Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE243
2009-10-29 15:27:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:
KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF OSCE: A SLIPPERY SLOPE
how-toVZCZCXRO3680 PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHVEN #0243/01 3021527 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 291527Z OCT 09 FM USMISSION USOSCE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6676 INFO RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0062 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0138 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0347 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0013 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0105 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1763
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000243
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF OSCE: A SLIPPERY SLOPE
USOSCE 00000243 001.2 OF 002
SUMMARY
-------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000243
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF OSCE: A SLIPPERY SLOPE
USOSCE 00000243 001.2 OF 002
SUMMARY
--------------
1. Following an October 21-25 visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
some of the participating nine OSCE Chiefs of Missions shared notes
and perspectives. Although the consensus was that we must take steps
to ensure "normality" during the Kazakh chairmanship of the OSCE in
2010, the group suspected that Kazakhstan may actually have a
well-developed plan to avoid issues they dislike, especially in the
third dimension, and run the organization the way they want,
focusing on their values and selective views on first and second
dimension security issues. The USG will need to be very vigilant,
consult closely with the EU-which appears to be developing fissures
on OSCE policy, and ensure close collaboration and sharing of
information between EUR and SCA, including their constituent posts.
Impact of a Summit on OSCE Work
--------------
2. If there is a formal OSCE Summit in 2010, the OSCE rules of
procedure preclude any other major meetings during that year,
including the HDIM, the Economic Forum, the Annual Security Review
Conference, and the Ministerial Council. In other words, much of the
major work of the OSCE will be set aside during a Summit year since
Summits are usually held to approve major new OSCE directions and
require three weeks of Prepcom meetings to review implementation of
previous commitments. (We do not think this is the type of Summit
that the GoK has in mind.)
3. In a lunch hosted by the Greek CiO October 27 for the head of
ODIHR and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (who both spoke
in that day's Corfu Process meeting),the Kazakh ambassador
confirmed our suspicions. Following an informal discussion of ways
to improve the HDIM, including the suggestion that the Kazakh CiO
invite NGOs to participate in a follow-on Corfu Process meeting in
Vienna next year to get their ideas and input on how to improve the
HDIM, he stated bluntly: "Since there will be a Summit, there will
be no HDIM next year." This is the first that Kazakhstan has openly
stated this fact.
4. The following day, the Kazakh ambassador told CDA Fuller that he
had meant this comment as a joke, but no one at the lunch, or
subsequently, has read it that way. The German ambassador was so
furious that he said he intended to openly work against the Summit
idea. The French ambassador was alarmed and said he was going to
immediately report this to Paris; by the NATO Caucus meeting the
next day, however, he had clearly received instructions to support a
Summit.
5. With guidance from EUR, USOSCE has never given any positive
indication about the Summit idea, due to lack of substance. We now
have an additional reason why this would be a bad idea under the
Kazakh chairmanship. We should, if anything, try to steer discussion
towards a high-level conference, perhaps on Afghanistan or Central
Asian security concerns. Of course, any Summit or high-level
conference will likely invite participation by regional
organizations, such as the CSTO and the CIS.
FOCUS ON TOLERANCE
--------------
6. Kazakhstan's emphasis on this topic will enable them to showcase
an area in which they have done well in the third dimension.
Unfortunately, it will divert attention from the more critical areas
of fundamental freedoms and basic human rights where they are doing
so poorly. If the key CiO focus in the third dimension remains
tolerance and there is no HDIM, there will be little space for NGO
criticism of Kazakhstan, or any other country, on other issues. We
need to be careful not to play into a possible trap on this issue.
Silencing the OSCE field Mission
--------------
7. During the October 21-25 visit of nine OSCE Chiefs of Mission to
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE mission director in Astana
advised that a gentleman's agreement was made between the SYG and
the GOK that the mission will do no spot reporting during the Kazakh
chairmanship. This was the price paid in July for Kazakhstan to keep
the Mission open--in the face of an expressed threat by the GOK to
close it. None of the nine COMs had been aware of this arrangement.
The Finnish former CiO agreed that the participating States will
have to speak out against such an arrangement next year.
8. On October 27, the Greek CiO confirmed this agreement. She
said that Kazakh Secretary of State/FM Saudabayev had made it quite
clear in June that he was not going to allow the OSCE mission to
send negative reports while his ambassador Kairat Abdrakmanov was in
the Chair. Later that day, the SYG confirmed that he had indeed
USOSCE 00000243 002.2 OF 002
made the gentleman's agreement, but at the direction of the Chair.
He said it had been the only way to preserve the OSCE Mission. CDA
Fuller protested that this was blackmail and that if the GoK closed
the mission just prior to assuming the chair, the non-democratic
message would have been quite clear and the reaction from the
international community would have been very strong. His response
was that this was a Greek CiO decision. (Comment. USOSCE senses
that the new Greek government is taking a firmer hand on OSCE
matters than the previous one and changing the instructions to the
CiO in Vienna. Washington may want to consider having Embassy
Athens talk with the new Greek PM/FM about the OSCE and the upcoming
Kazakh chairmanship, among other issues.)
Georgia
--------------
9. The Greek CiO advised CDA Fuller on October 27 that she had
received unsettling news from her Georgian colleagues about the
October 20 visit of a Kazakh high-level delegation to Tbilisi led by
deputy FM Zhigalov. The Georgians understand the Kazakh message to
be that they did not agree with any OSCE presence being "status
neutral" (i.e., no impact on the recognition of South Ossetia
Abkhazia),but wanted to ensure "equality." She said the Georgians
were quite worried. Kazakh OSCE ambassador Abdrakmanov denied to
CDA Fuller on October 29 that there was any intention of Kazakhstan
to change the OSCE approach. Embassy Tbilisi might want to check
with the Georgians to get their version of the Kazakh mission and
its possible implications.
10. On the positive side, the Kazakhs have apparently taken our
suggestion that their intended Special Representative on conflicts
Nurgaliev, who is currently the head of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, attend the next round of Geneva talks. It will not be
enough for him to understand the situation, but at least he will
meet the players and make himself known.
Comment
--------------
11. On the way back from the Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan trip, four of
the COMs met to share notes and agreed that the best thing we could
do during the Kazakh chairmanship in 2010 would be to hold the line
and prevent any further erosion of the OSCE principles and
procedures. Unfortunately, the new information provided above
suggests that the GoK may have developed a plan for ensuring that
only the issues it wishes to address are dealt with during 2010. In
the last 10 years, Kazakhstan has focused extensively on developing
regional cooperation on security and economic issues--which match
the first and second dimensions. Although it will continue to
repeat its declaration of support for the OSCE acquis and the third
dimension (including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law),
it will skillfully steer the agenda to other issues, using the full
force of the power that the United States and other western
countries built into the OSCE CiO position.
12. Civil society representatives from the five Central Asian
countries with whom the ambassadorial delegation met on the trip
berated the international community for having allowed Kazakhstan to
become chair and thereby erode the credibility of the OSCE. They
all insisted that the situation of human rights has deteriorated in
the region in at least the last year. It also appears that the
Central Asian countries are beginning to copy one another's
excesses. The lack of due process in the Zhovtis case in Kazakhstan
sent a chill throughout the region. Kyrgyzstan's recent
governmental reorganization which placed the MFA under the authority
of the president goes further than the Kazakhstan Secretary of
State's assumption of the FM minister position. Previous graduates
from Uzbekistan from the masters program at the OSCE Academy in
Bishkek were threatened with consequences if they ever sought a job
in an international organization.
13. It is clear that we are going to be facing a far more difficult
situation under the Kazakhstan chairmanship than simply holding the
line. This will definitely require a concerted effort on the part of
EUR and SCA and their respective posts to collaborate closely and
share information to meet this challenge.
FULLER
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF OSCE: A SLIPPERY SLOPE
USOSCE 00000243 001.2 OF 002
SUMMARY
--------------
1. Following an October 21-25 visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
some of the participating nine OSCE Chiefs of Missions shared notes
and perspectives. Although the consensus was that we must take steps
to ensure "normality" during the Kazakh chairmanship of the OSCE in
2010, the group suspected that Kazakhstan may actually have a
well-developed plan to avoid issues they dislike, especially in the
third dimension, and run the organization the way they want,
focusing on their values and selective views on first and second
dimension security issues. The USG will need to be very vigilant,
consult closely with the EU-which appears to be developing fissures
on OSCE policy, and ensure close collaboration and sharing of
information between EUR and SCA, including their constituent posts.
Impact of a Summit on OSCE Work
--------------
2. If there is a formal OSCE Summit in 2010, the OSCE rules of
procedure preclude any other major meetings during that year,
including the HDIM, the Economic Forum, the Annual Security Review
Conference, and the Ministerial Council. In other words, much of the
major work of the OSCE will be set aside during a Summit year since
Summits are usually held to approve major new OSCE directions and
require three weeks of Prepcom meetings to review implementation of
previous commitments. (We do not think this is the type of Summit
that the GoK has in mind.)
3. In a lunch hosted by the Greek CiO October 27 for the head of
ODIHR and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (who both spoke
in that day's Corfu Process meeting),the Kazakh ambassador
confirmed our suspicions. Following an informal discussion of ways
to improve the HDIM, including the suggestion that the Kazakh CiO
invite NGOs to participate in a follow-on Corfu Process meeting in
Vienna next year to get their ideas and input on how to improve the
HDIM, he stated bluntly: "Since there will be a Summit, there will
be no HDIM next year." This is the first that Kazakhstan has openly
stated this fact.
4. The following day, the Kazakh ambassador told CDA Fuller that he
had meant this comment as a joke, but no one at the lunch, or
subsequently, has read it that way. The German ambassador was so
furious that he said he intended to openly work against the Summit
idea. The French ambassador was alarmed and said he was going to
immediately report this to Paris; by the NATO Caucus meeting the
next day, however, he had clearly received instructions to support a
Summit.
5. With guidance from EUR, USOSCE has never given any positive
indication about the Summit idea, due to lack of substance. We now
have an additional reason why this would be a bad idea under the
Kazakh chairmanship. We should, if anything, try to steer discussion
towards a high-level conference, perhaps on Afghanistan or Central
Asian security concerns. Of course, any Summit or high-level
conference will likely invite participation by regional
organizations, such as the CSTO and the CIS.
FOCUS ON TOLERANCE
--------------
6. Kazakhstan's emphasis on this topic will enable them to showcase
an area in which they have done well in the third dimension.
Unfortunately, it will divert attention from the more critical areas
of fundamental freedoms and basic human rights where they are doing
so poorly. If the key CiO focus in the third dimension remains
tolerance and there is no HDIM, there will be little space for NGO
criticism of Kazakhstan, or any other country, on other issues. We
need to be careful not to play into a possible trap on this issue.
Silencing the OSCE field Mission
--------------
7. During the October 21-25 visit of nine OSCE Chiefs of Mission to
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE mission director in Astana
advised that a gentleman's agreement was made between the SYG and
the GOK that the mission will do no spot reporting during the Kazakh
chairmanship. This was the price paid in July for Kazakhstan to keep
the Mission open--in the face of an expressed threat by the GOK to
close it. None of the nine COMs had been aware of this arrangement.
The Finnish former CiO agreed that the participating States will
have to speak out against such an arrangement next year.
8. On October 27, the Greek CiO confirmed this agreement. She
said that Kazakh Secretary of State/FM Saudabayev had made it quite
clear in June that he was not going to allow the OSCE mission to
send negative reports while his ambassador Kairat Abdrakmanov was in
the Chair. Later that day, the SYG confirmed that he had indeed
USOSCE 00000243 002.2 OF 002
made the gentleman's agreement, but at the direction of the Chair.
He said it had been the only way to preserve the OSCE Mission. CDA
Fuller protested that this was blackmail and that if the GoK closed
the mission just prior to assuming the chair, the non-democratic
message would have been quite clear and the reaction from the
international community would have been very strong. His response
was that this was a Greek CiO decision. (Comment. USOSCE senses
that the new Greek government is taking a firmer hand on OSCE
matters than the previous one and changing the instructions to the
CiO in Vienna. Washington may want to consider having Embassy
Athens talk with the new Greek PM/FM about the OSCE and the upcoming
Kazakh chairmanship, among other issues.)
Georgia
--------------
9. The Greek CiO advised CDA Fuller on October 27 that she had
received unsettling news from her Georgian colleagues about the
October 20 visit of a Kazakh high-level delegation to Tbilisi led by
deputy FM Zhigalov. The Georgians understand the Kazakh message to
be that they did not agree with any OSCE presence being "status
neutral" (i.e., no impact on the recognition of South Ossetia
Abkhazia),but wanted to ensure "equality." She said the Georgians
were quite worried. Kazakh OSCE ambassador Abdrakmanov denied to
CDA Fuller on October 29 that there was any intention of Kazakhstan
to change the OSCE approach. Embassy Tbilisi might want to check
with the Georgians to get their version of the Kazakh mission and
its possible implications.
10. On the positive side, the Kazakhs have apparently taken our
suggestion that their intended Special Representative on conflicts
Nurgaliev, who is currently the head of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, attend the next round of Geneva talks. It will not be
enough for him to understand the situation, but at least he will
meet the players and make himself known.
Comment
--------------
11. On the way back from the Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan trip, four of
the COMs met to share notes and agreed that the best thing we could
do during the Kazakh chairmanship in 2010 would be to hold the line
and prevent any further erosion of the OSCE principles and
procedures. Unfortunately, the new information provided above
suggests that the GoK may have developed a plan for ensuring that
only the issues it wishes to address are dealt with during 2010. In
the last 10 years, Kazakhstan has focused extensively on developing
regional cooperation on security and economic issues--which match
the first and second dimensions. Although it will continue to
repeat its declaration of support for the OSCE acquis and the third
dimension (including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law),
it will skillfully steer the agenda to other issues, using the full
force of the power that the United States and other western
countries built into the OSCE CiO position.
12. Civil society representatives from the five Central Asian
countries with whom the ambassadorial delegation met on the trip
berated the international community for having allowed Kazakhstan to
become chair and thereby erode the credibility of the OSCE. They
all insisted that the situation of human rights has deteriorated in
the region in at least the last year. It also appears that the
Central Asian countries are beginning to copy one another's
excesses. The lack of due process in the Zhovtis case in Kazakhstan
sent a chill throughout the region. Kyrgyzstan's recent
governmental reorganization which placed the MFA under the authority
of the president goes further than the Kazakhstan Secretary of
State's assumption of the FM minister position. Previous graduates
from Uzbekistan from the masters program at the OSCE Academy in
Bishkek were threatened with consequences if they ever sought a job
in an international organization.
13. It is clear that we are going to be facing a far more difficult
situation under the Kazakhstan chairmanship than simply holding the
line. This will definitely require a concerted effort on the part of
EUR and SCA and their respective posts to collaborate closely and
share information to meet this challenge.
FULLER