Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE245
2009-10-30 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:  

FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR

Tags:  KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG 
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DE RUEHVEN #0245/01 3031326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301326Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6680
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000245 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RADALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR ND CNTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR
ATHENS

REF: STATE 111008

Classified By: Arms Control Chief Chris Ellis, Acting; Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000245 SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RADALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON, FRIEDT OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR ND CNTCOM: FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG SUBJECT: FSC: TRYING TO MOVE RUSSIA ON VD99; GEARING FOR ATHENS REF: STATE 111008 Classified By: Arms Control Chief Chris Ellis, Acting; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a "sidebar" with the Russians ) and in a subsequent follow-up discussion ) Ulyanov was receptive to the idea of working with the U.S. to "explore ways to strengthen current arms control and CSBM instruments, but not in exchange for specific language "to conduct a review of the Vienna Document 1999." Ulyanov believed Moscow would welcome working with the U.S. on considering individual CSBM proposals, but he also said Moscow was compelled by the imbalance of first to second and third dimension draft decisions for Athens to press forward a draft Ministerial Decision to review Vienna Document 1999 (VD99),especially since "so many others have expressed support" for the Russian language. Ulyanov expects to have a response to the U.S. proposal from Moscow by early next week. Several Allies (Italy, Turkey, Hungary, France, and Germany among others) indicated at the October 28 NATO Caucus support for the Russian proposal to review VD99 in order to keep Russia "on board" the Corfu Process. ¶2. (SBU) Meanwhile, the October 28 Forum for Security Cooperation wrapped up its Security Dialogue for the year ) with presentations by civil society groups on cluster munitions and Gender-specific small arms and light weapons issues ) and now turns its attention on preparations for the December 1-2, Athens Ministerial. All FSC Chairman reports should be circulated by the week's end. In Working Group "B," Russia laid down a marker that the proposed draft decision on Issues Relevant to the FSC was inadequate. Georgia and Russia continued their exchange on the significance of capturing the implications of the Tagliavini report in the pre-Ministerial language. Working Group "A" continued to have no movement. Meanwhile the U.S. briefed the quad (France, Germany and UK) on the (reftel) response to the Russian proposal for review of Vienna Document 1999 (VD99). The deadline for any amendments to the Chairman's progress reports is November 11 (see para. 11). End Summary.
;¶3. (C) Prior to the FSC plenary, the U.S. Del briefed the UK (Gare),France (Simonet) and Germany (Risse) on the response to Russia's proposed draft ministerial decision to review VD99. France and Germany were appreciative of the effort, but only the UK expressed satisfaction and support that the U.S. drew on the language from the Draft "Issues Relevant to the FSC," remarking that the phrasing was actually Russian. The U.S. underscored the importance of not re-opening VD99 in a way that may not be controllable or towards outcomes that would not be in our interests. ¶4. (C) Subsequently the U.S. (Ellis) discussed with Russia (Ulyanov) the U.S. proposal, clearly stating Washington "will not agree to a separate decision on a review of VD99." While appreciative of the U.S. proposal, and confident that Moscow would agree to a joint effort "in which individual CSBM proposals are advanced and considered on their own merits," Ulyanov noted Russia was compelled to table its draft decision on a review of VD99, otherwise the imbalance of ministerial decisions on the other dimensions would be unacceptable. (NOTE: Ulyanov also stated ) without an explicit linkage ) Russia's wholesale rejection of the U.S. proposal to strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms. End Note.) He said Russia was careful in drafting its language to avoid controversial language (i.e., "negotiate"),and to make the decision as broad as possible. He argued that the U.S. proposal would fit within the Russian draft decision. The U.S. countered that the Russian language was in fact more limited in scope than the U.S. proposal, pointing out the Russian draft language locks discussion into VD99, while the U.S. offered Moscow flexibility to explore ways to strengthen the current arms control and CSBM instruments as stand alone measures, for possible incorporation into VD99, or another OSCE instrument. Ulyanov said he would convey the U.S. points to Moscow, and while the way ahead would probably be USOSCE 00000245 002 OF 003 welcomed, we should not expect Russia to withdraw its draft decision for VD99 Review. ¶5. (C) Comment: Ulyanov was sincerely appreciative of the U.S. offer to identify together specific CSBM issues, well aware of the USG's criteria (significance, balance, and verifiability). Unfortunately, Russia has made gains with those allies who are concerned that the Corfu Process was wavering because there was nothing in it for Moscow. Several Allies at the October 28 NATO Caucus expressed support for the Russian proposal to review VD99 ) without discussing either how to construct a quid pro quo or what would be risked in a generic review of VD99. Because Russia was careful to note it would not abandon VD99 during the process, these allies believe they have nothing to lose by accepting the Russian language. The tone is increasingly one of some allies in the OSCE (e.g., Denmark, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal and Greece) valuing consensus for the sake of consensus. End Comment. Security Dialogue: CM Victims and Small Arms Gender Issues ¶6. (SBU) The FSC Plenary had presentations from Stan Brabant, Head of Policy for Handicap International on a victim's perspective on cluster munitions' from Vanessa Farr, Project Manager of Gender and Disarmament and Reintegration, UNIDIR; and Sarah Masters, Women's Network Coordinator for the International Action Network on Small Arms. All three presentations detailed the impact of these weapons on people and communities. Brabant challenged those OSCE states that have not signed the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions to do so. Farr reviewed the history of excluding gender references to violence, security, and arms control issues to the detriment of programmatic developments that do not direct resources effectively on controlling small arms acquisitions and the motives behind them. Masters noted the disproportionate impact that small arms and violence have on women and families, underscoring the importance of security sector reform and gender roles in post-conflict resolution. ¶7. (SBU) The EU Presidency (Sweden) called for National Action Plans in line with the 2008 EU comprehensive Approach to Implement UNSCRs 1325 and 1820. Germany noted its efforts towards humanitarian clearance of mines and unexploded ordinance, including cluster munitions. The U.S. noted its policy to reduce the humanitarian impact on civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by cluster munitions, including the June 2008 DoD Policy signed by Secretary Gates and promotion of negotiations in the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Working Group "B" ¶8. (SBU) The two draft ministerial decisions, on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (MC.DD/4/09/Corr.1) and on Issues Relevant to the FSC (MC.DD/8/09/Corr 1),each received preliminary review from Working Group "B." The SALW/SCA Draft Decision received vocal support from France and Sweden. U.S.-proposed language on the SALW/SCA draft was taken on board in OP.2, tiret 2 and tiret 4, that respectively added flexibility to develop an SALW plan of action "taking into consideration, as appropriate," the survey of suggestions made at the OSCE SALW Review Meeting; and to "take concrete steps" to implement the International Instrument to identify and trace illicit SALW. A revised draft will be circulated by the UK Chair. ¶9. (SBU) The draft Issues Relevant to the FSC was more problematic. Russia (Ulyanov) challenged the reproduction of the 2008 format, citing changes in the security environment including the Corfu process. Ulyanov criticized the reference (OP.2, first tiret) to "intensify the security dialogue" without further explanation of what that would entail. He expressed concern the paragraph suggested issues that were "not directly related to European Security, per se, and needed better elucidation on how to proceed." He argued for restoring a "true discussion" over the role of arms USOSCE 00000245 003 OF 003 control in European Security, including the need to improve the mechanisms. Russia said it will circulate written proposals to the draft. Georgia (Giorgadze) followed with its own suggestion to revise the Security Dialogue insert (OP.1, second tiret),to mention specifically the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, and the Tagliavini report. The UK Chair after the not unexpected verbal exchanges between Georgia and Russia, noted that there were "differences in opinion" and ended the discussion by closing out Working Group "B." Working Group "A" ¶10. (SBU) Nearly all of the documents for consideration in Working Group "A" were retained for the next agenda. Russia (Geyvandov) noted it was waiting for final instructions on the Agenda and Modalities of the 20th AIAM (FSC.DD/9/09),but expected some proposed amendments; Application of digital cameras for VD99 (FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev.1). (Note: on the margins of the FSC Turkey (Bekar) noted that Azerbaijan was opposed to the proposal on digital cameras, but that Ukraine and Belarus now fully supported. End note.) The UK chair retained on the agenda the Russian Food-for-Thought paper on an analysis of the implementation of VD99 (FSC.AIAM/2/09). Ukraine (Leshenko) introduced its own Food-for-Thought on Interpretations of Some Provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 Chapter I, "Annual Exchange of Military Information" (FSC.DEL/196/09),which would cover deployed or non-resident combat units separated from their primary location. Ukraine asked that the FFT be placed on the November 11 agenda for WGA. ¶11. (SBU) The proposal for a draft decision on an update of FSC Decision 15/02 on SALW was revised and circulated following Spain's announcement of co-sponsorship (FSC.DEL/193/09/Rev.1). The UK Chair noted all of the Chair's Progress Reports would be in circulation by the week's end, including on SALW, SCA, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspect of Security, and CSBMs. Any amendments delegations wished to make on the progress reports should be received no later than November 11 in order for the reports to be prepared in time for the Ministerial. The U.S. announced it was circulating on behalf of the co-sponsors a revised Food-for-Thought on Preparation of Best Practice Guides for Implementation of UNSCR 1540: an OSCE Compendium of Suggested Implementation Practices (FSC.DEL/246/07) to account for the progress made since its original distribution. FULLER

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