OSCE, RUSSIA AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T USOSCE 000273

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: AF OSCE PREL RS
SUBJECT: OSCE, RUSSIA AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Since 2007, despite a request from
Afghanistan, Russia has obstructed efforts to have the OSCE
conduct training inside Afghanistan, citing weak internal
security as the main reason. Privately, Russian officials
told us interagency differences have prevented a green
light from Moscow. The incoming OSCE Chair Kazakhstan and
the surrounding Central Asian countries, concerned by
threats emanating from Afghanistan, would like to see
greater OSCE efforts. OSCE activity, while miniscule in
terms of resources, offers particular expertise in border
security, provides visible widespread international
engagement and helps reinforce Afghanistan's regional
cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors.


2. (S) Attempts by the U.S., Canada and the UK to open
the door with a limited counternarcotics training project
in Kabul were reportedly nixed twice by FM Lavrov during
the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial Conference in Athens. As
a result, Russia, again this year, had to forego pursuing
OSCE budget resources to train Central Asians and Afghans
at the Domodedevo training facility in Moscow. USOSCE
provides the following input for the Russia-Afghanistan
sub-IPC scheduled December 9 in the hope of contributing to
better understanding of RussiaQs objectives and the way
forward. End Summary.

RUSSIA OPPOSED TO OSCE ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN'S BORDER
SECURITY
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3. (C) At the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Madrid
in December 2007, all 56 participating States approved 16
projects for the OSCE to implement in order to promote
greater security for Afghanistan. Fourteen of the
projects, which took place inside OSCE Participating
States, mostly in Central Asia, have been implemented. Two
further projects slated to take place just inside
Afghanistan's northern border -- creating a border training
facility to focus on customs training at Shir Khan-Bandar
and to create mentoring and monitoring teams to assist
northern border crossing point -- were blocked by Russia.
A Member of the Russian Mission to the OSCE in Vienna told
us privately in early October that the MFA had been in
favor of the two projects but they were unable to overcome
the resistance of other (nfi) agencies in Moscow.
Afghanistan's participation in the fourteen projects has
been at best uneven either due to a lack of suitable
training candidates able to travel outside of the country
or the ingrained resistance of neighboring Central Asian
states to accommodate Afghan participants. We understand
DOD funding (approximately $4.8 million) provided for the
two projects continues to remain available for similar
efforts pending approval by OSCE participating States.

A COUNTERNARCOTICS ALTERNATIVE
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4. (C) Recognizing we were again unlikely to make
any headway this year with the Russians on border security
activities, we shifted our focus to a high-priority area
for Moscow: narcotics traficking. During preparations for
the OSCE Ministerial Conference in Athens December 1-2,
Russia proposed a draft ministerial decision on
counternarcotics that achieved little except to try and
secure central OSCE financial resources for further
training at Domededovo. Working with the UK and Canada, we
conditioned our acceptance of the draft decision on Russian
agreement to a small OSCE counternarcotics training project
in Kabul. After reportedly taking the conditions twice to
FM Lavrov, the Russians refused to accept the training
project and they withdrew the draft decision from further
consideration at the Ministerial.


5. (C) OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut told us he again tried to convince Lavrov on
December 1 to allow the OSCE to perform border security
work inside Afghanistan, but Lavrov refused. The SecGen
also told us Tajikistan raised the issue and said the
Central Asian countries were positive about the idea of
OSCE training in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan specifically
emphasized the importance of working jointly on the
borders. The SG recognized that security for civilians
and fragmentation of efforts remain valid concerns.


6. (S) Comment: Although Russia earlier this year
approved the deployment of an OSCE Electoral Support Team
to Afghanistan, it has consistently refused to allow the
OSCE to work on security issues in Afghanistan. RussiaQs
continued objection to any OSCE training inside Afghanistan
and its willingness to let its draft counternarcotics
decision die rather than accept the small counternarcotics
project have exasperated nearly everyone, including the
Afghan ambassador to the OSCE who has spoken several times
to Russian OSCE ambassador Azimov about the issue. USOSCE
was astonished to learn from the Russian delegation that FM
Lavrov had raised these issues with the Secretary during a
December 1 telephone call. We understand that there will
be a Russia-Afghanistan sub-IPC in Washington on December

9. We hope that the information above will provide input
for a better understanding of RussiaQs objectives and a
decision on the way forward. End comment.

FULLER