CFE IMPASSE: HOW DID WE GET WHERE WE ARE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000098 SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI NSC FOR HAYES, MCFALL, DAVIDSON, HOVENIER, SHERWOOD-RANDALL OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) JCS, EUCOM, AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG SUBJECT: CFE IMPASSE: HOW DID WE GET WHERE WE ARE? REF: A. WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE 11/19/99 ¶B. 01 USOSCE 01038 ¶C. USOSCE 000095 ¶D. USOSCE 000085 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugh Neighbour for Reason 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary: At the London Summit, Presidents Obama and Medvedev pledged to explore a comprehensive dialogue on strengthening Euro-Atlantic and European security. The CFE agreement has long been considered a "cornerstone" of Euro-Atlantic security, and at Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to the Treaty regime. Regrettably, that won't change the reality: CFE is in a coma, and will likely never recover. The Parallel Actions Package pursued since July 2007 has not yielded the hoped-for breakthrough. The impasse on implementing what the West considers to be Russia's "Istanbul Commitments" of 1999 remains the key stumbling block, compounded now by Russia's suspension of its treaty obligations for 16 months and its occupation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian parts of Georgia. ¶2. (C) As the new Administration reviews its policy options and prepares the way forward on this, as on many other issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship, it may be useful to review how we got where we are today. This message adopts an intentionally contrarian point of view to our conventional policy on CFE. It seeks to review the evolution in the "Istanbul commitments," including how the originally-articulated 1999 U.S. conditions for submitting the agreement on adaptation of CFE (A/CFE) for ratification had changed by 2002. This is not to open a historical debate on what was said 7 to 10 years ago, but rather to show that differences of emphasis and interpretation of the "Istanbul Commitments" -- which are necessary for the current policy options review )- were present from the beginning in Istanbul. To this end, de-linking the submission of A/CFE for ratification procedures from the explicit preconditionality regarding Russian forces in the separatist regions that has characterized the U.S. position for many years may offer one way forward. End Summary. -------------- Early History of CFE -------------- �0A; ¶3. (U) CFE negotiations began in early-1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Treaty entered into force prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As such, the original CFE Treaty was very much a Cold War document. Although revised in 1996 largely to accommodate Russian concerns regarding limitations on Russian ground equipment in the flank, the existing CFE Treaty still retains many outdated provisions, including the structure of groups that previously represented the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. ¶4. (SBU) As NATO accepted new members, they retained their original group affiliation from a CFE perspective, leading to a situation in which all East European (former Warsaw Pact) members of Russia's "group" are now members of NATO. This led to intense negotiations to update the Treaty, culminating in the comprehensive package of revisions to the Treaty which was signed in November 1999 at the Istanbul Summit, which is known as the Agreement on Adaptation, or A/CFE. The A/CFE was the only legally binding instrument adopted in Istanbul, but there was also a package of other political commitments made at the time of signature of A/CFE contained in the Final Act. -------------- -------------- One Explicit Pre-Condition: Meeting the Flank Limits USOSCE 00000098 002 OF 006 -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) When A/CFE was signed in Istanbul in November 1999 along with the other documents, the only stated precondition for U.S. and Allied ratification was for Russia to lower its military equipment in flank regions inside Russia to within adapted Treaty levels. This was made clear by a statement on 19 November 1999 by President Clinton (Ref A),who stated: "I will only submit this Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the flank levels set forth in the adapted Treaty." (Note: The "flank" which President Clinton referred to are northwestern Russia, largely as defined by the Leningrad Military District, and southwestern Russia, largely as defined by the North Caucasus Military District. A/CFE places specific numerical limits on the amount of heavy military equipment Russia can place in these sensitive regions. At the time of Istanbul in 1999, Russian forces exceeded the new limits due to ongoing operations in Chechnya. End note.) ¶6. (C) The President did not mention any other pre-conditions, even though the Istanbul documents included a large number of other bilateral commitments that had separate, future deadlines, including those related to withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. The only pre-condition he announced at Istanbul was that related to flank levels. ¶7. (C) The approach within NATO was similar. In December 1999 meetings of NATO defense ministers and foreign ministers, communiques mentioned weapons in the North Caucasus and then said entry into force "can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States parties with the Treaty's limitations." NATO foreign ministers in May 2000 took a similar approach, saying entry into force "can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment, consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act." Their communique also noted Russia's "pledge to reduce to CFE limits...its forces in the North Caucasus. It is on this basis that Allies will continue to work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force." ¶8. (C) The U.S. approach was later confirmed, inter alia, by U.S. opening remarks at the Second CFE Review Conference in mid-2001 (Ref B). Assistant Secretary of State Avis T. Bohlen stated on 28 May 2001, "We have concerns relating to the commitments from the Istanbul Summit, first and foremost relating to the Russian Federation's equipment reductions to agreed "flank" levels. It will be impossible for the United States and for a number of others around this table to ratify an agreement that is not being complied with in one of its central provisions." Bohlen went on to underline the importance of Russian commitments on military withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova because they would be "critical in convincing our legislatures to move forward with ratification of the adapted Treaty." Although it was debated in the U.S. interagency before the CFE Review Conference, she did not/not list Georgia/Moldova as a precondition for submission for ratification. -------------- -------------- Careful Read of Istanbul Documents Supports This View -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) An interpretation that supports the USG linkage of submission for ratification to Russian equipment in flank regions at A/CFE levels is confirmed by the CFE Final Act USOSCE 00000098 003 OF 006 itself. In its 14th paragraph, the parties undertook "to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures...." This call for ratification was directly linked to the flank, since the paragraph also takes note "in this context" of Russia's commitment "to all obligations under the Treaty, and in particular, to agreed levels of armaments and equipment." ¶10. (C) Strenuous efforts by U.S. and Georgian negotiators at the time to insert comparable language regarding Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova into this paragraph were unsuccessful. Instead, references to the Russia-Georgia and Russia-Moldova commitments were placed in subsequent paragraphs of the Final Act immediately following the above citation, but not linked directly to ratification procedures. -------------- Georgia-Russia Annex to CFE Final Act -------------- ¶11. (C) The CFE Final Act also "welcomes" a joint statement by Georgia and Russia contained in Annex 14 to the Final Act regarding Russian withdrawals from Georgian territory. Russia missed the 1 July 2001 deadline in paragraph 2 of Annex 14 to disband and withdraw "military bases" at Gudauta and Vaziani. Nonetheless, Russia eventually withdrew entirely from Vaziani, Batumi, Akhalkalaki, as well as their repair facilities in Tbilisi, and by late-2007/early-2008, the only remaining issue was Gudauta, a facility almost 100 km from Georgian-controlled territory in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Russia maintained a minimal presence there ) it claimed in order to support its peacekeeping forces operating under a mandate. The best solution seemed to be a "documentary transfer" of the facility from Russia to Georgia, with Russia then getting permission from Georgia to use elements of the facility, which Georgia was prepared at various times to accept, with appropriate transparency measures. -------------- Moldova in Istanbul Summit Declaration -------------- ¶12. (C) The situation regarding Moldova is even more ambiguous. In the Istanbul Summit Declaration, a separate document by Heads of State or Government also adopted in Istanbul, paragraph 19 "welcomes the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002." This text follows immediately after the last sentence of paragraph 18 which takes "note of the positive role of the joint peacekeeping forces in securing stability in the region." Russia argues that its troops in the Transnistria region of Moldova are peacekeepers operating under agreement with Moldova, and in any case, in CFE terms they possess no declared TLE ) only 33 ACV look-alikes according to the latest Russian CSBM data declaration for 2009 ) down from 35 in their last CFE data declaration in 2007. ¶13. (C) The Russians consistently divided the Istanbul Commitments up into those that were CFE-related, i.e., related to treaty obligations on Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE),and those that were not. Consequently they removed or destroyed the declared TLE in Moldova and lowered their holdings in Georgia. The Russians have argued that the Istanbul Commitments were not intended to solve the unresolved conflicts in former-Soviet territory. Once they reached a point when all that was left in Moldova and Georgia was related to peacekeeping (pre-2008 war in the case of Georgia) and protecting the ammunition depot at Colbasna, USOSCE 00000098 004 OF 006 Russia claimed it had done everything required and prudent. -------------- NATO's Position Evolves -------------- ¶14. (C) In fact, after subduing Chechnya and in CFE data as of July 1, 2002, Russia's declared TLE in the flank had been reduced to within A/CFE limits. Thus, Russia expected U.S. and Allied ratification procedures of A/CFE to begin after mid-2002 -- the sole explicit U.S. condition for moving toward ratification having been met. Failure to adhere to NATO expectations regarding other Russian commitments in Istanbul, however, gave pause for concern. In particular, Russia failed to meet deadlines regarding withdrawal of forces from Moldova and Georgia. Although Russia eventually also withdrew all of its forces from Georgian-controlled territory, it maintained what it labeled peacekeeping forces deployed under international agreements in the separatist areas, including a small contingent at Gudauta in Abkhazia. Progress on withdrawing Russian ammunition from Transnistria ground to a halt in mid-2004, and the Orange and Rose Revolutions changed many people's way of looking at former Soviet Republics. Georgia also contributed combat forces in Iraq from 2004 until mid-2008, when Georgia's force in Iraq totaled a full brigade of 3000 troops, winning Tbilisi further support for its position. ¶15. (C) These and other political and strategic realities caused the U.S. and other allies to place added emphasis on the package of political agreements at Istanbul regarding Russian troop withdrawals from Moldova and Georgia. By the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO's position had changed. While welcoming the results of Russia's efforts to reduce forces in the flank to agreed levels, the Allies in Prague urged "swift fulfillment of the outstanding Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova, which will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty." Thus, by the end of 2002, the Russians argue that the original Istanbul pre-conditions for ratification had evolved into additional preconditions. The Georgia/Moldova-related preconditions subsequently became a central part of repeated NATO statements from 2002-2007. The Parallel Actions Package proposed by the U.S. and NATO in mid-2007 to resolve the resulting CFE impasse sought to find a way forward to meet these demands. -------------- -------------- Facing Lose-Lose Scenario: Time to Review Policy? -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) It must be admitted, however, that these preconditions have failed utterly to achieve their objectives if the aim was to encourage Russia to complete its withdrawal. The carrot of A/CFE ratification was never powerful enough to induce Russia to make progress on the unresolved conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, nor to finalize troop withdrawals from those territories. By insisting on this linkage, we have not advanced our objectives in Georgia and Moldova, and by failing to move ahead with A/CFE ratification, we now also risk losing CFE in the process ) a classic lose-lose scenario. ¶17. (C) The August 2008 war and Russian occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia has further compounded the dilemma. Russian troops and Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery are not going to be withdrawn in the foreseeable future. The Russians have publicly put the number at about 3,700 troops in each region. A/CFE is not such a tempting USOSCE 00000098 005 OF 006 prize that Russia would consider withdrawing from the breakaway regions or leaving Russian troops there without the protection of TLE. While we need to continue efforts to resist legitimizing the Russian troop presence in Georgia and Moldova, it may be time to re-think whether the linkage to A/CFE is the best vehicle for our policy. -------------- -------------- Could De-linking Arms Control from Regional Conflicts Help? -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) By indefinitely delaying ratification of this conventional arms control measure in Europe pending resolution of Georgia's and Moldova's territorial integrity, we are choosing a path that sacrifices the predictability and military/political constraints offered by CFE and A/CFE. We are on the brink of the complete collapse of a major conventional arms control agreement, an unwelcome step from the standpoint of U.S. and Allied interests, and an unnecessary distraction from a host of issues on our bilateral agenda with Russia. If this approach were leading to a greater good, it would still be worth it. But it is difficult to argue that the Istanbul linkage has gained us anything: it has not helped deliver a political settlement, and in the process the entire CFE regime is now in jeopardy. -------------- The Parallel Example of Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶19. (C) Returning to the conditions for Allied submission for ratification of A/CFE to where it originally was at Istanbul, i.e., linked only to Russian equipment levels in the flank regions, may provide a path toward breathing new life into conventional arms control in Europe. Arguably, intractable regional issues should not be allowed to unconditionally hamstring major U.S. and European conventional arms control interests. There is an almost precise parallel: At Istanbul the U.S. urged Azerbaijan to sign A/CFE despite the occupation of some 20% of its territory and large quantities of undeclared military equipment held by another CFE State Party, i.e., Armenia. The Azerbaijanis were advised they could not solve the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh with A/CFE if they could not solve it otherwise. Azerbaijan eventually acquiesced and signed. ¶20. (C) De-coupling Georgia's and Moldova's issues would not/not mean the U.S. or NATO were abandoning Georgia or Moldova to the mercy of Russia. Quite the contrary. President Obama has made it clear the U.S. will never recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia. For half a century, the U.S. steadfastly refused to recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, yet we proceeded with a CFE agreement that covered those territories as part of the Soviet Union because it was sound disarmament policy. It may take just as long to get Russia out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Entry into force of A/CFE may be the first step towards getting Russia out of the remainder of Georgia, especially if there are provisions for transparency and verification regarding the two breakaway territories. Indeed, host nation consent for troops remains a requirement under A/CFE in Article I, Para 3, as it was in the original CFE in Article IV, Para 5. -------------- --- Comment: Put Russia on the Spot and Move Forward -------------- --- ¶21. (C) Adjusting positions held over several years and adopted by NATO at the most senior level will undoubtedly prove difficult. This message argues for serious consideration of just such a course, because we believe we USOSCE 00000098 006 OF 006 are at a juncture when it is time to re-think some of our approaches as we seek a path forward with Russia (Ref C). A decision to offer to begin the ratification process of the A/CFE as signed in 1999 will serve the interests of the U.S. and the interests of security in Europe, and would temporarily take the steam out of Russian efforts to modify the treaty to eliminate the flank regime. It is unclear that NATO agreement to move toward ratification now would have any impact on treaty parties Moldova and Georgia, whose agreement is also needed for entry into force of A/CFE. ¶22. (C) Obviously, intense and extensive consultations with Allies, the Russians and other Treaty partners would first be necessary. Before actually submitting for ratification, some necessary hard work would undoubtedly follow on remaining parts of the Parallel Actions Package, such as regarding flanks, Baltic accession and the definition of "substantial combat forces." Perhaps part of the solution would be an arrangement regarding Moldova, which already is tantalizingly close, and a kind of enhanced transparency regime for Georgia and the North Caucasus, which could be modeled on Dayton Article IV. But getting this issue off the list of grievances in the Russia-U.S. relationship would also place the onus on Moscow if it refused to support and implement a treaty that it signed in 1999 and ratified in 2004. Delinking the political-related "Istanbul Commitments" on regional conflicts from A/CFE and pushing forward with ratification is an option that deserves careful consideration. . NEIGHBOUR