OSCE MINISTERIAL FOCUSES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000275 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OSCE RS KZ GR PREL SUBJECT: OSCE MINISTERIAL FOCUSES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY DIALOGUE USOSCE 00000275 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The seventeenth OSCE Ministerial Council, held December 1-2, 2009 in Athens, focused mainly on the ongoing European security dialogue known as the Corfu Process. Although Russia,s proposed European security treaty (EST) dominated the headlines, the U.S. achieved its highest priority goal for the Ministerial of keeping the dialogue on European security firmly anchored in the OSCE,s Corfu Process discussions, which will continue in 2010 under the Kazakhstani chairmanship. In addition, other important decisions were taken on the OSCE Chairmanship in 2012, strengthening Vienna Document 1999, countering transnational threats, energy security, small arms and light weapons, weapons of mass destruction, Roma-Sinti, and participation of women in political life. The improved atmosphere among participating States throughout the Fall brought consensus on the traditionalbroad-ranging Ministerial Declaration within reach, failing ultimately on the same critical stumbling blocks as in prior years: the Istanbul commitments and disagreements over Georgia. It also proved impossible to adopt decisions on Freedom of Media and Rule of Law, largely important for their symbolic value. ¶2. (SBU) Negotiations in Athens on the Corfu Process declaration and decision were contentious and protracted. While most delegations negotiated in good faith, Russia consistently tore apart the draft decision and generally indicated they only wanted general brainstorming discussions and no concrete results from the Corfu Process. The Russians eventually overplayed their hand, infuriating delegations to the point that at the Ministers, working lunch on December 1, Foreign Ministers isolated Russian FM Lavrov, insisting that there had to be both a declaration and a decision to take the process forward in a concrete way. Lavrov apparently personally rewrote the decision, removing most of the objectionable language his delegation had inserted the night before. While consensus was finally achieved on the basis of this draft, we are under no illusions that Russia would have agreed to the text absent such pressure from the U.S. and our allies. ¶3. (SBU) Agreement on the Corfu Process declaration and decision was also complicated by Kazakhstan's insistence on including in the documents a positive acknowledgement - if not endorsement - of its proposal to hold an OSCE Summit in ¶2010. Following Kazakhstani threats to veto the declaration, Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Kazakhstani FM Saudabayev personally negotiated last-minute language that closed the deal. Ministers noted "positively" the Kazakhstani proposal and committed to review progress on the substance and modalities of the proposal in the coming year, to determine if the substance would merit a high-level meeting. At the last moment, Uzbekistan surprised everyone by reopening the declaration to change the word "positively" back to the previous language "with interest." Subsequently, the Kazakhstani Ambassador confirmed that due to tensions between the two countries Uzbekistan did not want a summit to take place during the Kazakhstani Chairmanship. ¶4. (SBU) In addition to the Corfu Process declaration and decision, Ministers adopted 19 decisions and declarations. The most important decisions included: the choice of Ireland as the OSCE,s Chairman-in-Office in 2012, countering transnational threats (co-sponsored by Russia and the United States),the OSCE,s role in energy security, small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition, early childhood education for Roma-Sinti, and supporting increased participation of women in political life. Also of note, all 56 OSCE ministers issued a declaration reaffirming commitments on non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and adopted a decision to work to strengthen arms control and CSBM instruments, specifically including Vienna Document 1999. There were also positive 3 2 and Ministerial statements on Nagorno-Karabakh that referenced progress in the settlement process. ¶5. (SBU) The Corfu Declaration is the most important political declaration to be adopted at an OSCE Ministerial since Oporto in 2002. Moreover, the improved atmosphere among participating States throughout the Fall due to the Corfu discussions brought consensus on the traditionally broad-ranging Ministerial Declaration within reach, though it USOSCE 00000275 002.2 OF 002 ultimately failed. The main stumbling blocks continue to be Istanbul commitments and disagreements over Georgia. Major disagreements with Russia over Georgia, OSCE activity in Afghanistan, and in the human dimension, also limited substantive progress on other U.S. priorities though the US and Russia did come to agreement on a CFE paragraph to be included in the broad-based Ministerial Declaration--had there been one. Azerbaijan and possibly Georgia indicated they were prepared to block consensus if a JCG convened in Athens moved to adopt the CFE paragraph. Attempts to negotiate a statement on the Transnistria conflict in Moldova faltered again this year over long-standing disagreements on the Istanbul Commitments, the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the Transnistrian region, and other issues. Decisions on Freedom of Media and Rule of Law, largely important for their symbolic value, were ultimately blocked by Uzbekistan (the latter together with Turkmenistan). ¶6. (SBU) Comment: We achieved our highest priority, to provide for the continuation of a comprehensive, open-ended discussion of European security, anchored within the OSCE,s Corfu Process. Nevertheless, the intensity of negotiations, and the willingness of Russia and incoming Chair Kazakhstan to play hardball presage another tough year for the OSCE. Another factor we will need to take into account is that the Central Asian countries are not united and have their own political differences with Kazakhstan, as well as Russia. The year of the Kazakhstani Chairmanship should prove interesting indeed and will require close coordination between the EUR and SCA bureaus and posts. FULLER