UN U/SYG PASCOE ON BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001097 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: UN U/SYG PASCOE ON BURMA REF: SECSTATE 121789 Classified By: Ambassador DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a December 3 meeting with Under-Secretary-General Pascoe, DAS Marciel conveyed reftel points, stressing the opportunity for the UN to leverage the Burmese Generals' desire for having the elections recognized as "legitimate" and speak out publicly on the need for dialogue (reftel). UN Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe responded that the UN has consistently advocated for inclusive dialogue, with little to no success. Pascoe commented that he was unsure whether Special Advisor Gambari could make a final trip before taking up his new role as Special Representative for the UN Mission in Darfur on 1 January. Pascoe remarked that Secretary-General Ban was forward-leaning on Burma and would likely replace Gambari sooner rather than later. He commented that the Burmese dropped the UN for engagement with the United States, and he sought recommendations on the best way forward, adding that the UN needed to do some "soul searching" on its Burma policy. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On December 3, DAS Scot Marciel conveyed reftel points and urged the UN to speak out publicly on the critical need for dialogue prior to 2010 elections. Marciel stressed that Burmese leaders are very interested in having upcoming elections recognized as "legitimate," opening the door for the UN and the international community to press for inclusive dialogue as a precondition. Marciel noted that the U.S. has made clear to the Government of Burma that the only way the election could be credible is if it were preceded by a serious dialogue between the government and the opposition/ethnics that results in agreement on broad participation in the political process. ¶3. (C) UN Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe responded that the UN has been calling for inclusive dialogue all along, with little to no success. He said the UN would not likely lend any credibility to elections, unless they could "withstand the laugh test." Drawing on previous experience in the region, Pascoe predicted that the generals will hold elections regardless and "all this will devolve to the next generation of generals." He agreed with the U.S. approach of bilateral engagement, but wondered aloud whether the U.S. would have any success "getting the generals to do anything," commenting that the UN has not had success. Pascoe speculated that up to 90 percent of Burmese leaders hoped something would change but had no influence with top leadership. He remarked that engagement at the top levels is key, noting that it was not clear how much influence neighboring countries like China and India had over the country. ¶4. (C) Pascoe said that Special Advisor Gambari will take up his new role as Special Representative for the UN Mission in Darfur on January 1, noting that it was uncertain whether the Burmese would allow one last trip. He said SYG Ban is forward-leaning on Burma and will likely name an envoy to replace Gambari sooner rather than later, but did not offer potential candidates. Pascoe asked Marciel what role the U.S. envisions for the UN, commenting that when the U.S. "made eyes" at the Burmese, the Burmese essentially dropped their engagement with the UN. Marciel responded that it is important that the new envoy can talk to the generals, but equally important that s/he can talk to others -- like ASSK and the ethnic minorities -- on a regular basis. He added that that there is no need for the UN to rush to appoint a new Special Advisor. Pascoe noted that the UN needed to do some "soul searching" on its Burma policy. ¶5. (U) This was cleared by EAP DAS Scot Marciel. RICE