AMBASSADOR RICE'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000283 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH FRANCES DENG, UN SPECIAL ADVISER FOR THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE ¶1. Summary: Ambassador Rice met with Francis Deng, the UN's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on March 16 to discuss current activities of his office and priorities for the future. Deng explained his efforts to engage three important constituencies on the work of his office in order to build support for genocide prevention: member states, colleagues in the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). He stressed the need for stronger ties with the Security Council in order to boost the effectiveness of his office despite reluctance on the part of the Russians and Chinese. He remarked that sovereignty can no longer be seen as a protection against outside interference, but as a responsibility of the state towards the welfare of its own citizens. On the question of peace versus justice, Deng's position has shifted to favor the need for accountability for those who commit egregious crimes. Ambassador Rice expressed her disappointment in the leaders of Africa who too often pursue their own interests rather than protecting the welfare of Africans. She pressed Deng to publicly acknowledge that the government of Sudan's decision to expel humanitarian NGOs amounts to genocide by other means. End summary. ¶2. Deng opened the meeting by stating that his mandate as the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) is impossible, but must be made possible. He views the work of his office as the catalyst for a larger process within the UN to prevent genocide from occurring. In his role as the SAPG, Deng must engage three main constituencies: a) governments of member states, b) colleagues within the UN system, and c) NGOs. Many member states see the concept of genocide prevention and the related framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as tools for the world's great powers to interfere in internal matters of weaker states. Deng must allay their fears to generate support for the work of his office. The UN system must be convinced that a number of its constituent parts have a role to play in early warning and prevention of genocide. NGOs push Deng's office to adopt a strategy of "name and shame" and have doubts about the effectiveness of his mandate due to weak linkages with the Security Council. ¶3. As a priority for his office, Deng seeks greater interaction with the Security Council. He does not want to push himself on the Council as he knows that his mandate remains sensitive to some members including Russia and China. Some Council members and many member states remain wary of the principle of sovereignty as responsibility that Deng promotes. They prefer to view sovereignty as protection from outside domination or interference while Deng promotes the vision that sovereignty implies a responsibility to safeguard the welfare of a country's citizens. ¶4. Deng told Ambassador Rice that he seeks P-5 support to allow his mandate to become more effective through a stronger connection with the Security Council. At the moment, he does not push to be allowed to brief the Council unless he knows that he will get a positive response. He worries that his office will be weakened if he asks to be able to report to the Council and is rejected. If the US and other Council members make a habit of requesting briefings from the office of the SAPG, he believes that he will have more credibility within the UN system and beyond. ¶5. On the topic of peace versus justice, Deng started out firmly in the camp that believes that peace must take precedence over justice for the victims of atrocities, especially given the African cultural preference for peace and reconciliation. However, Deng's views have shifted and he now asserts that justice must be given priority. Leaders who are responsible for crimes against their own people must be held accountable. ¶6. On Sudan, Deng expressed dismay at the violence that has wracked his country for decades. He lamented the confrontational approach adopted by the government of Sudan in response to the ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir when the country would have been better off cooperating with the international community to cement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and find a political solution to the conflict in Darfur. ¶7. Ambassador Rice challenged Deng on the dismal response of African leaders to the crisis in Sudan. She described many African leaders as being more interested in their narrow self-interests rather than the good of the people of Sudan. She noted that the SPLM had not played a constructive role in seeking security and justice for the people of Darfur, and that the SPLM remained conspicuously silent when the government of Sudan announced the expulsion of international humanitarian NGOs from the country. Deng replied that the weak African response sprang from a feeling that the ICC targets African nations. Ambassador Rice reminded Deng that African nations helped to create the ICC and that Uganda and the DRC had initiated ICC proceedings in their own countries. The Security Council became involved in Africa only in the case of Sudan. ¶8. Deng remarked that he had drafted a mild statement in response to the Sudanese government's action to expel aid agencies, but that it was stuck in the office of the Secretary General where a quiet, low-key approach is favored when dealing with this matter. Ambassador Rice noted that she had gone on record as labeling the Sudanese expulsion of humanitarian agencies and the resulting closure of aid programs "genocide by other means". She expressed the hope that Deng or the UN could make a similarly strong statement. ¶9. On Sri Lanka, Deng spoke of conversations that he had with that country's permanent representative to the United Nations. The Sri Lankan perm rep told Deng that his country's actions in mounting an offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elan (LTTE) in the north of Sri Lanka were known to its friends the United States and India. The Sri Lankan representative left the impression that his government's measures against the LTTE are supported by the US and India. A visit to Sri Lanka left Deng impressed with the great cleavages between the Sinhalese and Tamils that would not be solved by the government's victory on the battlefield. ¶10. Deng touched briefly on R2P and noted that the Secretary General wants close cooperation between the office of the SAPG and Ed Luck who is heading up the UN approach on R2P. The mechanism for cooperation remains to be determined, but Deng expects to operate out of joint offices with Luck. Rice