UN U/SYG PASCOE ON BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001097

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: UN U/SYG PASCOE ON BURMA

REF: SECSTATE 121789

Classified By: Ambassador DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a December 3 meeting with
Under-Secretary-General Pascoe, DAS Marciel conveyed reftel
points, stressing the opportunity for the UN to leverage the
Burmese Generals' desire for having the elections recognized
as "legitimate" and speak out publicly on the need for
dialogue (reftel). UN Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe
responded that the UN has consistently advocated for
inclusive dialogue, with little to no success. Pascoe
commented that he was unsure whether Special Advisor Gambari
could make a final trip before taking up his new role as
Special Representative for the UN Mission in Darfur on 1
January. Pascoe remarked that Secretary-General Ban was
forward-leaning on Burma and would likely replace Gambari
sooner rather than later. He commented that the Burmese
dropped the UN for engagement with the United States, and he
sought recommendations on the best way forward, adding that
the UN needed to do some "soul searching" on its Burma
policy. End Summary.


2. (C) On December 3, DAS Scot Marciel conveyed reftel points
and urged the UN to speak out publicly on the critical need
for dialogue prior to 2010 elections. Marciel stressed that
Burmese leaders are very interested in having upcoming
elections recognized as "legitimate," opening the door for
the UN and the international community to press for inclusive
dialogue as a precondition. Marciel noted that the U.S. has
made clear to the Government of Burma that the only way the
election could be credible is if it were preceded by a
serious dialogue between the government and the
opposition/ethnics that results in agreement on broad
participation in the political process.


3. (C) UN Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe responded that
the UN has been calling for inclusive dialogue all along,
with little to no success. He said the UN would not likely
lend any credibility to elections, unless they could
"withstand the laugh test." Drawing on previous experience
in the region, Pascoe predicted that the generals will hold
elections regardless and "all this will devolve to the next
generation of generals." He agreed with the U.S. approach of
bilateral engagement, but wondered aloud whether the U.S.
would have any success "getting the generals to do anything,"
commenting that the UN has not had success. Pascoe
speculated that up to 90 percent of Burmese leaders hoped
something would change but had no influence with top
leadership. He remarked that engagement at the top levels is
key, noting that it was not clear how much influence
neighboring countries like China and India had over the
country.


4. (C) Pascoe said that Special Advisor Gambari will take up
his new role as Special Representative for the UN Mission in
Darfur on January 1, noting that it was uncertain whether the
Burmese would allow one last trip. He said SYG Ban is
forward-leaning on Burma and will likely name an envoy to
replace Gambari sooner rather than later, but did not offer
potential candidates. Pascoe asked Marciel what role the
U.S. envisions for the UN, commenting that when the U.S.
"made eyes" at the Burmese, the Burmese essentially dropped
their engagement with the UN. Marciel responded that it is
important that the new envoy can talk to the generals, but
equally important that s/he can talk to others -- like ASSK
and the ethnic minorities -- on a regular basis. He added
that that there is no need for the UN to rush to appoint a
new Special Advisor. Pascoe noted that the UN needed to do
some "soul searching" on its Burma policy.


5. (U) This was cleared by EAP DAS Scot Marciel.
RICE