Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USUNNEWYORK163
2009-02-20 01:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM 
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0163/01 0510115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200115Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5898
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0313
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3542
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000163 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE
IRAQ COMPACT

Classified By: Ambassador Rice for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000163 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM SUBJECT: GAMBARI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR RICE ON BURMA AND THE IRAQ COMPACT Classified By: Ambassador Rice for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a February 18 meeting with Ambassador Rice, Special Advisor Gambari outlined the main challenges to progress in Burma, including a fundamental division of the international community on the issue. He reviewed his goals for his recent visit and added that for different reasons, neither the regime nor Aung Sun Suu Kyi (ASSK) were comfortable with a visit by Secretary-General Ban. Gambari reviewed the positions of key players in the region, including China, India, Russia and Japan, and stressed the need to provide the SYG tools to engage the regime. Ambassador Rice emphasized that U.S. priorities were the release of all political prisoners, including ASSK, and inclusive dialogue. She cautioned Gambari against squandering the SYG visit without assurances of concrete progress. After the meeting, Gambari's Special Assistant sought U.S. guidance on inviting the Burmese to the upcoming Group of Friends Meeting. On Iraq, Gambari asked for the U.S. to press the Iraqi's to reconsider the timing and venue for the Iraq Compact conference. End Summary. Three Main Challenges in Burma ¶2. (C) Special Advisor Gambari said there were three main challenges in Burma. First, there is no international consensus on the reality on the ground or whether Burma belongs in the Security Council. Gambari said that because the Security Council was fundamentally divided, the Secretary-General had convened the Group of Friends. When the same division crept into the Group of Friends, the good offices mission tried a smaller group, convened by the Indonesians, comprising China, India, Burma and the UN. When the Indonesians tried to elevate the level of discussion in the group, the Indians distanced themselves from the discussion. Unity in the international community is needed to make progress in Burma, Gambari insisted. The second challenge, Gambari noted, was identifying how to engage the Burmese authorities on Gambari's five-point plan. The third was pulling ASSK and the opposition (namely the National League for Democracy (NLD)) into the political process. The Recent Trip to Burma ¶3. (C) Gambari said his goals for his recent visit were to identify the bottom line; to mediate between ASSK and the regime with the objective of nudging them toward di
alogue; and to assess and prepare for the Secretary-General's possible visit to Burma. Gambari said the Burmese were wary of a Ban visit, noting the likelihood of high expectations for concrete results - a price they were unsure they could pay. He added that ASSK also thought Ban should not come until the regime released all political prisoners, including her. Gambari said the junta wanted to proceed with elections with or without the opposition. They also told Gambari that they were ready to dialogue with ASSK. ASSK and the NLD, on the other hand, will not participate in elections and ASSK refuses to dialogue with the regime until she is assured the dialogue will be meaningful. Gambari commented that it was critical to narrow the gap between the regime and ASSK and the opposition on these issues. Gambari stressed that the Secretary-General needed tools to engage the regime, including possible development assistance, which can be coordinated with concrete progress on the political track. In response to Ambassador Rice's inquiry as to why Ban could make a difference, Gambari opined that the regime sees Ban as a fellow Asian who can "get things done." If they could accommodate Ban's wishes, he continued, Ban would be in a position to convince countries that have imposed sanctions, including the United States, to reconsider their policy toward the regime. China, India, Japan and Russia ¶4. (C) Gambari said China was unwilling to engage on Burma, stressing that stability - not human rights or democracy - is its top priority. He said the key to engaging the Chinese is to convince them there will be no long-term stability without democratic reconciliation. India's competition with China for contracts and investment in the Burma complicate its policy, he added. The Indian Government is not true to the will of its people and does not have a consistent policy on the issue. Gambari said Japan believes that excessive pressure will alienate the regime and galvanize Chinese interests in the region. He remarked that Russia is building a nuclear research center and has oil and gas interests in the country. U.S. Perspective USUN NEW Y 00000163 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Ambassador Rice emphasized that Burma is one of the most isolated regimes in the world with an egregious record of human rights violations. The regime must take concrete action, she added, beginning with the release of all political prisoners, including ASSK. Ambassador Rice said that if Ban were to travel to Burma without concrete progress, the UN would squander a very important tool and erode the SYG's credibility. Ban can only visit Burma after there is concrete progress, she stressed, like the release of all political prisoners, including ASSK. Rice told Gambari the good offices mission needed to propose to the regime (and get buy-in on) a package of real pressures and meaningful incentives and overcome what has, up to this point, been an impervious regime. ¶6. (C) After the meeting, Gambari's Special Assistant, Erwan Pouchous, told USUN that the Secretary-General is considering inviting the Burmese to the upcoming Group of Friends meeting, and sought U.S. guidance on the matter. Iraq Compact ¶7. (C) As Special Advisor on the Iraq Compact, Gambari conveyed Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki's intention to hold the next Iraq Compact conference in Baghdad in May. Gambari said he did not think donors would be ready in May and the venue would be problematic. He asked for U.S. support in pressing Iraq to reconsider the timing and venue for the conference. Rice

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