new entity. ACTION REQUEST ¶19. (U) USUN requests Department's views on the questions above by May 1, to enable mission to interact effectively with others in the General Assembly and secretariat to shape the future UN mechanism to deal with women and gender. RICE