LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR NEXT YEAR'S CORFU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000291 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: PREL RU OSCE SUBJECT: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR NEXT YEAR'S CORFU DIALOGUE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY Classified By: Casey Christensen for reasons 4.(b)&(d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. At the final session of the Corfu Process under the Greek Chairmanship participating States sought to identify ways in which the European security dialogue could advance next year under Kazakshstan's leadership. Most comments welcomed the constructive tone of the discussions so far and urged a focus on conflict prevention, resolution and management, pointing to the protracted conflicts where progress was necessary but not sufficient to advance security in Europe. In their interventions, PermReps also touched upon Kazakhstan's planned summit, the Russian European Security Treaty draft and a renewed focus on transnational threats. The Russians embraced the Ministerial's results but also pointed to their draft security treaty anticipating "substantial" replies to it. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Greek OSCE Chairmanship convened December 17 a final wrap up Corfu Process (CP) discussion among PermReps to take stock following the Decision and Declaration on the CP at the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial and look ahead to the next phase under Kazakhstan's Chairmanship starting in January. Planned in some haste, the session was designed as Greek Ambassador Marinaki told us earlier in the week to put the right spin on the Ministerial and provide "some guidance and direction" to the Kazakhs as to where they should plan on taking the dialogue. It was also intended to clarify to PermReps how the PC and FSC would work together to support the CP discussions ahead. ¶3. (U) Opening presentations were made by Ambassador Marinkaki for the CiO (and incoming FSC Chair),Ambassador Cliff (UK) as FSC Chair and Ambassador Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan) as the incoming Chair. Summing up what the CP had accomplished thus far, Marinaki pointed to an improved atmosphere and an increasingly common vocabulary about the challenges facing European security. She saw the dialogue in 2010 tackling three thematic blocks ) security in Europe, security of Europe and the OSCE itself ) and she felt it should aim at more concrete proposals for remedies rather than the more theoretical discussions which characterized the first phase. Ambassador Cliff urged tight coordination between the PC and FSC in supporting the CP and drawing from the Athens Ministerial tasking to the FSC he focused on 
three ways in which the CP and the FSC would interact: addressing key security challenges including arms control and CSBMs; exploring ways to improve implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and contributions to improving OSCE instruments in crisis management. Ambassador Abdrakhmanov said Kazakhstan's plans for a summit would be a key reference point in the work of the CP, citing the Ministerial Decision's mandate to produce an interim report by June 2010. He suggested that CP sessions would be held around once a month and promised to produce a notional calendar of meetings by early January. He said he will look to the Secretariat to produce regular food for thought papers and would plan on input from nongovernmental experts and representatives from other regional security organizations. ¶4. (SBU) In their interventions most of the PermReps recalled that the point of the CP was to restore trust and confidence as a means to improving European security. They repeated the mantra that the dialogue should be anchored in the OSCE and encompass all three dimensions. Sweden pressed for it to be "Vienna-based but not Vienna-centric." A number of delegations commented on the Kazakh desire to make the CP one of the main topics of a possible summit next year with most insisting that identifying substance had to proceed any firm agreement on a summit. France, however, turned the argument around and said that the firm prospect of a summit would generate the necessary political will to ensure the CP contained substance. ¶5. (SBU) Several PermReps commented on Russia's proposed European Security Treaty, particularly Moscow's timing just before the Ministerial for sharing a first draft. If our task is to restore trust and confidence, the Dutch Ambassador said, then this Treaty proposal won't do it, although it could represent a step in a process leading to such an eventual result. Others seemed a bit more dismissive; Canada termed the treaty draft a "possible input" to a comprehensive process. Russia reversed the priority of efforts, framing the CP as a valuable platform for exchanging views on the Treaty draft. ¶6. (SBU) Gaining a sense of the topics, rhythm and goals for the CP next year was a key objective for many delegations. They welcomed the Kazakh's intent to present a detailed work plan early in the New Year, pointing out how important it would be for planning purposes and the inclusion of representatives from capitals. A majority felt the USOSCE 00000291 002 OF 002 indicative list of topics included in the Ministerial decision would serve as a good basis for progress. Many echoed the Greeks' call for concrete proposals and ideas, with some suggesting the June interim report might be accompanied by at least several PC decisions ratifying specific ideas and proposals. ¶7. (SBU) Several delegations touched on the importance of the U.S. ) Russian cosponsored Ministerial decision on transnational threats in the context of the CP. While they felt the CP needed to grapple with traditional security issues, including arms control and CSBMs, the Ambassadors saw a focus also on transnational threats as adding a needed dose of reality and relevance to the process. Belgium, for example, stressed the immediate value of focusing on issues such as terrorism, trafficking, climate change and energy security. Canada highlighted the importance of OSCE work on Afghanistan citing that country as a key source of a number of transnational threats. ¶8. (SBU) Russian Ambassador Azimov hailed the successful outcome of the Ministerial and said the CP Decision and Declaration reinstated security dialogue as the main focus of the OSCE's work and it has reconfirmed the importance of comprehensive security along with inclusiveness and transparency. The CP also demonstrated, he continued, that the dream of a Europe whole, free and at peace is still elusive. He felt the CP would give a special emphasis to arms control and CSBMs, and provide a strong intellectual impetus to strengthening the 1999 Vienna Document and the CSBM Program of Action. He also saw the CP as a way to improve OSCE's effectiveness, correct "distortions" in human dimension activities and enhance the role other regional and sub-regional security organizations could play. ¶9. (SBU) The U.S. intervention applauded the Ministerial outcome and said we expected the CP to extend areas of agreement and contribute to consensus building. We urged a very concrete approach and suggested the first Kazakh Corfu session, presumably in late January, focus on conflict prevention and resolution and we cited our October proposal on a possible new mechanism as something worthy of further consideration. We also noted the expected interplay next year between CP themes and ongoing OSCE work, noting transnational threats, tolerance and energy security in particular, and urged some thought be given as to how to manage it. Finally, we laid out some expectations for the interim report in June, suggesting that it should provide us with a clear understanding on the root causes of insecurity in Europe and a better perspective on effective ways to address them. We concluded by positing that the CP could represent a renaissance in the OSCE's work and goals. ¶10. Comment. Given the festive season and the sense of a successful Ministerial in Athens a fortnight earlier Ambassadors were in a good mood over prospects for the CP. The bonhomie, however, was somewhat tinged by persistent concerns about how and how fairly the Kazakhs will manage their Chairmanship. Most delegations see the next six months as another step in a long-term process that will confirm the pertinence of existing institutions and commitments while generating an enhanced understanding of differing perspectives. Kazakhstan,s list of indicative topics for this next step in the CP due in early January will be an important benchmark in measuring expectations of how far and how fast we may go in this process. FULLER