AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000050 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 2) REF: A. USOSCE 0049 ¶B. USOSCE 0046 USOSCE 00000050 001.6 OF 007 ¶1. (SBU) Note: This is the second part of a two-part cable reporting the March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. See reftel A for the first part. End note. -------------- Working Session 2: Other Documents -------------- Conventional Arms Transfers -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Russia complained that states supplying Georgia, "among the most militarized states on the planet," with large numbers of arms and military equipment were violating the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. Arms supplied to Georgia continued to threaten peace and regional stability and had made possible the targeting of civilians and domestic repression. Ulyanov urged states to reconsider the earlier Russian proposal for an embargo of, at least, offensive arms to Georgia (FSC.DEL/155/08/Rev.1). ¶3. (SBU) The Czech Republic, on behalf of the EU, reported that the earlier EU position (FSC.DEL/170/08) had not changed: EU states complied with all relevant requirements, including OSCE principles, in their arms transfer practices. ¶4. (SBU) Georgia replied that its arms acquisitions were transparent and in compliance with OSCE principles and other international norms. Georgia had been inspected many times, by Russia among others, under CFE and VD99. Meanwhile Russia had supplied separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with heavy arms, including armor, aircraft, and artillery. How did this jibe with the OSCE principles? ¶5. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) remarked that delegations had heard this debate before. He contested Russia's description of Georgia as "heavily militarized:" if so, why had Russia been able to easily defeat Georgia in the August 2008 conflict? The U.S. had armed and trained Georgian forces in response, in part, to Russian concerns over Chechen terrorists based in the Pankisi Gorge. U.S. assistance had been reciprocated by Georgia's participation in coalition operations in Iraq. Could Russia explain how Abkhazia and South Ossetia obtained their weapons? For the immediate future, the U.S. supported robust EU and OSCE observer missions in Georgia and the occupied territories and full compliance with all provisions of the ceasefire. Non-Proliferation -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Italy, Belarus, and the UK (Gare) agreed that non-proliferation should remain on the agenda of the FSC, Italy calling it "the heart" of work in the Forum. Gare urged states to continue their efforts to implement UNSC Resolution 1540 on preventing the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors, noting that the recent UNSC Resolution 1810 extended the mandate of 1540 until 2011 and placed added emphasis on the role of regional organizations like the OSCE. USOSCE 00000050 002.4 OF 007 Stabilizing Measures -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Georgia reprised earlier remarks that such measures were next to useless in South Caucasus without Russia's political will to reach a peaceful solution. Code of Conduct -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Switzerland confirmed it will sponsor another regional seminar on the Code of Conduct; it hosted a Code seminar in Almaty in 2008 for Central Asian states. Sweden and Finland supported a German suggestion for a permanent mechanism outside the AIAM to review implementation of the Code. Georgia complained that "one participating State" violated several provisions of the Code during the August 2008 conflict. The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, Austria) reported delegations appeared close to consensus on a draft decision to update the Code questionnaire. Small Arms and Light Weapons -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Finland asserted good decisions were taken last year. Future work should build on 2008 work in the FSC on brokering, air transport of SALW, and MANPADS and support the UN Program of Action on SALW (UNPOA). The upcoming review of the OSCE Document on SALW should follow the agenda of the recent Third UNPOA Biennial Meeting of States (BMS). Future emphases should include brokering, marking and tracing, end use certificates, illicit transportation, transparency, and information exchanges. Sweden concurred, adding that project work should remain a priority. The session coordinator (Schweizer, Germany) suggested the OSCE might host a regional conference on the UNPOA before the Fourth BMS in 2010. ¶10. (SBU) Switzerland supported Finland's recommendations. Over the last ten years the OSCE has developed a core competence in SALW, but better ties with the UNPOA are still needed. Future efforts should focus on improved implementation, perhaps by strengthening experts in the field. ¶11. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) said it supported OSCE work on SALW, noting its recent destruction of 15 MANPADS and successful stockpile management program. Review of the document should consider all other SALW-related decisions, such as FSC.DEC/15/02 on expert advice on implementation. ¶12. (SBU) The UK recommended three guiding principles while conducting the review of the OSCE Document on SALW: implementation; consistency with the UNPOA; and no new burdens on states already in compliance. Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Switzerland observed that in the field, work on SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) is done together. Review of the SALW document should include SCA. They are linked. Experts should participate in the review. More outreach is needed; this could include translation of the Best Practice Guides into non-OSCE languages. Finland USOSCE 00000050 003.4 OF 007 supported the Swiss recommendations, noting its recent contribution of a guide on melange rocket fuel oxidizer disposition would be of interest to many states. Germany and Switzerland supported the coordinator's suggestion of a workshop on project implementation, including indicators of surplus. ¶14. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked for the status of negotiations between the OSCE and Ukraine over privileges and immunities, including questions of legal liability, for OSCE personnel working on the melange project in Ukraine. Ukraine (Leschenko) reported that the MOU defining these immunities was pending approval before the upper house of the national parliament. The CPC (Geertsen) added that resolution of the issue will also depend on the methods employed by the firms awarded the contract for elimination. MANPADS Export Controls -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Finland said there was a need for greater outreach on the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS, including assistance to individual states. The U.S. reported an outreach seminar in Vienna with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners in October 2008 that addressed stockpile management and export controls and led to further bilateral assistance. End-User Certificates -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Switzerland recommended thorough analysis of the results of the information exchange on end-user certificates and related verification procedures in order to derive best practices. Finland agreed, noting there is a lack of clear binding commitment to these standard elements among the 56 participating States. -------------- Working Session 3: CSBM Improvements -------------- Russian Orthodoxy -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) took the floor first, striking a familiar cord in lamenting the alleged stagnation of CSBMs since 1999. He argued the need to adapt the document to changing conditions and supported his position by noting that the Russian Food-for-Thought on VD99 implementation estimates that more than half of the provisions no longer function. Ulyanov conceded that two years ago Russia had abandoned the idea of seeking a comprehensive change to the document. But, noting that "half-measures have not worked," Ulyanov said that lack of progress on Russian proposals, including that on rapid reaction forces, had led them back to their original concept of a full update of the document. ¶18. (SBU) Ulyanov complained that no matter how many times Russia consults with its OSCE partners, they still misunderstand Russia's intent. Ulyanov repeated that Russia does not want to "abandon, freeze, or undermine" the current document. Rather, Russia wants to identify shortcomings, develop appropriate updates for those shortcomings, and open USOSCE 00000050 004.4 OF 007 the document to codify those changes. Ulyanov compared the OSCE to other international organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, where the most important documents are reviewed and revised. Why then, he asked, does the idea of change bring panic in the OSCE, even though it updated VD99 four times during its first decade. "What Has Changed?" -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Ulyanov characterized the silence that followed his question, "What has changed since the 1990s?" as symptomatic of a group used to ten years of stagnation. Ulyanov claimed that the only change was the erosion of political will. He repeated that he intended to discuss reopening the document again in the FSC on March 25. Ulyanov responded to a question on the value of the VD99 information exchange to introduce what he characterized as a newly revised proposal for naval CSBMs (FSC.DEL/120/08.Rev.1). U.S. Cautions Against Reopening VD99 -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) acknowledged a recurring theme at the 2009 AIAM: that VD99 is not a perfect document. But, said Neighbour, the document is working and it is important for all pS to live up to their obligations as they are currently written. Neighbour cautioned that reopening VD99 would be an uncertain and very long road that could call into question the successful provisions of the current document. ¶21. (SBU) Neighbour asserted that much of the document is fine, but agreed with Ulyanov that political will is lacking. Chapter III on Risk Reduction, for example, is fine as written. Making changes to Chapter III would not have changed the outcome in August. The CiO went to extraordinary lengths to avert a crisis, but what was lacking was the political will to find a peaceful resolution. ¶22. (SBU) Neighbour also asked pS to look at Russia's analysis from a broader perspective: to consider aspects outside the OSCE. Neighbour reasoned that when one delegation has suspended its implementation of the biggest CSBM of all, that is CFE, it hardly seems the right time to reopen VD99. Neighbour added that Russia cannot substitute VD99 for CFE. U.S. Opposes Naval CSBMs -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Neighbour also recalled that Russia's naval CSBM was earlier discussed in the FSC and noted that some 20 pS, Allies and others, questioned the merit of Russia's proposal. Neighbour remarked that: - Russia did not identify any security concern that the naval CSBMs would address. In essence, there is no "problem" to solve via a CSBM. - In the absence of any security concern to be addressed and any substantive modification to the proposed measures, it would not be productive for the FSC to spend time discussing measures that will not provide any collective benefit to OSCE states. USOSCE 00000050 005.4 OF 007 - NATO Allies are open to engagement on a variety of naval issues, in appropriate fora. For example, in the NATO-Russia context, cooperation on maritime search and rescue has been promoted by NATO Allies. Neighbour concluded by stating that the U.S. is willing to engage, in consultation with Allies and friends, on substantive concerns to improve existing CSBMs based on reciprocity, military significance, and verifiability. Irish Support -------------- ¶24. (SBU) On the margins, Ireland (Donagh) approached USDel and noted its satisfaction with the U.S. intervention. Donagh said he thought he was talking for a number of smaller non-NATO pS when he said that the tone and timing of the intervention was very effective and much appreciated. Similar sentiments were subsequently heard from Finland, Switzerland, and some Allies. How Significant Are Units in the Urals? -------------- ¶25. (SBU) Ulyanov replied that, if anything, naval forces were certainly as "militarily significant" as Russian artillery units stationed near the Urals. He noted that over the last ten years there have been two major military operations, the first in the Balkans and the second in Iraq, and both of these operations relied heavily on naval forces. Ulyanov said verifiability is a topic for negotiation and he questioned concept of reciprocity, asking how reciprocity can be achieved between, for instance, Russia and San Marino or the Holy See. ¶26. (SBU) Ulyanov conceded that VD99 cannot replace CFE since each has its own purpose. CFE sets limits on conventional forces, which are verified through a strict inspection regime. The verification of information exchanged on conventional forces in VD99 is intended to build confidence, not verify limits. ¶27. (SBU) Belarus thanked the U.S. and Russia for starting the discussion and noted that while Belarus did not want to go back two years, there are proposals on the table (presumably the Russia/Belarus proposal on RRF) for which they are looking for feedback. CiO Greece: VD99 a Safety Net -------------- ¶28. (SBU) Greece (Sourani),the current OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office, recalled Camille Grande's use of the term "benign neglect" in his presentation at the FSC on European security (reftel B). Sourani contended that VD 1999 is a victim of its own success and cautioned pS not to underestimate the value of the current measures for confidence-building through contacts. She suggested that, in a period where CFE was not being implemented, VD 1999 became a sort of safety net. She asked pS to consider what would happen if VD 1999 became inoperable. Sourani empathized with Russia's frustration at the lack of interest in their USOSCE 00000050 006.3 OF 007 proposals but noted the proposals tabled in previous sessions, commenting that the FSC would have some concrete proposals to work on. She cautioned that the lengthy discussions on the update to the Code of Conduct questionnaire underscore how difficult it can be to gain consensus at 56. UK: Those Were the Days -------------- ¶29. (SBU) The UK (Gare) thanked Russia for circulating their paper and for the U.S. intervention which presented the other side of the coin. Gare took exception to one point made by Greece and noted that only one pS had suspended implementation of the CFE treaty and that all other States Parties were continuing to implement CFE. Gare said the level of trust and confidence during the 1990s was much higher, with all pS sharing a common vision. Since 2000, however, the level of trust and confidence has eroded and now it is more difficult to find consensus. In these conditions, it is important to find areas of common agreement. ¶30. (SBU) Turkey asked whether it was really necessary to destroy the existing architecture in order to reestablish a common direction. Turkey argued that pS should look for ways to improve the current system rather than attempting to rebuild the architecture from scratch. Ulyanov: We're Gaining on You -------------- ¶31. (SBU) Russia conceded that we do not know where we would end up when we opened VD 1999 and that it would be a long road. But he said Russia does not see continued use of the current document as a problem in the mean time. He also agreed with the UK, that pS are now pulling in different directions. However, he noted with satisfaction, the number of pS calling for changes to VD 1999 increased from two last year to five this year. ¶32. (SBU) The coordinator (von Arx, Switzerland) asked whether it was possible to create a theoretical "box" in which pS could freely discuss the concept of updating VD 1999 without impacting the implementation of the current document. He asked whether pS could work inside such a framework. He also asked whether a CSBM could be developed for reacting to crises under "bad weather" conditions and how regional CSBMs can help. ¶33. (SBU) Referring to regional measures, Ulyanov recalled Russia's proposal to extend the Black Sea CSBM to the Baltic Sea. He said that Russia was thinking in terms of a modest measure that would not require additional financing or significant increase in work. U.S. on All-Weather CSBMs -------------- ¶34. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) said CSBMs were meant to be "all-weather" measures. He noted that pS, including the U.S., had implemented provisions under both CFE and VD 1999, including inspections and evaluations, during operations in the Balkans and in Kosovo. USOSCE 00000050 007.3 OF 007 ¶35. (SBU) Armenia commented that it considered regional CSBMs of value and called on their more coordinated use. Armenia noted, however, as conditions change so must the CSBMs and therefore there should be a discussion on whether VD 1999 needs to be updated. Azerbaijan noted that while the idea of regional CSBMs makes sense, particularities of regional security concerns makes it difficult for outsiders to assist in creating such measures. Too often the result is erosion of confidence. Too many CSBMs are not being fully implemented or are seen as win-lose, when they should be developed an implemented on a win-win consensus. ¶36. (SBU) Switzerland agreed with the coordinator's point on creating boxes. Switzerland noted that one such box should be the AIAM, and that another box should be the Heads of Verification. Switzerland said it would make a proposal in the FSC to hold the HOV permanently in December or January so that the results of the discussions could be forwarded to the AIAM in March for consideration. ¶37. (SBU) On the margins, Finland (Kangaste) indicated that Nordic states might support this effort. Canada also commented favorably on the idea of allowing HOV's to meet separately on technical maters, but at a time that allowed for the results to feed into the AIAM as appropriate. NEIGHBOUR