AMBASSADOR RICE'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000128 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH PAKISTANI PR HAROON Classified By: AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Rice met February 11 with Pakistan PR Abdullah Hussain Haroon. The Pakistani PR gave a lengthy presentation on Pakistan,s fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida, and insisted repeatedly that the only solution to defeating terrorism in the region was for the U.S. to equip the Pakistani army and police with advanced weaponry. Ambassador Rice asked for Pakistan,s cooperation in the abduction case of Amcit and UNHCR employee John Solecki. Haroon asked that the U.S. support the nomination of Peter Galbraith to the three-person UN Commission of Inquiry in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Haroon claimed that Pakistan,s inability to secure its territory stemmed from its economic problems, which were brought upon it by the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. He also blamed unnamed conspirators from outside Pakistan who armed the Taliban and al Qaida with weaponry more advanced than that used by the Pakistani military. Saying "it is not a shame to ask for something you don,t have," Haroon repeatedly insisted that Pakistan was willing to fight terrorism and to close terrorist safe havens if only the U.S. would supply advanced weaponry to the Pakistani military. He added that cooperation along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border would be useful as well. Haroon,s argument, which monopolized virtually all of the introductory meeting with Ambassador Rice, was that Pakistan plays a crucial role in fighting terrorism throughout the world. If Pakistan were to fail, the instability brought on by terrorism would spread to India, China and Russia, said Haroon. Turning to the Mumbai bombings, Haroon said Pakistan would not be so foolish as to plan the attacks. He dismissed as amateurish the Indian dossier collected from the terrorists, and said India and Pakistan must live together. He blamed the U.S. for not forcing this to happen and concluded that Pakistan had suffered the most from terrorism. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Rice raised the abduction of John Solecki, the Amcit head of UNHCR in Quetta. She pressed for Pakistan,s full assistance and effort at the provincial and federal level, as well as for maximum cooperation with the FBI. Haroon replied, "I would like you to succeed." He then noted his close relationship with the head of the Department of Safety and Security, David Veness, and recommended that the U.S. enter into "private negotiations" with the hostage-takers. He intimated that they were Baluch who were trying to make a political statement. ¶4. (C) At the end of the meeting, Haroon asked for U.S. assistance to nominate Peter Galbraith to the Bhutto Commission of Inquiry. Galbraith is well known in Pakistan, said Haroon, and therefore the Commission would be perceived there in a favorable manner. Noting Galbraith,s long friendship with Bhutto, Ambassador Rice asked whether the opposite might be true, and the impartiality of the Commission might be called into question. Haroon said this "could be," but he concluded that Galbraith would be "clear-headed and crisp." Rice