AMBASSADOR RICE AND UN DPKO USG LE ROY DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000202 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM UNSC CG IN SU XA AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE AND UN DPKO USG LE ROY DISCUSS INDIA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM MONUC, SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, REFORM Classified By: U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: UN Peacekeeping USG Le Roy told Ambassador Rice on February 26 that India planned to withdraw its troops from MONUC. He asked for U.S. assistance in encouraging DRC President Kabila to support Indian troops, to help avert India's departure. Le Roy said Rwandan troops could return to DRC for additional operations against the FDLR if needed. On Sudan, Le Roy did not expect violence against UN interests following the expected ICC announcement. He agreed to Ambassador Rice's request for a briefing on the recent fighting in southern Sudan. Regarding Afghanistan, Le Roy called for greater coordination among donors and with the UN, and he and Rice brainstormed on ways to keep President Karzai from calling early, illegitimate, elections. Le Roy also shared general thoughts on ways to improve UN peacekeeping. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (U) Ambassador Rice held an introductory meeting with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) U/SYG Alain LeRoy on February 26. Le Roy was joined by DPKO Military Advisor Lt. General Chika Dbia Isaac Obiakor, DPKO Asia/Middle East Division Director Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, and Special Assistant David Haeri. U.S. participants included Ambassador DiCarlo, senior advisor, and poloff. -------------- DRC/MONUC -------------- INDIA TELLS UN IT WILL WITHDRAW ALL ITS TROOPS ¶4. (C) U/SYG Le Roy told Ambassador Rice that India had informed DPKO through a note verbale on February 20 that it intended to withdraw all its troops and assets from MONUC. Le Roy said India had asked DRC President Kabila to publicly support India's troops, which Kabila had refused to do. India therefore decided to withdraw. India assured DPKO its withdrawal would be gradual, but Le Roy noted MONUC would lose eventually most of its air assets and one fourth of its troops if India departs. Le Roy said UNSYG Ban is pressuring Kabila during his February 28 visit to the DRC to praise the Indian troops. Ban will also meet with Indian troops in the DRC and will send Indian Prime Minister Singh a letter urging India to remain in MONUC. Le Roy confirmed India was being treated badly by Kabila. He noted that the Indian PermRep told him India did not need the money from peacekeeping operations, and Le Roy thought this could indicate India will be less interested contributing to future UN peacekeeping operations. ¶5. (C) Le Roy stressed DPKO was very concerned about the potential loss of MONUC resources. He requested the U.S. pressure President Kabila to express confidence in Indian troops to keep India from withdrawing from MONUC. Le Roy gave assurances he would notify the U.S. the results of Ban's efforts. ¶6. (C) ACTION REQUEST: USUN suggests Department consider approaching DRC leaders to urge their public support for Indian troops serving with MONUC. RWANDAN TROOPS IN DRC LEAVING NOW MAY LEAVE DOOR OPEN FOR THEIR RETURN ¶7. (C) Le Roy said the recent joint DRC/Rwandan operation against the FDLR was only partially successful, but he thought it a welcome surprise to see the DRC/Rwanda bilateral relationship improve so dramatically in such a short period of time. He commented that the Rwandan troops behaved very well, utilized good planning, and were disciplined. In response to Ambassador Rice's question on the potential for Rwandan troops to return to the DRC, Le Roy said Kabila stood to gain strong leverage with the DRC parliament (which voiced opposition to the joint operation due, inter alia, to previous lengthy Rwandan incursions in eastern DRC),if Rwandan troops did actually leave now. ¶8. (C) On the additional 3,000 troops approved for MONUC in November under SCR 1843, Le Roy said the troops would include one Bangladeshi battalion and one Egyptian battalion and the two special forces companies would come from Egypt and/or Jordan. -------------- SUDAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Le Roy reported he did not anticipate attacks against the UN in response to the expected ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir. He thought Sudan would not grant visas for P-3 members, and Ambassador Rice confirmed U.S. military advisors had already been denied visas. Le Roy feared human rights workers would be forced out of Sudan. Ambassador Rice confirmed the U.S. does not support an Article 16 deferral for Bashir, and counted only six or seven Council members (including Russia, China, Libya, Viet Nam, Burkina Faso, and Uganda) that we believed would support a deferral. ¶10. (C) Le Roy was concerned Chadian and rebel forces were gathering on the Chad-Sudan border, saying he thought Chad could use the ICC announcement in an attempt to gain terrain and power, while Sudan could be sending rebels to Chad to detract attention from any arrest warrant. ¶11. (SBU) Le Roy affirmed DPKO would conduct a Council briefing on the recent fighting in Malakal in southern Sudan in response to Ambassador Rice's request. -------------- AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C) Ambassador Rice, in response to Le Roy's question on when to expect the results of the U.S. policy review on Afghanistan, said it would be completed by the end of March, before the NATO summit. Le Roy said there was no need to change UNAMA's mandate. He noted there was much confusion regarding donor efforts, both among donors and between the donors and the UN. The UN had difficulty understanding where donor funds were going, and there was a lack of communication amongst all parties. Le Roy said the imbalance in PRT support needed to be addressed, as most development money was sent to the southern PRTs. -------------- PEACEKEEPING REFORM -------------- ¶13. (C) Ambassador Rice solicited Le Roy's views on Peacekeeping Reform. Le Roy said there were three issues to address: (1) the gap between demand and supply for peacekeeping; (2) the effectiveness of current peacekeepers; and (3) alternatives to UN peacekeeping (such as AU and EU forces) since the UN was currently at its "outer limits" of ability. Rice