SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE OSCE MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000262 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: OSCE RU PREL SUBJECT: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE OSCE MINISTERIAL Classified By: CDA CAROL FULLER FOR Reasons: 1.4, (B),(C),and (D). ¶1. (SBU) The November 24 Reinforced Permanent Council provided participating States a final opportunity to outline their expectations for the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens and sum up accomplishments under the 2009 Greek Chairmanship. Although the comments by Delegations were generally positive, the specifics revealed some continuing sharp differences in the expected tone, scope and content of the Ministerial and raised some doubt that there will be a solid statement of support for the Greeks, signature accomplishment, a robust European security dialogue known as the Corfu Process (CP). Proposed edits of key Ministerial decisions by several delegations, notably the Russians, solidified the view that positions on key issues are still far apart. ¶2. (SBU) in his opening presentation Secretary General de Brichambaut reviewed the &remarkable distance 8 participating States have covered so far in launching a new dialogue on European security in the framework of the Corfu Process: the 56 participating States have completed an initial comprehensive assessment of European security and also highlighted the enduring strengths of the OSCE. After posing a number of questions about how best to proceed, he suggested five broad areas that required further attention in the next stage of the dialogue: the need to reconfirm basic OSCE principles; redoubled efforts on protracted conflicts; serious resumption of arms control efforts; new strategies for transnational threats (including threats emanating from Afghanistan); and reinforced efforts on rule of law, including strengthened mechanisms to defend human rights and fundamental freedoms. He emphasized the importance of synchronizing a number of OSCE processes with one another as well as with the work of other organizations, such as NATO and the EU. He also gingerly touched on widespread interest in a summit, noting the challenge will be to harness the ambition a summit represents with the potential progress in the security dialogue. ¶3. (SBU) Kazakhstan, as the next CiO, devoted its entire intervention to its plans for a summit. A summit would reinvigorate the dialogue and "strengthen and improve" the OSCE. Many delegations noted that significant substance would be a necessary precondition to any summit. France said a summit would have three major goals: reaffirmation of commitments in all three dimensions, provide an impetus to resolve currently intractable issues (protracted conflicts and CFE),and define principles and mechanisms for confronting new transnational threats. The EU statement by the Swedish Presidency simply stated an openness to a "high-level meeting (motivated by substance." ¶4. (SBU) a large majority of the interventions began with praise for the Greek initiative of launching the CP and observations how it has revitalized the dialogue on European security and refocused needed attention on the principles and work of the OSCE. Many pushed for a balance in the discussions among all three dimensions as topics are identified. The Swedes, as EU Presidency, said the CP had "great potential." Ukraine stressed the importance of OSCE as an anchor for any European Security dialogue, while Norway said the dialogue needed more structure and the next phase of Corfu could provide that structure. Canada said the next, higher level of the CP needed to produce results and deliverables. Finland agreed on the potential for the CP but emphasized improved implementation of commitments as a prerequisite to progress. More tangibly, several felt the CP could pave the way to better mechanisms on conflict prevention with some, such as the Lithuanians and the Danish, singling out the U.S. proposal made last month to empower the Chairmanship to dispatch an expert team to trouble hotspots. This clearly worried the Russians and their statement stressed the lasting need for consensus on all things. ¶5. (SBU) Most delegations commented on the intention of the Greek Chairmanship for the Ministerial to have an overall political declaration, as well as a declaration and decision on the CP. All voiced support for the trio of documents, but often highlighting differing, at times competing, priorities. The Swedes called for the CP documents to reflect "clear and strategic" ambition and they pressed for the five themes (conflict prevention, transnational threats, human rights, arms control/CSBMs, implementation of commitments) which they said "provide a solid strategic direction" for the process. Russia welcomed the CP but emphasized that it must respect existing OSCE structures ("As with doctors, first rule is do no harm to the patient"). It should be more about fortifying political will than reconfiguring OSCE structures. Belarus agreed on preserving existing structures and urged no new format either. ¶6. (SBU) Interventions also touched upon some of the other USOSCE 00000262 002 OF 002 decisions facing Ministers when they arrive in Athens. Many commented favorably on the transnational threats decision the U.S. is cosponsoring with Russia, citing the symbolic value of the cosponsorship team as well as its recognition of the need for OSCE to adapt to a shifting threat environment. A few (Russia and Belarus) decried the continued imbalance in OSCE activities in favor of the human dimension, while others, notably, Canada said that is a signature OSCE strength. Others praised Kazakhstan's initiative to host a tolerance conference in 2010, with Turkey calling it an "important impetus." A substantial number praised the energy security decision, although Russia cautioned that the OSCE's role in that area has yet to be clearly defined. Several urged progress on stalled arms control and confidence and security building measures, with some, notably Germany, noting that momentum in the CP could help jumpstart progress. Lunch Discussion ¶7. (C) Over a CiO-hosted lunch, following the Reinforced PC, for select ambassadors and high-level reps from capitals, delegates expressed some optimism for the final stage of negotiations for the Athens Ministerial. All focused on the more positive tone in the Corfu Process which has facilitated a real exchange of informal views on European security. Germany and Russia had not yet seen the latest JCG revised language on the CFE paragraph for the political declaration and maintained their insistence on language for a review of the Vienna Document. When questioned by the ChargQ about possible Russian flexibility on language in the counternarcotics decision to allow a limited training project, Deputy FM Grushko expressed surprise that any flexibility was expected. Germany had earlier expressed its own skepticism. This Russian-sponsored decision will fail without addition of two words: "in Afghanistan." Comment ¶8. (C) Ministerial expectations are still teetering between optimism that the OSCE is on to something with the CP and the usual skepticism that this is just more talk about talk leading to nothing new and failing to overcome growing mistrust and divisions. The decision by S and some other key Western European Ministers not to attend has sown additional doubts about underlying commitments and interest in the OSCE. Nevertheless, a critical mass of participating State still feel the OSCE is best placed to tackle Europe's ongoing unease over security fueled by the protracted conflicts, Russia's grumbling and the search for a more effective continental approach to transnational threats FULLER