UNGA: UNSC REFORM - INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000130 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC SUBJECT: UNGA: UNSC REFORM - INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE FEBRUARY 19; PROPOSED U.S. NEXT STEP REF: USUN NEW YORK 69 Classified By: Ambassador Susan E. Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Action request in paragraph ten. ¶2. (C) Summary: The President of the General Assembly will launch intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council expansion in an informal plenary of the General Assembly on February 19, 2009. He will introduce a work plan with a schedule of meetings and "rules of the game" for the negotiations but does not plan to delve into the substance of the issues, according to his staff. No single Security Council expansion proposal currently has sufficient support to garner the necessary two-thirds approval of the membership required for a UN Charter amendment. USUN believes the appropriate U.S. position is not to support any particular configuration of Council expansion but instead voice support for an expansion that enhances the Council's legitimacy and does not diminish its ability to carry out its mandate or its effectiveness and efficiency. End summary. ¶3. (C) The President of the General Assembly (PGA) will launch intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council expansion in an informal plenary session of the General Assembly on February 19, 2009 (reftel). The PGA is also expected to present his work plan for the way forward at that meeting. According to his staff, it will include a schedule of meetings and "rules of the game" for the negotiations but will not delve into the substance of the issues leaving that for member states. We anticipate that a large number of states will then take the floor to speak, and the U.S. should be prepared to make a statement. Given that this is the start of a new chapter on this question -- actual intergovernmental negotiations -- the initial debate may extend into a second day. ¶4. (C) During or at the end of the initial debate, India or a like-minded state may introduce a procedural motion forcing a vote on the rules for the negotiations, i.e., that they should only be based upon UNGA Decision 62/557, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UNGA rules and procedures, and past practice, in order to forestall new rules introduced by the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) bloc, such as an insistence on the concept of a "single undertaking" or consensus being required to adopt any Security Council expansion proposal. (Comment: Given U.S. support for UNGA rules and procedures, we would recommend supporting such a procedural motion. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Since no proposal currently garners the necessary two-thirds support or even the "widest possible political acceptance" as called for in UNGA Decision 62/557, this process is likely to continue moving slowing for quite a while. The recent African Union (AU) Summit did not alter the terms of the Ezulwini Consensus, according to the Egyptian Mission. (Note: The Ezulwini Consensus is a common position adopted by members of the AU in 2005 which calls for two permanent seats with veto rights and five elected seats for African states. End note) Since the AU did not remove the veto requirement from the Ezulwini Consensus, the Group of Four (G-4),cannot count on support from all African states. (Note: The G-4, which seeks six new permanent seats and four additional elected seats, has essentially given up on veto rights for new permanent members. End note.) ¶6. (C) Another option that has been mentioned is an "interim" solution, which is code for an expansion that includes no additional permanent members but longer-term non-permanent members. Both the UK and France have voiced support for such a measure if an expansion involving permanent members cannot garner two-thirds support. ¶7. (C) Given the lack of sufficient support for a single proposal, USUN believes the appropriate U.S. position for the February 19 meeting is to voice support for the broad principles of an expansion that enhance Council legitimacy and do not diminish the Council's ability to carry out its mandate, and meet the challenges of the 21st century, or impede its effectiveness and efficiency. USUN believes we should not support any particular configuration of Council expansion at this time in order to avert either artificially accelerating the reform process or galvanizing opposition to an approach favored by the U.S. If support appears to be growing around a single proposal or group of proposals, we will reassess our position. ¶8. (C) USUN intends during the course of the debate on February 19 to articulate U.S. expectations for intergovernmental negotiations, based upon positions previously articulated by the President, the Secretary, and Ambassador Rice. USUN proposes that the U.S. intervention be based upon the following elements: -- The United States believes that the long-term legitimacy and viability of the UN Security Council depend on it reflecting the world of the 21st century. -- We will make a serious, deliberate effort, consulting with key allies and capitals, to find a way forward that enhances the ability of the Security Council to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of the new century. -- The United States is not linking Security Council reform to other aspects of UN reform. We view both as important and will pursue them in tandem. -- We support expansion of the Security Council in a way that will not diminish its effectiveness and its efficiency. -- At this stage, we have not made a determination about any particular configuration of Security Council expansion. ¶9. (C) Apart from being the most appropriate approach tactically, this general message of support for effective reform does not prejudge or circumscribe the outcome of any eventual Administration policy review on this issue. USUN also understands that such a message delivered early in the proceedings would be welcomed on all sides of this debate at the UN. (Note: According to the PGA's senior advisors and other delegations, there is a perception that the U.S. up to now has been unwilling to seriously consider Security Council expansion. End note.) ¶10. (SBU) Action request: USUN requests Department approval of the elements in paragraph eight by OOB on February 17. End action request. Rice