SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG: OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000263 SIPDIS FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG FROM CHARG CAROL FULLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2019 TAGS: OSCE RU PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG: OSCE MINISTERIAL IN ATHENS Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller Reasons: 1.4, (B),(C),and (D) ¶1. (C) We look forward to seeing you at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Athens. Your participation will help signal U.S. support for a revitalized OSCE and allow us to call for greater emphasis on democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Your participation will also help cement the OSCE as the most appropriate forum for the Russian-inspired dialogue on European security ) the so-called Corfu Process ) and help facilitate agreement on a means of continuing the dialogue through Kazakhstan,s 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. Reaching such agreement and deflecting Kazakhstan,s proposal for a high-level meeting on European security are key goals for the Ministerial. Additionally, we hope you will be able to advance Minsk Group objectives on Nagorno-Karabakh. ¶2. (C) While we do not expect to reach consensus on an overarching political declaration ) not least owing to continuing serious differences with Russia over Georgia, the CFE Treaty, and other issues ) we can use the Ministerial to further our policy goals and to underscore and reaffirm the commitments that underpin European security. We should seek to reaffirm the principles and commitments enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents. In addition, we should emphasize the need to strengthen the OSCE,s capacity to exercise its core crisis prevention and conflict resolution mandate. SIGNALING SUPPORT FOR THE OSCE AND ITS HUMAN DIMENSION -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Many participating States have expressed appreciation for renewed U.S. engagement in the OSCE under the new Administration, and look to the United States to lead the organization. One of our principal objectives for the Ministerial is to confirm U.S. support for the OSCE and its uniquely comprehensive concept of security, which encompasses not only traditional political-military matters, but also the economic/environmental and human dimensions of security. We believe the latter is critical to ensuring long-term security, and want to use a revitalized OSCE as a stronger platform for the promotion and defense of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms across Europe and Eurasia. Your intervention at the Ministerial will provide an opportunity to call for greater emphasis on these issues, and underscore their continued importance as an indispensable element of security in today,s world. STEERING DISCUSSIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (C) We should use the Ministerial to cement the OSCE as the most appropriate forum for an ongoing dialogue on European security, and highlight the organization,s potential role in conflict prevention and resolution. The so-called Corfu Process, initiated at an informal OSCE Ministerial on the Greek island of Corfu in June 2009 as a response to Russian President Medvedev,s proposal for a new European security treaty, has encompassed discussions on the status and future of European security, conducted in Vienna through regular informal PermRep meetings. Backed by an overwhelming majority of OSCE participating States, we have insisted that any discussions on European security should be concentrated in the OSCE ) as the most inclusive security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area ) and resisted Russian attempts to create parallel tracks in other forums. We have also used the Corfu Process to stress the importance of the human and economic/environmental dimensions of security, despite Russia,s obvious preference for an exclusive focus on military matters. ¶5. (C) Russia clearly wishes to use President Medvedev,s proposal for a European security treaty to shift attention to traditional hard security matters, block continued NATO enlargement, and preserve a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. To counter this, we must emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of security and recall the right of sovereign states to determine their own security arrangements. We should use the Ministerial to highlight our belief that for any European security regime to be successful, it must be based on shared principles and values, including territorial integrity and respect for human rights. The principles Russia professes to espouse ) such as the peaceful resolution of conflict and the indivisibility of security ) are clearly inconsistent with its &suspension8 of CFE Treaty implementation and its August 2008 incursion into Georgia. USOSCE 00000263 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) In our Corfu Process discussions in Vienna, we and our allies have argued that the war in Georgia highlighted continuing threats to security and stability in the OSCE region, and demonstrated that the organization,s capacity for early action must be strengthened. We have also argued that we must improve the OSCE,s ability to prevent and resolve conflict. Our goal is to use the Ministerial to highlight the OSCE,s potential in this area, to urge the exploration of additional confidence-building and conflict resolution measures, and to outline our vision of strengthening European security by building on already existing institutions such as the OSCE. ¶7. (C) Reaching agreement on a means of continuing the Corfu Process through Kazakhstan,s 2010 OSCE Chairmanship is a key objective for the Ministerial. We expect negotiations on a declaration and decision related to the process not only to dominate preparations for the meeting, but also to dominate discussions in Athens. We believe the Corfu Process should continue in a similar format in 2010, with in-depth discussions on key topics identified as requiring more work, such as human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy; conflict prevention and resolution; arms control and CSBMs; transnational threats and cross-dimensional challenges; the need for fuller implementation of existing OSCE commitments; and ways to create, upgrade, or make better use of existing OSCE mechanisms and instruments across the OSCE,s political-military, economic/environmental, and human dimensions. We also believe informal meetings in Vienna should involve a wider range of participants, including from capitals, international organizations, and civil society. Discussions in 2010 need to lead to concrete proposals for strengthening European security. ¶8. (C) We do not believe, however, that discussions thus far warrant a decision at the Athens Ministerial on a high-level meeting on European security under Kazakhstan,s OSCE Chairmanship. However, a growing number of delegations believe that a Summit would help reaffirm the importance of the OSCE and are therefore prepared to agree in Athens to a potential Summit. You will want to deflect any attempts by Kazakhstan or other participating States to secure consensus in Athens on the idea of holding an OSCE Summit in 2010 on this issue. While we are open to a high-level conference at some point on an issue such as Afghanistan ) especially if Kazakhstan can persuade Russia to allow OSCE border assistance activities inside northern Afghanistan ) a decision at this time would be premature. We should urge participating States to focus on the substance of the dialogue and avoid rushing to conclusions or decisions. ADVANCING MINSK GROUP OBJECTIVES ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) We will also seek to use your attendance at the Ministerial as leverage in negotiating, before your arrival, a strong statement on Nagorno-Karabakh. We hope this statement will help reassure the Turks that we are making progress towards a settlement of the conflict and provide cover for them in their parliamentary debate on the Turkish-Armenian protocols. Your participation in the meeting with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers ) which regularly takes place at OSCE Ministerials ) will also show the United States and Russia working seamlessly together in the Minsk Group, and serve as an example of the kind of cooperation we would like to see in other areas of the OSCE,s work. Other Issues -------------- ¶10. (SBU) With all the energy concentrated on these big ticket issues, negotiations on major decisions have lagged behind. Moreover, Russia has played a destructive game in obstructing almost every proposed decision. Nevertheless, we expect there may be some key Ministerial Decisions on: -- Further OSCE Efforts to Address Transnational Threats and Challenges to Security and Stability (co-sponsored by the United States and Russia) ) This is a strategic decision that sends an important signal about U.S.-Russian cooperation in this key area. -- Further Measures to Support and Promote the International Legal Framework against Terrorism ) This mainly technical decision helps us realize the potential of the OSCE to encourage adherence to these UN instruments. USOSCE 00000263 003 OF 003 -- Strengthening Dialogue and Co-operation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area ) The United States is one of the main backers of this decision, which would mandate political dialogue on energy security issues and allow further exploration of an OSCE role in this area. Unfortunately, consensus is uncertain since Russia is trying to dilute any new mandate. -- The Future Orientation of the Economic and Environmental Dimension ) This is an EU priority; it would provide for a review in 2010 of the activities undertaken by the OSCE in the second dimension. -- Follow-up to the 17th Economic and Environmental Forum on Migration Management ) This decision, which emphasizes the positive aspects of migration, is a Greek priority. -- Enhancing OSCE Efforts to Ensure Roma and Sinti Sustainable Integration ) This decision adds valuable mandates in the area of early childhood education. -- Women,s Participation in Political and Public Life ) The United States and the EU strongly support this decision, which would encourage the implementation of equal opportunities measures in government, political parties, security institutions, and peace-building initiatives. -- Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding ) This decision will approve Kazakhstan,s plans to host a high-level tolerance conference in June/July 2010 in Astana. -- Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition ) This decision tasks the development of a plan of action and review of the SALW Document by May 2010, among other declared steps in support of the SALW control regime. -- Declaration on Non-Proliferation ) This is an expressed commitment of OSCE participating States in support of the various regimes to control, contain, or prohibit the spread of WMD and related technologies. -- Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Adoption of the UN Convention against Torture ) This is mainly drawn from previously agreed language, but sends a political signal about the commitment of participating States to preventing torture. -- Strengthening the Legal Status of the OSCE ) This decision will set up a working group to continue exploring in 2010 the issue of granting the OSCE legal personality. Conclusion: -------------- ¶11. (C) The OSCE has long been a key tool for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, but Russian actions have taken a toll on the organization,s effectiveness. We need to use the Athens Ministerial to call for greater emphasis on key human dimension issues, and underscore and reaffirm the commitments that underpin European security. We also need to ensure the continuation of the Corfu Process within the OSCE framework in 2010 and urge additional OSCE efforts in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution. Additionally, we need to emphasize the need to achieve real progress in the resolution of the protracted conflicts. If we can achieve these objectives, while countering conflicting messages from Russia, we can help lay the foundation for a revitalized organization. FULLER