DPRK: SECURITY COUNCIL, KEY PLAYERS RESPOND TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000355 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2019 TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM ETTC MCAP KN SUBJECT: DPRK: SECURITY COUNCIL, KEY PLAYERS RESPOND TO DPRK LAUNCH Classified By: Amb. Susan Rice for Reasons 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 5 bilateral meeting, Amb. Rice told Japanese Perm Rep Takasu that in response to the recent Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) missile launch the United States will seek a Security Council resolution that includes real consequences for the DPRK's actions. She noted the United States would be in the lead on the UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR),but would highlight U.S.-Japan collaboration. According to Takasu, Japan's bottom line is to secure a UNSCR; Rice responded by emphasizing the U.S. priority that any Council response "have teeth." In a separate meeting with Chinese Perm Rep Zhang, Rice also emphasized the need for consequences, although Zhang believed a Council press statement, not a UNSCR, was the appropriate response. The Security Council then met in emergency closed consultations to discuss the launch. The majority of Council members agreed that the launch constituted a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1718's ban on such ballistic missile-related activity, with the P-3, Japan, Austria, Turkey, Costa Rica, Mexico and Burkina Faso supporting a firm Council response. Libya invoked the DPRK's right to the peaceful exploration of space, while Vietnam and Uganda were non-committal. China called the event an "experimental communications satellite launch" and urged a proportionate and "restrained" response, preferably a press statement. Russia said it wanted to see more technical data before drawing conclusions. All delegations raised the Six Party process, with some arguing that a strong Council reaction could drive DPRK away from the process while others believed a firm Council response was key to preserving its viability. Rice urged the Council to act in a firm, swift and united manner, stressing that a failure to respond would not only undermine the Six Party process but also challenge the credibility of the Council and its resolutions. She proposed the Council respond with a UNSCR to enhance implementation of previously-imposed sanctions. At the close of the session, Council members agreed that Mexico, as Council President, would deliver a brief press statement reflecting the discussion and noting the Council will continue negotiations on a response. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: In a meeting among the P-5 and Japan just after the Council consultations, the United States distributed a draft UNSCR that would condemn the launch, add new technical goods to be prohibited under UNSCR 1718 and designate entities determined to be involved in the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Japan and the P-3 supported this approach. Chinese Perm Rep Zhang, asserted that strong Council action would undermine the Six Party Talks and circulated points for a Council press statement. Rice and the Japanese Perm Rep emphasized that a firm Council response was essential to preserving the confidence needed to implement commitments in the Six Party Talks. The Russian charge said the U.S. approach actually constituted "new sanctions" and was unacceptable. The group agreed to meet the following day to review responses from capitals. END SUMMARY. JAPANESE: A UNSCR IS OUR BOTTOM LINE -------------- ¶3. (C) Japanese Perm Yukio Takasu asked to meet with Amb. Rice on April 5 and just prior to the emergency Security Council consultations on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) missile launch. Takasu praised President Obama's firm statements in response to the launch. Rice noted that the United States would have the lead on a draft UNSCR to respond to the incident, but that we would be sure to highlight U.S.-Japan collaboration in the product and consult closely. Citing domestic political sensitivities, Takasu asked that the resolution be seen as a joint product "not just in appearance, but in substance." ¶4. (C) Rice stressed that, like Japan, the United States also wants a UNSCR, but that the U.S. priority is to ensure that there be tangible consequences for the DPRK's actions. A toothless resolution, she said, would not be acceptable, particularly in light of the President's remarks on April 5. Takasu explained that Japan's "bottom line" was to achieve a resolution. Rice also warned Takasu against raising public expectations about the final product. ¶5. (C) Takasu asked that the draft UNSCR's two annexes -- one describing technical goods to be prohibited and another listing entities to be designated --- not be shared with Russia and China at a P-5 plus Japan meeting later in the day. He explained that Japan preferred the addition of three entities to the list of eleven entities currently in Annex II. Japan, he explained, has designated these additional three for domestic sanctions and there would be domestic problems if the UN list did not match Japan's domestic list. Reiterating the U.S. insistence on consequences for the DPRK's action, Rice insisted that we needed to share the annexes in order to demonstrate our seriousness. (NOTE: Takasu later agreed to circulate the original annex with a notation saying "Others to be designated." He also asked that the United States consider on a high-priority basis U.S. support for the additional three entities and also pledged to seek from Tokyo further guidance on this matter. END NOTE.) CHINA: STILL SEEKING A PRESS STATEMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) In another bilateral meeting prior to the Council's session, Rice told Chinese Perm Rep Zhang that the United States considers the DPRK's April 4 missile launch a clear violation of UNSCR 1718. She reiterated both President Obama and Secretary Clinton's desire to get a "resolution with teeth" in the Council. Rice told Zhang that the United States would convene a meeting of the P-5 Japan after the emergency Council session to discuss draft elements of the U.S. resolution. Zhang sought clarification regarding the Secretary's conversation with his minister. He asked whether her intent was to convey that we wanted a UNSCR, as the Chinese minister heard the word "statement" at some point in the conversation and assumed that the United States would settle for a Presidential Statement (PRST). Rice underscored that the United States wanted a UNSCR with consequences for the DPRK. ¶7. (C) Zhang explained China's preference for a press statement instead of a UNSCR, adding that there was a "long way to go" before finding a compromise between our two positions. Zhang said that if the United States were to table elements for a UNSCR, then China would have to table elements for a Presidential Statement (PRST). Zhang stressed the need for the Council to strike the right balance between an appropriate response in the Council and leverage to keep the door open for continued DPRK engagement. He emphasized that a strong Council response could destabilize Six Party talks, causing the DPRK to walk away. Zhang also voiced concern that any draft statement should be close hold until there was consensus among the group. Rice countered that a strong Council response would buttress Six Party efforts, sending a clear message that DPRK cannot violate international laws with impunity. A weak response could also alienate Japan and South Korea, she added. Rice said the United States had already compro mised on its original position by foregoing additional sanctions. She agreed that any Council product should remain close hold until the group reached consensus, but reiterated that meaningful action is required or process is rendered ineffective. COUNCIL LEANS TOWARD U.S. POSITION -------------- ¶8. (C) On April 5 and at the request of Japan, the Security Council met in closed consultations to discuss the DPRK missile launch. Takasu strongly condemned the launch, stating that it violated UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1695. He urged the Council to react with a new UNSCR, noting that the credibility of the Council was stake as well as the integrity of UNSCR 1718. Takasu said that Japan had "carefully examined" the possible effects a strong Council reaction might have on Six Party talks, but maintained that the best response is a "clear and firm" one. ¶9. (C) Rice said that regardless of the stated purpose of the launch, it was a violation of UNSCR 1718 and provided the DPRK with important technical data for that country's ballistic missile program. She stressed the U.S. concern that the DPRK was further developing its delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. She pressed Council members to react in a firm, swift and united manner and adopt a new Council resolution condemning the launch, demanding compliance to UNSCR 1718 and taking additional steps to enhance implementation of previously-imposed sanctions, including the designation of additional technical goods and entities related to the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Rice called on all Six Parties to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and stated the U.S. intention to work collectively and effectively with Council members on the issue. She cautioned the Council against standing idle while the DPRK clearly violates UNSCRs and international law. ¶10. (C) Chinese Perm Rep Zhang characterized the missile launch as an "experimental communication satellite" and noted that the DPRK prepared for the launch in accordance with international standards. He called into question whether the launch constituted a violation of UNSCR 1718. Zhang claimed that China, a close neighbor, is committed to regional stability and cautioned that a strong Council response could destabilize the region as well as the Six Party process. Zhang pressed the Council to react in a "prudent and restrained" manner, proposing a press statement as the best way forward. Russian Deputy Perm Rep Scherbak said Russia's final position would depend on what happened, adding that Russia was still verifying the parameters of the launch. With regard to Council action, Scherbak opined that the Council should be unified on the way forward and Russia is prepared for further consultations. ¶11. (C) France, the UK, Austria and Croatia aligned themselves with the joint U.S.-EU statement condemning the missile launch as a violation of UNSCR 1718, calling on the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and pressing for a resolution in the Council. French Perm Rep Ripert agreed on the need for quick, unified action in the Council. Austrian Deputy Perm Rep Ebner noted the importance of the Six Party process in achieving peace and security in the region. Turkish Perm Rep Ilkin and Croatian Perm Rep Jurica agreed that the launch constituted a violation and supported a consensus Council resolution. Ilkin called for all Six Party members to "return to talks." UK Deputy Perm Rep Pierce strongly condemned the launch, noting that the action should also be viewed in a wider proliferation context. Pierce said that a robust response from the Council is imperative and the DPRK must respect international norms, international law and engage constructively in Six Party talks, but declined to call specifically for a UNSCR. ¶12. (C) Costa Rican Perm Rep Urbina and Burkina Faso Perm Rep Kafando agreed the launch constituted a violation of UNSCR ¶1718. Both stressed the importance of the Six Party process and, in calling for a Council response to the launch, emphasized the need to reinvigorate dialogue. Vietnamese Perm Rep Le stressed the importance of the Six Party process and called on all parties to exercise "maximum restraint." Regarding a Council response, Le said Vietnam was still collecting data on the launch. Ugandan Perm Rep Butagira also called for restraint and said Uganda is prepared to embrace an outcome that supports Council unity. ¶13. (C) Libyan Deputy Perm Rep Dabbashi claimed the launch was not "as dangerous as people think," adding that Libya believes all states have the right, without exception, to develop capabilities in the peaceful use of outer space. Dabbashi said a new resolution would not build confidence or create a climate conducive to resolving the issue and supported the Chinese proposal for a press statement. Mexican Perm Rep Heller recognized the rights of all state to the peaceful use of outer space, but like several other delegations, noted that the DPRK was developing its missile program "to non-peaceful ends." Heller called on the DPRK to comply with the provisions of Council resolutions and return to Six Party talks. He agreed that the Council should respond swiftly and firmly. ¶14. (C) The Council had an extended and difficult discussion regarding how the Council President (Mexican Perm Rep Heller) should characterize the day's discussions. Russia and China resisted Council efforts to refer to "concern" about the launch, pushing instead for a dry procedural readout of the day's meeting. The Council eventually found an agreeable formula that said the Council addressed the concerns arising from the launch. U.S. SHARES TEXT WITH P-5 JAPAN -------------- ¶15. (C) In a P5 Japan meeting immediately following the Council consultations, Rice highlighted President Obama's call for the Council to react swiftly and forcefully to this event. Furthermore, she said, the DPRK must be punished for its clear violation of UNSCR 1718. Rice noted the U.S. preference for a new sanctions regime, but said that in the interest of getting something done quickly, the United States is willing to work within the framework of 1718 and enhance the implementation of sanctions previously imposed in that resolution. She distributed draft elements of a resolution that would condemn the launch, add new technical goods to be prohibited under UNSCR 1718, designate entities determined to be involved in the DPRK's ballistic missile program and support the Six Party Talks. ¶16. (C) Japanese Perm Rep Takasu said the DPRK's launch affects Japan's security and was in clear defiance of the Council. He added that it was also in clear defiance of numerous bilateral requests to the DPRK discouraging the launch. The UK and France agreed, reiterated the need for a strong reaction by the Council and expressed general agreement with the elements of the proposed UNSCR. ¶17. (C) Zhang said the Council response must be "cautious and proportionate." He justified this approach because 1) it follows the precedent of Council action after the DPRK's 1998 missile launch, 2) it makes a distinction between this recent launch of a "satellite" and the more serious events -- missile launch and nuclear test -- in 2006, and 3) a resolution would likely mean the end of the Six Party Talks. Zhang distributed draft elements for such a product that would express Council "concern," urge the DPRK to comply fully with 1718, call on all countries in the region and the Security Council to work to resolve this issue peacefully, and reiterate the importance of the Six Party Talks. In addition, he said, the idea of adding annexes to a draft resolution would make this process go much slower. ¶18. (C) Russian charge Scherbak, largely quiet during the meeting, said Russia's "mindset is close to China's." Russia's absolute priority, he said, is not to jeopardize the Six Party Talks. Scherbak called for a compromise to ensure the unity of the Security Council, but added that the U.S. proposed approach indeed does constitute new sanctions and is not acceptable. ¶19. (C) The United States, UK and France rebutted China's points questioning the necessity of a UNSCR. Rice noted that the international legal and political environment is quite different now compared to 1998 and that UNSCR 1718, a Chapter VII resolution, expressly prohibits what the DPRK did. The Council, argued Rice, cannot return to the status quo ante. In addition, she noted that the United States shares the goal of the Six Party Talks to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Rice emphasized that responding in a minimalist way would greatly weaken the credibility and viability of the Six Party Talks. UK Deputy Perm Rep Pierce noted that in the past, every strong Council reaction has produced positive DPRK behavior, while weaker Council reactions have encouraged the DPRK to continue to respond in irrational ways. Perm Rep Ripert of France said the P-5 have a special obligation regarding nonproliferation, and emphasized that the launch used ballistic missile tec hnology, which is expressly prohibited under UNSCR 1718. ¶20. (C) Rice concluded the discussion by calling for Perm Rep-level discussions on Monday April 6 at 3:00 p.m. Although Zhang initially proposed a lower-level meeting, he agreed to consult with Beijing and aimed to return with an official reaction to the draft elements. The Perm Reps also agreed not to disclose details of the meeting to the press. In a sidebar conversation following the meeting, Zhang suggested to Takasu and Rice that the addition of the two annexes was the most problematic element for China. The Russian charge suggested privately that the Secretary should call FM Lavrov on the matter. Rice