AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000393 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/RHS, SCA AND PRM, USAID FOR DCHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 TAGS: CE EAID PHUM PREF PREL UNSC SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SRI LANKA Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, reason 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C) Ambassador Rice spoke with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon via telephone on April 10 to urge the appointment of a special envoy for Sri Lanka given the growing risks to civilians caught between the government of Sri Lanka's (GSL) military forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in the "no-fire zone". The SYG noted that he was open to the idea of a special envoy and that this matter was under consideration at the UN. However, he made no commitment to name a special envoy for Sri Lanka. ¶2. (C) The SYG asked for suggestions and inquired what the special envoy should attempt to accomplish. Ambassador Rice put forward a couple of names for consideration for the special envoy post: Lakhdar Brahimi and Vijay Nambiar. She told the SYG that she would forward the USG views on the special envoy position. The following points were then forwarded to Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Homes that same day (April 10) in a non-paper: a) a special envoy would be most effective during a humanitarian pause and therefore would need to go immediately, b) the envoy would ensure, and be able to report on, the proper treatment of displaced persons, c) the envoy would go into the "safe zone" and speak directly with Tamil Tiger leader Prabhakaran to negotiate the release of civilians, d) the envoy would work out arrangements that provide a dignified end to the fighting to include the LTTE giving up arms to an international body, amnesty and reintegration for most LTTE cadres, and efforts to conv ince the GSL leadership to seek an alternative to military actions against the safe zone, and e) the envoy could begin to establish the post-conflict political framework between the two sides. ¶3. (C) U/SGY Holmes sent the following reply to the non-paper by e-mail on April 10: "We (UN) will reflect further but my views remain the same for now: this is more likely to confuse and distract than help at this moment. The chances of the GSL accepting such a role are very low, and the same probably applies to the LTTE, though that is much harder to know." ¶4. (C) Comment: Given Ban's noncommittal reply and Holmes' opposition, it is unlikely the UN will appoint a special envoy, at least for now. Rice Rice