OSCE/FSC: STRUCTURING WORK ON CSBMS, INCLUDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000286

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2015
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: STRUCTURING WORK ON CSBMS, INCLUDING
VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999

REF: STATE 111008

Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour,
Reason 1.4B/D


1. (C) Summary and Guidance Request: As Washington reviews
policy options and ways forward on many issues in the
U.S.-Russia relationship at the end of 2009, USOSCE would
recommend additional attention be focused on the "Vienna
Document 1999" (VD99),the OSCE's landmark CSBM vehicle. In
the ten years since adoption of VD99, numerous related
proposals have been discussed, and VD99 itself has been
reviewed in detail three times. However, it has seen neither
changes nor updates. Moreover, all OSCE pS agreed at the
Athens OSCE ministerial two weeks ago on exploring ways to
strengthen arms control and CSBM instruments, "including
strengthening the Vienna Document 1999". As the Deputy
Secretary said, "there is room for improvement here and we
look forward to discussing ways to make this instrument more
effective".



2. (C) While Post recommends continued U.S. opposition to
Russia's proposal for a politicized "review" of VD99, it does
believe targeted improvements can be identified that would
benefit USG interests. Per Reftel, with the Ministerial now
behind us, Post is ready to work with Russia to develop a
work program in which individual CSBM proposals are advanced
and considered on their own merits, with later examination as
to whether they are more appropriate as stand-alone measures
or should be incorporated into Vienna Document or another
OSCE instrument.



3. (C) Post proposes to consult broadly with Allies as well
as the Russian Del, as previously instructed reftel, to seek
to identify an informal list of issues/proposals that might
be considered in the FSC. Considering the level of interest
in addressing substantive issues in the FSC, Post expects
many delegations to press for a rapid transition from such an
informal list to actual proposals that could lead to
decisions. Depending on the complexity of the issue, work to
develop a proposal could be done in Vienna, in Brussels by
NATO experts, or even in capitals. It will also be important
to identify proposals that we might develop jointly with
Russia and/or others.



4. (C) Guidance request: Post has developed an initial list
of issues, detailed in para 5 below, and recommends it be
instructed to begin work now with the Russians and others,
moving beyond simply putting them on a list and starting to
develop outlines for actual proposals. End Summary and
Guidance Request.


--------------
What Tangibles Should U.S. and Allies Seek?
--------------



5. (C) Several issues have been addressed to a limited degree
in the FSC during the past year and Post believes they will
receive early attention, including a quick effort to develop
proposals. Based on previous discussions, these proposals
should be very popular with the Allies and most of the other
pS. Post believes all could be of benefit to the U.S.:

-- Redefine VD99 verification quotas, which could increase

USOSCE 00000286 002 OF 005


the number of inspections and evaluations available in Russia
and elsewhere for the U.S. and the Allies;

-- Increase the size of inspection/evaluation teams;

-- Lower the threshold on exercises for mandatory
notifications and observations;

-- Allow the use of digital cameras but not digital cameras
equipped with GPS; and

-- Alter the rules for declaring an inspection/evaluation so
it cannot be used to take a quota to reduce
transparency/openness, e.g., in 2009 when Russia went to
Belarus and Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan.


-------------- --------------
Two VD99 Evaluations in Russia Yearly--Let's Get More
-------------- --------------



6. (C) Details on the ticks above in para 5 follow:



A. Adjustments to VD99 verification provision quotas. Even
before Russia "suspended" its implementation of CFE, a number
of OSCE participating States (pS) had expressed concern about
limited opportunities for VD99 inspections and evaluations.
This concern has increased because Russia has refused all CFE
inspections and significantly increased its engagement in
VD99 verification activities, thereby blocking opportunities
for other pS to conduct verification activities, such as by
taking the last inspection quota (e.g., for Belarus in
September 2009).

-- This concern will increase in 2010 because the number of
VD99 reportable Russian "units" drops from 167 to 107 due to
downsizing and reorganization under the Russian Defense
Reform Program. Russia will thus be subject to only 2
evaluations under VD99 for the entire year. (Comment. This
continues a decreasing trend in the number of reported
Russian "units"; when the evaluation regime first came into
effect in the early 1990s, the Russian quota was 7
evaluations annually. End Comment.) The number of
inspections under VD99 is unchanged: three per year for each
and every country with territory in the zone of application,
regardless of the size ) or existence ) of military forces.

-- There are a number of different proposals the U.S. and
Allies could advance in negotiations to increase their
quotas, such as increasing the number of evaluations by, for
example, improving the ratio of one evaluation for every 60
units to one for every 30 units or even one for every 15
units. As long as the U.S. continues to report at current
force levels, there would be no increased quota for the U.S.
Consideration could also be given to increasing the number of
inspections.

-- Such an increase in quotas should be a major U.S. VD99
priority. With the ongoing major reorganization in Russian
conventional forces that began this year, it is important to
have more on-the-ground information available from
evaluations and inspections than we currently get under VD99.

-- An increase would also contribute to a political culture
of transparency, cooperation, and predictability.


B. Increasing the size of inspection and evaluation teams.

USOSCE 00000286 003 OF 005


The combination of small teams (4 people for inspections and
3 for evaluation visits) and few events is seen by many
delegations here as further limiting the opportunities for
transparency. This should be a U.S. priority in conjunction
with point A, above.

-- Increasing the size of teams, perhaps doubling the size
for both inspections and evaluations, would allow teams to
break at a site into groups (each with at least a team
leader, an equipment expert, and a linguist). This would
also allow better levels of experience and more eyes on the
ground.

-- A political benefit would be an increased multilateral
character of inspections and evaluations through
opportunities for more foreign guest inspectors and
evaluators (VD99 already allows up to 3 countries to
participate on an inspection/evaluation) and more
opportunities for the U.S. to participate on Allied teams.


C. Lowering the threshold on exercises for mandatory
notifications and observations could also be a U.S. goal.

-- This has been a long-term Russian proposal. It is also
now being pushed by Belarus. This could show sensitivity to
their expressed interest and be part of a package in exchange
for something we want.

-- From a U.S. perspective, it would enable VD99 observation
of future Russian and CSTO exercises such as those in 2009 in
the North Caucasus, Belarus, and Kazakhstan which were just
below the current VD99 observation threshold.

-- Assuming the new thresholds were lowered to somewhere just
above a brigade, which is the level that has been suggested
in the past, it should have minimal impact on the need for
U.S. notification or coordination with Allies due to the
small size of U.S. exercises today.



D. Allow the use of digital cameras without needing to
request permission (IAW with Chairman's statement dated 29
Nov 2002 FSC.DEL 595/02 Rev 2). We would interpret this to
mean only digital "cameras," not digital cameras equipped
with GPS, nor cameras that communicate, such as through the
Internet.

-- Turkey has a proposal to this effect already on the table.
We asked it be deferred until January 2010 for further
study. Recommend Washington provide updated guidance on this
early in 2010 so we can engage on this popular proposal.



E. Place a qualifier on the use of verification events. We
propose ensuring that an inspection/evaluation cannot be used
to take a quota to reduce transparency/openness.

-- For example, in 2009 Russia inspected Belarus shortly in
advance of an exercise in which it participated, and
Kyrgyzstan inspected Kazakhstan during an exercise in which
it participated. In both cases, they took the last quota
just before a NATO Ally was able to notify a planned
inspection. While Russia and Kyrgyzstan should not have had
information about specific NATO plans, they would have known
from past practice that NATO pS place a priority on
inspecting notified CSTO military exercises.

-- A decision that says inspections conducted by a pS
participating in a military activity notified under VD99

USOSCE 00000286 004 OF 005


within a designated period (e.g., four weeks) of that
military activity, do not count against the inspection quota
of a pS could be one possible fix.



F. There are a number of additional ideas being discussed in
Vienna that will demand consideration; with a few edits, some
may benefit the USG. For instance, would a requirement that
every pS annually notify at least one military exercise for
observation make sense for us? Ukraine is changing an
already-tabled food-for-thought (the FFT in FSC.DEL/96/09 on
27 October) aimed at Russian forces in the Crimea into a
concrete proposal. (We have not substantively engaged on
this FFT yet. If we do so, should we urge Ukraine to change
references to "deployment" to "separately located"?) The
Czech Republic just published a FFT on VD99 Chapter IV
Contacts, and Denmark has ideas circulating informally among
Allies called "VD99 Plus," which suggests a way to categorize
agreed measures. There will be more.


--------------
Transparency on New Types of Systems?
--------------



7. (C) In addition, consultations with Allies will almost
certainly reveal interest in pursuing other issues that have
not yet been discussed in the FSC, either related to VD99 or
not ("new"). Post believes that it is in our interest to
consider whether there are such issues that the U.S. would
like to raise.



8. (C) To this end, Post would like to suggest for Washington
consideration whether it is in the U.S. interest to propose a
CSBM to provide transparency on new types of systems being
deployed in the zone of application, e.g., UAVs, UCAVs, and
MRAPs not subject to VD99. Britain is already reporting
UCAVs in its GEMI and CAT data. While obviously we do not
need this data on British UCAVs, notifications about similar
holdings by Russia and some others could be useful. (Perhaps
this would be better separated from information exchange
provisions in VD99 since it already is a separate category in
the GEMI exchange. Although some of our Allies have these
types of equipment, Post is not aware of them focusing on a
separate mechanism to provide transparency.)


--------------
Need Assistance from Outside Vienna
--------------



9. (C) Post proposes beginning work on these issues with the
QUAD and other Allies in Vienna, but believes it will be
important to get Allied buy-in to this approach. Post
recommends working this within the VCC and raising this at
the January 28 HLTF meeting. This would be needed to ensure
high-level support and to prevent sniping from delegations
that may be too eager to accommodate Russian demands as well
as from other delegations that may have grown too comfortable
with paralysis and no movement.



10. (C) Regarding development of actual text for proposals,
for the U.S., time permitting, we would like to pursue
consultations with Allies through existing channels at NATO,
with Allies and friends in Vienna, and bilaterally with

USOSCE 00000286 005.2 OF 005


Russia. This should precede open debate in the FSC. We will
encourage Allies to follow a similar pattern for converting
their own ideas into proposals.


--------------
Now is the Time
--------------



11. (C) Comment: We believe the Deputy Secretary's remarks
at the OSCE Athens Ministerial on VD99 ("there is room for
improvement here and we look forward to discussing ways to
make this instrument more effective") and the ministerial
decision in Athens which adopted the language the U.S.
promoted (e.g., exploring ways to strengthen arms control and
CSBM instruments, "including strengthening VD99") lay the
foundation for an approach that can be pursued as an
alternative to the Russian proposal for a "review" of VD99.
Now is the time to seek to advance U.S. interests as
described above: If we do not assert leadership, others with
less helpful proposals will seize the initiative. This would
create a situation where, inter alia, Russia will seek to
divide the Alliance, as they did in the FSC in November on
VD99. On the other hand, we can work to change provisions
that are in U.S. interest, and add CSBMs where advantageous.



12. (C) We recommend Washington consider reviewing existing
proposals, develop new proposals, determine any red lines,
and confirm/monitor a negotiation strategy. Post would like
to begin its initial work on this set of issues in early
January, recognizing that some elements will need additional
preparation in Washington and Allied capitals. Guidance
request para 4. End comment.
FULLER