UNSC IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MOVING ON MONCHEGORSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000162 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: PARM IR UNSC MNUC ETTC KNNP SUBJECT: UNSC IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MOVING ON MONCHEGORSK REF: A. USUN 97 ¶B. USUN 103 ¶C. NICOSIA 104 ¶D. NICOSIA 108 ¶E. USUN 75 USUN NEW Y 00000162 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cyprus has submitted a report to the Iran Sanctions Committee detailing the results of a more complete inspection of the M/V Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged vessel found transferring Iranian arms-related materiel in violation of Security Council sanctions on Iran. The letter says Cyprus has decided to store the cargo in Cyprus. USUN proposes working in the Iran Sanctions Committee to draft a reply to this letter that will encourage Cyprus to continue making responsible decisions regarding the final disposition of this cargo. As a first step toward dealing with the violation itself, USUN proposes working in the Committee on draft letters to Iran/Syria requesting an explanation for this violation. Over the next few weeks, USUN envisions more steps in the Iran Sanctions Committee to highlight this sanctions violation, deter future violations and reinforce the credibility of UN sanctions on Iran. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Cyprus sent a letter to the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee ("1737 Committee") on February 12 that included a detailed list of items found on the M/V Monchegorsk, a Cypriot-flagged vessel found transferring Iranian arms-related materiel to Syria in violation of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007). The letter states that Cyprus conducted a more thorough investigation of the ship's cargo and that Cyprus, "having a more precise knowledge on the nature and quantities of the cargo, decided to retain, unload and sore the cargo in Cyprus." The report on the cargo lists items with descriptions indicating clearly that they are "arms-related materiel" and therefore covered under the prohibitions of resolution 1747 (2007). ¶3. (C) USUN has discussed with UK and French counterparts, as well as the chair (Japan) of the Iran Sanctions Committee, next steps in the Committee for dealing with Cyprus, as well as with Iran and Syria, who were the apparent violators of resolution 1747's ban on transfers of arms or arms-related materiel from Iran or the procurement of such items by others. Our goals are to encourage Cyprus to continuing following a responsible course in deciding the final disposition of the off-loaded cargo, and to engage Iran and Syria in a low-key manner to expose this violation of resolution 1747 (2007),deter future violations and reinforce the credibility of Security Council-imposed sanctions on Iran. ¶4. (C) With respect to Cyprus, USUN proposes to work in the Iran Sanctions Committee to draft a reply to Cyprus that would welcome Cyprus' decision to offload the cargo; state more explicitly that this transaction does indeed constitute a violation of Iran sanctions resolutions; and note the Committee's interest in knowing details about the ownership of the cargo. (NOTE: Photographic evidence from previous U.S. Naval inspections of the M/V Monchegorsk suggested that at least some of the cargo may belong to the Defense Industries Organization, an Iranian military entity designated under resolution 1737 (2006). END NOTE.) Japan, with U.S./UK/French input, has already drafted such a letter (sent to Department for review); the Committee could approve such a draft as soon as February 24. ¶5. (C) As a first step to dealing with the actual sanctions violation, USUN proposes to work in the Iran Sanctions Committee to draft letters to Iran and Syria (per ref A). These letters would note the apparent violation of resolution 1747 (2007) and request an explanation and any further details relevant to this transaction. This letter would give Iran and Syria a short deadline -- probably five working days -- to provide a response. U.S./UK/France are working on a draft now (also to Department for review). ¶6. (C) Depending on the responses (or non-responses) received, the United States and our partners would work with the Japanese chair to propose ways the Sanctions Committee can respond to this sanctions violation. Possible options for Committee action include: -- Send a Note Verbale to all Member States notifying them of this violation of resolution 1747 (2006) and urging enhanced vigilance of the carrier involved, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISIL); -- Send follow-up letters to Iran and Syria warning them against committing further violations; USUN NEW Y 00000162 002.2 OF 002 -- Inform other international organizations (e.g., World Customs Organization, International Maritime Organization) of this violation and solicit their thoughts on how they can work to ensure such violations do not occur in the future; -- Refer the matter to the Security Council for its consideration and possible action. ¶7. (C) USUN will consult with Washington before moving forward on any of these initiatives. All our actions in the Iran Sanctions Committee will be low-key and designed not to undermine other U.S. policy priorities regarding Iran. Rice