UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001056 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019 TAGS: CD CDG KN PARM PREL UNGA SUBJECT: UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF THE 2009 SESSION ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Changes in the U.S. voting pattern on key resolutions on nuclear disarmament and conventional arms control highlighted the 2009 session of the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee. In place of the ten negative votes it cast in isolation in 2008, this year the United States did not vote in isolation even once, and the United States also reduced its total number of negative votes from 23 to 10. The greater willingness of the U.S. to engage with the sponsors of key resolutions and to take a more positive approach won a lot of positive commentary and should pay dividends in more operational forums. The U.S. changes were particularly noted in the Japanese nuclear disarmament resolution, which the United States co-sponsored this year after voting against since 2001 and which receives a good deal of attention in Japan; the CTBT resolution, which the United States (along with all the other P-5 states) also co-sponsored; and the resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),a UK initiative, which the United Stat es agreed to support in return for agreement that negotiations on the ATT would be undertaken under consensus rules. ¶2. (C) Amid the generally better atmosphere, less positive signs were apparent as well. Pakistan took an obstructionist line in its approach to the resolutions on the CD and on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Both resolutions were so watered down in the process of reaching consensus that they retained significantly less substance as compared to the initial drafts. Pakistani representatives were clearly trying to walk back the progress made in the CD's 2009 session and prevent the early start of FMCT negotiations. ¶3. (C) Another worrying sign was the increasingly hostile tone and number of Arab-Israeli confrontations, certainly exacerbated by the conflicts in the IAEA General Conference, positioning for the upcoming NPT Review Conference, and the lack of progress on Middle East peace. While the outcomes of the two resolutions involving the Middle East ("The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" and a "Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone") did not change, the more pointed rhetoric did not bode well for the future in any of these areas. The dominant corridor discussion after the session focused on the need to concentrate and coordinate the collective efforts of the CD members, including the nonaligned, to improve prospects for a successful RevCon. END SUMMARY Nuclear Issues -------------- ¶4. (U) Except for the attention given to the Arms Trade Treaty, the session of the UNGA First Committee reverted to a concentration on nuclear disarmament and related subjects. President Obama's attention to those issues in speeches in Prague and New York, the resumption of U.S.-Russian negotiations on strategic nuclear reductions, the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation held just prior to the start of the First Committee, the revived hope of an early start to FMCT negotiations, and the impending 2010 NPT Review Conference all contributed to a renewed interest in nuclear issues. In the First Committee that interest was manifested by the attention paid to resolutions on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (introduced by Australia),nuclear disarmament (introduced by Japan),and nuclear disarmament in the NPT context (introduced by the New Agenda Coalition or NAC). On all these and others the big news was the change in U.S. position or engagement with others in light of new U.S. policies. ¶5. (U) Thanks to the change in the U.S. position to support ratification and entry into force of the CTBT; the Administration's willingness to embrace the vision of a world without nuclear weapons; and instructions to the U.S. delegation to seek engagement, rather than isolated statements of positions, the U.S. voting pattern changed dramatically. In place of the ten negative votes it cast in isolation in 2008, this year the United States did not vote in isolation even once, and the United States also reduced its total number of negative votes from 23 to 10. ¶6. (SBU) CTBT: The CTBT resolution became entangled in the issue of the North Korean nuclear program, as the sponsors (in particular, Australia, the lead sponsor this year) did not want to propose a resolution on nuclear testing that did not mention the DPRK's nuclear test earlier in the year. China, however, pressed very hard to water down the reference, and in the end, in order to secure P-5 co-sponsorship for the first time, the resolution was left with merely a reference to the UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK test. ¶7. (U) Japanese Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament: The United USUN NEW Y 00001056 002 OF 003 States had made clear through explanations of vote in previous sessions that it considered the Japanese resolution ("Renewed determination toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons") to be the most balanced and most in line with its positions. Since 2001, however, the United States had voted against this resolution, primarily because of its endorsement of the CTBT. This year, after careful review, the U.S. decided that it could support and even co-sponsor the draft resolution if its call for irreversibility of nuclear disarmament was softened by calling it a "principle of irreversibility." This resolution attracts considerable interest in Japan, and the U.S. co-sponsorship was widely noticed there, with the Japanese press at the UN seeking official commentary on the changed U.S. position form the head of the U.S. Delegation. ¶8. (SBU) New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution on Nuclear Disarmament: The United States considered the NAC resolution, "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments," less balanced than the Japanese resolution and had voted against it for many years. However, because the U.S. could support much of its language and in light of the significance of the NAC countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) in the disarmament/nonproliferation arena, the U.S. engaged the NAC on proposed modifications that would enable the U.S. to vote for the resolution or abstain. ¶9. (SBU) Specifically, in return for a U.S. abstention, the delegation proposed a "softening" of the reference to the "13 Practical Steps" toward nuclear disarmament, which had been agreed at the 2000 RevCon; the inclusion of a reference to FMCT as part of the nuclear disarmament agenda; strengthening of the reference to the need for compliance with NPT obligations; and a revision in the language on NPT universalization. Despite several rounds of consultations, the NAC countries decided they could not accept the U.S. proposals, and the United States, along with four other states, voted "no" on the resolution. In explaining the vote, the U.S. representative regretted that consultations had proved unsuccessful but appreciated their seriousness and committed the United States to remaining in contact with the NAC. For their part most NAC members agreed that consultations should continue. (Comment: It is our understanding that with a little more time, the co-sponsors of the NAC resolution might have been able to coordinate further and reach agreement on many of the U.S. proposals. End Comment) Conventional Weapons -------------- ¶10. (SBU) ATT: The most prominent resolution on the conventional disarmament side dealt with the proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and called for negotiations to take place in 2012 after preparatory committee meetings in 2010 and ¶2011. Intensive high-level contacts between the United States and the UK, the principal supporter of the ATT, resulted in a U.S. decision to support the resolution and the negotiation of an ATT. In return the British agreed that the negotiations would be conducted on the basis of consensus. During the course of the UNFC session, this decision led to a spirited and at times acrimonious debate between some European and other countries which saw consensus as potentially blocking action or resulting in a weak treaty, and others, including major states, China, and Russia, which thought the British were rushing things and that consensus should apply even to the Preparatory Committees. The latter argued that if key arms producers and exporters were not included from the start, they would never join an ATT. After some symbolic changes to meet the concerns of Germany and others, the ATT resolution passed, 153 yes (U.S.) - 1 no (Zimbabwe) - 19 abstentions. The abstentions came from China, India, Pakistan, Russia, a few radical Latin American states, and some of the Arab states, including Egypt. ¶11. (U) SA/LW: Another positive development on conventional weapons was the U.S. turnaround on the resolution entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects." Last year the U.S. was the lone dissenter in the final vote. This year the U.S. delegation was able to persuade lead sponsors South Africa, Colombia and Japan to make minor changes and then build support for those changes among the many co-sponsors, so that the U.S. not only voted with the majority but co-sponsored the resolution. ¶12. (U) Once again, as in recent years - and even despite the greater interest this year in nuclear disarmament -- more countries participated in the "thematic debate" on conventional weapons than in the debates on other subjects. While many of the statements on nuclear weapons sounded as if written by the same "nuclear weapons speech factory," those USUN NEW Y 00001056 003 OF 003 dealing with conventional weapons were frequently based on states' direct experience with the problems created by the illicit trade in such weapons. Conclusions -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The new U.S. approach of greater engagement received widespread praise. For example, at an October 26 informal dinner hosted by the Indians for CD delegates from Geneva, Canadian, Indian, Japanese, and Egyptian representatives spoke in strongly positive terms about the United States, noting that that if one country should be given credit for a new approach and flexibility in First Committee this year, it was the Untied States. All were quite effusive in lauding the more open-minded approach by the U.S. This was not an isolated incident, as many delegates during the First Committee session took positive note of the dramatic changes in the U.S. voting pattern. Representatives from several moderate non-Western states expressed an interest in greater engagement with the United States and aligning their policies more closely with those of the United States. This development could foreshadow more positive outlooks for other multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation forums, including the CD's upcom ing 2010 session, if we are able to get beyond the few -- but serious -- remaining issues described below. ¶14. (C) The 2009 UNFC session was not an unalloyed success. In consultations on the resolutions on the CD and FMCT, Pakistan made clear that it had not changed the position it had taken in Part III (August/September) of the 2009 CD session where it refused to accept the CD work program providing for FMCT negotiations, as it insisted on changes in the resolutions, which watered them down considerably. Pakistan even seemed to be walking back its grudging acceptance in May 2009 of the CD's program of work (CD/1864): it indicated in a First Committee statement that all of the core issues on the CD agenda -- a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances, and nuclear disarmament -- should receive equal treatment (i.e., negotiations) in the CD's 2010 program of work (POW). This approach would be a clear departure from CD/1864, which provided for negotiations only on FMCT, while the CD would engage in "substantive discussions" on the other issues. ¶15. (C) The tenor of discussions on the Middle East focused on the resolutions on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) and on the "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" and was more contentious this year than even in the past. Whether because of the dust up over this question at the IAEA General Conference in September, the impending NPT Review Conference, or the continuing stalemate in the Middle East peace process, the language and extent of Arab and Israeli interventions exhibited more animosity this year than in the recent past. The increased contentiousness, which was first notable in the September 2009 IAEA General Conference, may be limited to the UNFC, but it could well prove a harbinger of difficulties in upcoming multilateral forums, including the NPT Review Conference. ¶16. (C) By a number of measures, the change in U.S. tone succeeded in shifting the subtext in advance of the 2010 NPT RevCon away from a predominant focus on disarmament to one also spotlighting the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT. Pakistan, Iran and the DPRK were clearly isolated on a number of issues, both in substance and style; whether their isolation and the clearly negative high profile generated by their approach in the UNFC will lead to tactical or substantive changes by them or the NAM in general at the 2010 CD and in the NPT RevCon remains unclear. However, corridor discussion after the session focused on the need to concentrate and coordinate the collective efforts of the CD members, including the nonaligned, to improve prospects for a successful NPT RevCon. Wolff