Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK393
2009-04-13 23:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
how-toVZCZCXRO8734 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHTRO DE RUCNDT #0393 1032302 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 132302Z APR 09 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6336 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0268 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2549 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 3637 RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME IMMEDIATE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000393
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/RHS, SCA AND PRM, USAID FOR DCHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: CE EAID PHUM PREF PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
SRI LANKA
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, reason 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000393
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/RHS, SCA AND PRM, USAID FOR DCHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: CE EAID PHUM PREF PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
SRI LANKA
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, reason 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
1. (C) Ambassador Rice spoke with UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon via telephone on April 10 to urge the appointment of
a special envoy for Sri Lanka given the growing risks to
civilians caught between the government of Sri Lanka's (GSL)
military forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
(LTTE) in the "no-fire zone". The SYG noted that he was open
to the idea of a special envoy and that this matter was under
consideration at the UN. However, he made no commitment to
name a special envoy for Sri Lanka.
2. (C) The SYG asked for suggestions and inquired what the
special envoy should attempt to accomplish. Ambassador Rice
put forward a couple of names for consideration for the
special envoy post: Lakhdar Brahimi and Vijay Nambiar. She
told the SYG that she would forward the USG views on the
special envoy position. The following points were then
forwarded to Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
John Homes that same day (April 10) in a non-paper: a) a
special envoy would be most effective during a humanitarian
pause and therefore would need to go immediately, b) the
envoy would ensure, and be able to report on, the proper
treatment of displaced persons, c) the envoy would go into
the "safe zone" and speak directly with Tamil Tiger leader
Prabhakaran to negotiate the release of civilians, d) the
envoy would work out arrangements that provide a dignified
end to the fighting to include the LTTE giving up arms to an
international body, amnesty and reintegration for most LTTE
cadres, and efforts to conv
ince the GSL leadership to seek an alternative to military
actions against the safe zone, and e) the envoy could begin
to establish the post-conflict political framework between
the two sides.
3. (C) U/SGY Holmes sent the following reply to the non-paper
by e-mail on April 10: "We (UN) will reflect further but my
views remain the same for now: this is more likely to confuse
and distract than help at this moment. The chances of the
GSL accepting such a role are very low, and the same probably
applies to the LTTE, though that is much harder to know."
4. (C) Comment: Given Ban's noncommittal reply and Holmes'
opposition, it is unlikely the UN will appoint a special
envoy, at least for now.
Rice
Rice
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/RHS, SCA AND PRM, USAID FOR DCHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: CE EAID PHUM PREF PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE SPEAKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
SRI LANKA
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, reason 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
1. (C) Ambassador Rice spoke with UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon via telephone on April 10 to urge the appointment of
a special envoy for Sri Lanka given the growing risks to
civilians caught between the government of Sri Lanka's (GSL)
military forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
(LTTE) in the "no-fire zone". The SYG noted that he was open
to the idea of a special envoy and that this matter was under
consideration at the UN. However, he made no commitment to
name a special envoy for Sri Lanka.
2. (C) The SYG asked for suggestions and inquired what the
special envoy should attempt to accomplish. Ambassador Rice
put forward a couple of names for consideration for the
special envoy post: Lakhdar Brahimi and Vijay Nambiar. She
told the SYG that she would forward the USG views on the
special envoy position. The following points were then
forwarded to Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
John Homes that same day (April 10) in a non-paper: a) a
special envoy would be most effective during a humanitarian
pause and therefore would need to go immediately, b) the
envoy would ensure, and be able to report on, the proper
treatment of displaced persons, c) the envoy would go into
the "safe zone" and speak directly with Tamil Tiger leader
Prabhakaran to negotiate the release of civilians, d) the
envoy would work out arrangements that provide a dignified
end to the fighting to include the LTTE giving up arms to an
international body, amnesty and reintegration for most LTTE
cadres, and efforts to conv
ince the GSL leadership to seek an alternative to military
actions against the safe zone, and e) the envoy could begin
to establish the post-conflict political framework between
the two sides.
3. (C) U/SGY Holmes sent the following reply to the non-paper
by e-mail on April 10: "We (UN) will reflect further but my
views remain the same for now: this is more likely to confuse
and distract than help at this moment. The chances of the
GSL accepting such a role are very low, and the same probably
applies to the LTTE, though that is much harder to know."
4. (C) Comment: Given Ban's noncommittal reply and Holmes'
opposition, it is unlikely the UN will appoint a special
envoy, at least for now.
Rice
Rice