GEORGIA: AMBASSADORS RICE AND DICARLO URGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000127 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: AMBASSADORS RICE AND DICARLO URGE GEORGIANS TO DECLARE VICTORY Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Georgian PermRep Alexander Lomaia expressed appreciation for the extension of UNOMIG, but warned that Georgia might not view another UNOMIG extension as worthwhile in June 2009. He complained that Russia had already begun to spin the draft resolution as a victory. Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo urged Lomaia to look at what was actually achieved in the resolution, and noted also that Western members of the Council held the line on all issues related to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, Rice and DiCarlo pointed out that Russia had acquiesced to another four-month technical rollover that would buy more time for Georgia to achieve its preferred outcome of a more robust UN operation via energized Geneva discussions, and with indirect references to a security zone. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Georgian PermRep Lomaia sought a meeting with Ambassadors Rice and DiCarlo on February 12 to express appreciation for UNOMIG's extension, but disappointment with some elements of the draft resolution agreed upon by the Friends of Georgia (Croatia, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States). He acknowledged the efforts of the United States and other Western Friends to obtain a technical rollover, and of our efforts to support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Council's procedural decisions. At the same time, he said that the combination of an absence of a Georgia reference in the resolution with the inclusion of a reference to a "future UN presence in the region" undermined Georgia's territorial integrity. He was also concerned that language on the August 12, 2008 cease-fire agreement did not include a call on Russia to fulfill its obligations to withdraw its forces to pre-August 8 positions. Lomaia wondered whether a reference to Resolution 1808, which he saw as a signal of the Council's commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity, would fall out of a future resolution, and he pointedly asked how committed the U.S. was to keeping UNOMIG at any price. ¶3. (C) On procedural issues, he acknowledged U.S. efforts to ensure that "The Situation in Georgia" remained the agenda item for the Council's deliberations, but he expressed concern that the informal Program of Work read, "Res 1839". He believed that Russian PermRep Churkin is portraying the draft resolution as a victory for Russia and is using its ambiguities to support the Russian narrative that a new UN mission would reflect "new realities" on the ground after the August conflict. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Rice and DiCarlo both urged Ambassador Lomaia to consider what was actually achieved in the negotiations over extension of the UN mandate, and encouraged Lomaia to counter the Russian version with the facts. Rice emphasized that we had managed to get Russia to agree to another technical rollover of the UN mission, with no concessions on our territorial integrity redlines. Rice said that the U.S. had worked very hard to make sure Russia was not able to change the official agenda from "The Situation in Georgia", and had successfully warded off Russian efforts to get an agreement on a New York appearance by Abkhaz de facto leaders. ¶5. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo added that the word, Georgia, had already fallen out of the previous resolution, but when members of the Council adopt a new resolution, there will be no doubt that the resolution refers to Georgia since the agenda would read, "The Situation in Georgia." DiCarlo also pointed out that the text reinforces the need to respect the August 12 and September 8 agreements as well as the need to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees-- important issues for Georgia. Ambiguities in the text give Western countries just as much room to declare victory as the Russians will have. As an example, DiCarlo said, the reference to paragraph 2(a) of the Moscow Agreement and the SYG's recommendations in his report of February 4 allows us to reinforce our view that Russia is bound by the weapons and personnel limitations in the security zone. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Rice encouraged the Georgians to use the time between now and June 15 to make progress in Geneva. When Lomaia expressed concern about whether the "erosion" of Georgia's position in the text would continue in June, Rice said that Georgia should make sure not to box themselves in by publicly characterizing the resolution as working against their interests, as that would be self-defeating. Rice agreed that we would need to do another assessment in four-months time about whether it is worthwhile to continue the UN presence, but the Geneva talks would play a large role in determining the shape of any future mission. She also said we would have to weigh the costs of keeping the mission against the price we would have to pay to keep it. USUN NEW Y 00000127 002 OF 002 Rice