JAPAN WANTS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IF DPRK

S E C R E T USUN NEW YORK 000191 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC PINR KN XB SU XA SUBJECT: JAPAN WANTS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IF DPRK LAUNCHES; THINKS RESPONSE TO BASHIR ICC ARREST WARRANT WILL BE CALM Classified By: UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (S) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY. Ambassador Rice shared U.S. concerns regarding a potential DPRK missile launch with Japanese PermRep Takasu on February 26, and asked for Japan's support in publicly calling any launch a violation of SCR 1718. Takasu stressed Japan's desire for a Security Council Resolution (SCR) even if weakly worded in the event of a launch, while Ambassador Rice opined that an immediate Presidential Statement could offer a greater opportunity for a strong SCR subsequently. Takasu said Japan would pressure China for support during its Foreign Minister's visit this weekend. On Sudan, Takasu doubted any Council member would press for a resolution authorizing an Article 16 deferral of the expected arrest warrant for President Bashir, since he believed there were not enough votes for it to pass. Takasu reported that Libya will likely want to brief the press as Council president, and would likely ask for a meeting on Sudan for March 6. END SUMMARY. DPRK-IF THEY LAUNCH, JAPAN WANTS A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ¶3. (S) Japanese PermRep Takasu requested a meeting with Ambassador Rice to discuss the DPRK and Sudan on February 26. Ambassador Rice shared with Takasu U.S. concerns with the DPRK's potential missile launch. Rice noted Secretary Clinton had called on each member of the six-party talks to issue a statement defining any new launch, including a space launch, as a violation of SCR 1718. Takasu said Japan was still considering the Secretary's request. He stressed Japan was doing everything it could to discourage the DPRK from any launch and that such a launch would be a direct threat to Japan. Takasu also suggested sanctions against the DPRK previously approved, but not yet implemented, should be implemented now. He confirmed Japan would react quickly to any launch by pushing for a resolution in the Council. ¶4. (S) In the event of a launch, Japan wants a resolution "similar to the one against Iran," (SCR 1835 from September 2008),according to Ambassador Takasu. (Note: SCR 1835 included no new sanctions against Iran. It called on Iran to comply fully with previous resolutions. End Note). Rice argued that a strongly worded Presidential Statement (PRST) would leave the door open to additional measures, whereas a resolution like SCR 1835 could make a future resolution that included sanctions more difficult to get approved. Takasu asserted that in Tokyo there is a "big difference" between a PRST and a SCR. He believed the Security Council would need to be seen as doing something forceful, and China and Russia would not approve additional sanctions now, so this type of resolution could be Japan's best option. Rice reiterated the need to leave open the possibility of a strong resolution, and asked if he believed China would support a weaker resolution now. Takasu thought if China could be convinced such a launch was a violation of SCR 1718, it could support one. ¶5. (S) ACTION REQUEST: USUN seeks Department guidance to share with Japan on their request for support for an initial UNSCR vice PRST, in the event of a launch. JAPAN'S FM HEADING TO CHINA, WILL ASK FOR CHINESE SUPPORT ¶6. (S) Japan's Foreign Minister will visit China from February 28 to March 1 and would encourage China to pressure the DPRK not to launch, Takasu said. Japan was very interested in learning China's position on a resolution. Takasu believed Russia would follow China's lead, and encouraged the U.S. to push for China's support as well. ¶7. (S) Takasu also shared that an unnamed senior DPRK official, a "big communist" with a science and technology background, was currently in China, noting the visit may influence China's interpretation of SCR 1718 regarding this potential launch. SUDAN/BASHIR: JAPAN DOUBTS ANYONE WILL CALL FOR ARTICLE 16 DEFERRAL ¶8. (S) On the likely issuance of an ICC arrest warrant for Sudanese President Bashir, Ambassador Takasu reported from his meetings with other Security Council members that he did not believe China, Russia, African countries or Libya would push for an Article 16 deferral because they did not have the votes. He said Council members wanted as quiet a response to the announcement as possible, unless the situation on the ground deteriorated. He reported no member was expecting a major reaction to the announcement in Sudan. LIBYA TO PUSH FOR A PRESS STATEMENT ¶9. (S) Takasu said Libya was bound by the African Union (AU) to push for a press statement by the Council President (Libya will be President of the Security Council in March),but believed the Council could avoid any more formal response. Takasu believed the matter could be handled by Libya as president speaking to the press afterward, noting the need for Sudan to cooperate with the UN and UNAMID. COUNCIL MEETING ON SUDAN EXPECTED MARCH 6 ¶10. (S) He noted Libyan Charge Dabasshi said the AU is expected to meet following the March 4 ICC announcement and that the AU would then issue a statement. Takasu expected Libya would get instructions following that meeting to hold closed consultations on Sudan on March 6. No member, according to Takasu, was pushing for a public forum to discuss Sudan. He said Costa Rica wanted to demand publicly that Sudan cooperate with the UN, but Costa Rica realized it had no Council support for its position. ¶11. (S) When asked how the U.S. would react, Ambassador Rice said we would respond in kind. If Libya, African nations, including Sudan, and China respond in a low-key manner, so would we. If they grandstand, we would respond more forcefully, she said. Rice