JOINT FSC-PC 14 OCTOBER: ISAF DEPUTY COMMANDER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000224 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, NILSSON, FRIEDT OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG SUBJECT: JOINT FSC-PC 14 OCTOBER: ISAF DEPUTY COMMANDER URGES "EXPEDITIONARY POLICE" CAPABILITIES ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Dutton appealed to the joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council (FSC-PC) for developing "expeditionary police" capabilities that would parallel those of the military for building capacity in Afghanistan. Dutton also emphasized sustained "political will" as the primary factor for mission success. There appeared to be unanimity in the FSC-PC for further OSCE engagement in Afghanistan, especially for border security, rule of law and other governance issues. ¶2. (SBU) Meanwhile, the plenary adopted the Best Practice Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts (FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2). In Working Group "B," Russia suggested the group move forward with its proposal for Naval CSBMs under the pretense that "no comments" from delegations implied consent. The U.S. made clear its concerns. We expect Russia will continue to press on this issue as well as their proposal to amend VD99. No draft documents were moved to plenary from Working Group "A." End Summary. Deputy ISAF Commander ¶3. (SBU) The 41st Joint FSC-PC, held on October 14, ) unusual in that it was the second Joint session in a month ) featured Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Jim Dutton's frank appraisal of the shortfalls to achieving a success in Afghanistan. He introduced his brief with the blunt assessment, "The single likely cause for strategic failure in Afghanistan would be the loss of political will to see this through." Following his rapid review of achievements (e.g., successful Pakistani engagement and cooperation on the border, Afghan National Army budgeting, credible plan for developing the Aghan National Police, evolution of the political and democratic process),he warned that the positive masked the reenergized insurgency, public perceptions of decline, press skepticism, lowered expectations, and calls among some for an early "exit." He noted insurgents also read the press and use it to rationalize a strategy of "waiting out." ¶4. (SBU) Dutton underscored ISAF's military achievements were not the best measure for success in Afghanistan, but were only one component of a strategy to gain the initiative, consolidate gains, and make the gains sustainable as the best path towards an exit strategy. He explained the goal was not about defeating the insurgency, but neutralizing its ability to threaten the stability of the Government of Afghanistan or the security of its people. He underscored the need for sufficient resources to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP),which he characterized as wasteful, deficient in leadership, and corrupt with a high proportion of drug addicts. He argued for creating an expeditionary capability for national police forces that could be deployed to Afghanistan to train and mentor the ANP in the same way that the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is designed to do. ¶5. (SBU) Dutton also advocated for a different strategic approach to strengthen the counter-insurgency operational culture, the security partnership away from its preoccupation with force-protection, responsive and accountable governance (key to comprehensive security),and organizational changes focused on "unity of effort." He noted Afghanistan needed to connect subnational to national governing institutions, to improve PRT coordination, to focus on rule of law issues, and to improve the resources-to-task ratios. Dutton argued the Taliban was weak and defeatable by the Afghanis with our help, but he advised no insurgency is defeated without some level of political reconciliation. ¶6. (SBU) Sweden (Nesser),speaking for the EU and the several candidate, Stabilization and Association countries among others, inventoried EU member states' commitments to Afghanistan including in the areas of civilian reconstruction, governance and rule of law, policing, as well as border management and customs administration. Sweden further suggested OSCE consider cooperating with Afghanistan to enhance border security, counter-terrorism, to combat radicalization, trafficking in drugs and persons and promote respect for human rights and regional cooperation. Sweden noted these would contribute to not only Central Asia but the whole OSCE area and beyond. USOSCE 00000224 002 OF 003 ¶7. (SBU) The U.S. (Fuller),Canada (Gregory),Russia (Azimov) each made statements supporting OSCE's niche, value-added capabilities. Russia called for a greater role for it in NATO discussions with ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, and more discussion in the NATO-Russia Council especially on addressing counter-narcotics strategies, including coordination between NATO and the CSTO. Turkey (Buluc) supported OSCE engagement to assist Afghanistan in border and police and counter-narcotics training. ¶8. (SBU) Dutton responded to various points, thanking Russia for its contribution to opening up the air corridor for supplies, noting that the counter-narcotics component in Afghanistan was important but not as serious as focusing on Pakistan and Iran components, encouraging OSCE members states to consider developing an expeditionary police capability to help build ANP capacity, and underscoring that the minimization of civilian casualties was ISAF's top priority, though statistically the collateral damage was extremely low. Vienna Doc 99 "Contacts" BPG Adopted ¶9. (SBU) Following the Security Dialogue (Agenda Item 2),the plenary agreed to the Draft Decision on the Best Practice Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts (FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2). Under AOB, the Greek Chair (Bakoyannis) announced that it requested Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to present to a special session of the Permanent Council the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mision on the Conflict in Georgia at a mutually agreeable date. Also under AOB, the CPC Director (Salber) reported on the OSCE presentation to the 1540 Review Meeting in New York. Sweden marked the tenth anniversary of ESDP. Naval CSBMs ¶10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) recommended moving its Proposal for a Draft Decision on CSBMs in the Naval Area (FSC.DEL/120/08/Rev.2) to Working Group "A" for discussion since it had received no comments from delegations on it. "This implied consent," Ulyanov said (Note: knowing full well that over half of FSC pS had expressed concern about Russia's proposal in the past year. End note.). Russia also requested that its AIAM proposal to amend VD99 (FSC.AIAM/2/09) be placed on the agenda of Working Group "A." ¶11. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) drew upon standing generic guidance refuting the need for naval CSBMs (98 STATE 156529). Russia attempted to underscore the U.S. was missing the point in that Russia was seeking to address only the issue of Chapter 1 of its proposal, "Exchange of Military Information." The U.S. noted in addition to the problematic language in Chapter 1 (i.e., "zone of application"),the information Russia was requesting was readily available through open sources, and thus added no value. The U.S. reiterated that absent a highly unusual situation in which a clear national interest would be served, it remained U.S. policy not to enter into discussions regarding naval CSBMs that would impinge on operations in international waters. Russia retorted that such arguments would apply equally to land forces and perhaps we did not need the Vienna Document (Comment: at this point several delegations rolled their eyes! End comment.) Russia said the U.S. position was not an acceptable reason to not discuss the issue of Naval CSBMs in that the Russian proposal if for a specific area and would not impinge on U.S. moving ships through the Mediterranean. ¶12. (SBU) The Chair (UK) moved off the agenda item when no delegation requested the floor following the last Russian intervention. The Chair did announce that it would move the Russian AIAM proposal to the following week's agenda for Working Group "A." Working Group "A" ¶13. (SBU) There were no current implementation issues raised. Under Item 2, VD99, the Chair kept the draft decision on the Agenda and Modalities of the 20th AIAM (FSC.DD/9/09) on the agenda for the following session "to give all delegations an opportunity to obtain guidance from capitals." Turkey's revised proposal for a draft decision on possible FSC action towards improving the application of VD 99 compliance and verification measures (now digital cameras only) was USOSCE 00000224 003 OF 003 acknowledged with Belarus and Sweden expressing support for the draft. It remains on the agenda for the next WGA. ¶14. (SBU) Under Agenda Item 3, Sweden, a co-sponsor along with Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK, introduced the revised Food For Thought paper on an update of FSC Decision 15/02 on expert advice on implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on SA/LW (FSC.DEL/151/09/Rev.1). The U.S. (Ellis) said with the revisions it could now support the draft. The chair will keep the document on the agenda for the next WGA. ¶15. (SBU) There were no interventions under Agenda Item 4 (SCA). Under Item 5 (Code of Conduct),the CPC reported it was organizing with Austria a November 5 regional workshop in Sarajevo on Security Sector Reform and civilian oversight of the Armed Services for South East Europe. Under Item 6 (other CSBMs),the Czech Republic reported below threshold and demonstration of major equipment airbase visit under the VD99. ¶16. (U) The next WGA is scheduled for October 21, following WGB and the FSC plenary. Fuller