GEORGIA/RUSSIA: GERMANS PROMOTE REVISED UNOMIG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000018

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/RUSSIA: GERMANS PROMOTE REVISED UNOMIG
MANDATE

REF: USUN 1181

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The German Mission to the UN is advocating a
beefed-up mandate for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) when the current mandate expires on February 15,

2009. Germany hopes Security Council members will corner
Russia into agreeing to extend authorization for a military
observer mission in Abkhazia, but with new responsibilities
including police training, IDP returns and humanitarian
assistance. In a recent meeting with the German DPR,
Ambassador Wolff encouraged the Germans to coordinate their
efforts closely with the UN-OSCE-EU co-chairs of the
Geneva-based talks on Georgia security arrangements. He also
suggested to Ney that another technical rollover of UNOMIG
may prove to be the best way to keep the focus on the Geneva
discussions. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) German Deputy PermRep Martin Ney shared with
Ambassador Wolff on December 23, Germany's "Food for Thought"
non-paper, containing ideas for a revised UNOMIG mandate.
Ambassador Ney advocated three "redlines" for a revised
UNOMIG mandate: a UN mission would need to be deployed on
both sides of the boundary between Georgia and Abkhazia; the
revised mission (including the name of the mission) would
need to avoid suggesting a new status for Abkhazia; and it
would need to be a "substantial" mission rather than another
technical extension of the current mission. Clarifying the
third point, Ney suggested there should continue to be a
security mechanism similar to the current observer mission,
in order to ensure stability. Ney suggested the observers
could patrol the same zone as the current UNOMIG mission does
(as defined by the now-defunct Moscow Agreement),thereby
avoiding a protracted negotiation over the observer's new
zone of responsibility. He also suggested a new civilian or
police component could be established that would engage in
police training, and that the mission should leverage other
UN agencies to assist in the return of IDPs and the provision
of humanitarian services.


3. (C) Ney believes the "Western Friends" (France, Germany,
the U.K. and U.S.) need to come to a shared understanding
soon on what sort of UN mission we would like to see in
Abkhazia, since the current UNOMIG mandate will expire on
February 15. To that end, Ney said Germany had proposed
Caucasus Directors from Western Friends' capitals meet in
Berlin on January 12 to reach agreement on the elements of a
new mandate. Germany would then present the Western Friends
proposal to Russia. Ney said he believes Moscow has an
interest in working out a sensible "modus vivendi" with the
West that would allow for orderly life and more local
development in Abkhazia. He thought a unified stance from
the Western Friends would convince Russia that "they cannot
win on the status issue" in the Security Council, and could
also force Moscow to accept an observer mission on both sides
of the boundary between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. German
PermRep Mattusek had floated with Russian Permrep Churkin the
idea of a "substantial resolution" in February, and Churkin
"was not totally opposed," Ney said. The Germans have also
talked to French and U.K. PermReps, who were considering the
ideas. In parallel to the Berlin meeting, Ney suggested that
the New York-based Ambassadors of the Western Friends should
develop a plan for pursuing the new SC resolution.


4. (C) Wolff asked whether the Germans had coordinated their
thinking with the EU, OSCE, and UN Geneva co-chairs. Ney did
not know, but said he thought Berlin had not engaged in
detailed discussions with the co-chairs. The German Mission
in New York had shared the Food for Thought paper with UN
SRSG Johan Verbeke in early December. Wolff also noted that
Germany's non-paper only addressed the UN mandate in Abkhazia
and wondered whether South Ossetia needed to be part of the
discussion, given Russia's decision to prevent consensus on
extension of the OSCE mandate in South Ossetia, and since
ignoring South Ossetia could grant indirect legitimacy to the
status quo there. Wolff also agreed it is important to
determine what sort of mandate we want and to utilize the
upcoming UNOMIG renewal process to help us get there. He
thought it would be valuable for the New York-based
Ambassadors of the "Western Friends" to meet in advance of a
Berlin meeting to lay the groundwork for discussions.


5. (C) Considering how to proceed on a new resolution, Wolff
suggested we would need to determine whether a new UN mandate
is worth the potential price we could pay. Russia will
likely try to force the West to negotiate directly with
Abkhaz authorities, he said, which could implicitly confer on
them a new status. We would need to determine to what extent
the Abkhaz want a continued UN presence in Abkhazia, since
the Abkhaz position would influence the Russian position.

USUN NEW Y 00000018 002 OF 002


Wolff suggested we should consider another technical rollover
for UNOMIG in February, as it might be the best option for
circumventing Russian efforts to push the Security Council
into accepting a new reality for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


6. (C) In a separate conversation with DepPolcouns and
Poloff, Georgian DPR Irakli Chikovani said Georgia would like
a UN presence to continue in Georgia/Abkhazia, but made clear
he believes the current UNOMIG mission is incapable of
fulfilling its mandate. Georgia is hoping to achieve another
3-4 month technical rollover in order to buy more time for
the Geneva-based security talks to make progress on security
arrangements. Chikovani believed that Russia would try to
prevent a technical rollover, or use it as leverage to
extract concessions from the West on the appearance of Abkhaz
de facto authorities in New York for a Security Council
meeting or Arria-format meeting. Chikovani had not considered
whether a UN mandate should cover South Ossetia as well as
Abkhazia. He thought the most important security issue for
Georgia was the Russian occupation of the Akhalgori region of
South Ossetia and the expulsion of ethnic Georgians from the
Region after the end of the August conflict, but had no
suggestion for advancing that item for further Security
Council consideration.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) We may want to pursue another short technical rollover
of UNOMIG when the mandate expires on February 15. This
would give additional time for the Geneva-based security
discussions to make progress on security arrangements and IDP
returns for the conflict areas in both South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. A short delay in revising the UN mandate would also
allow the UN and EU to more closely coordinate consideration
of next steps, since the EU will undertake a review of the
future of its EU Monitoring Mission in late March. We
understand from our Secretariat contacts that Foreign
Minister Lavrov told the Secretary-General in December Russia
would not accept another UNOMIG technical rollover in
February. Instead, Russia would insist on either a redefined
mandate or no mandate at all. This might be a Russian
tactic, as Chikovani suggested, to extract agreement from us
to allow the appearance of the defacto Abkhaz authorities in
New York. If the P3 1 are united in our pursuit of another
technical rollover and clear about our redlines, Russia may
choose not to block Council action. However, should Russia
decide it is willing to take the heat for blocking a
technical rollover, we may need to pursue a resolution for a
revised UN mandate in Georgia. In this regard, the German
initiative to discuss our preferred outcome among may prove
timely.
Khalilzad