OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 1 - 3, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000199

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: MARR OSCE PGOV PREL KZ GG RU
SUBJECT: OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: SEPTEMBER 1 - 3, 2009

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for Reasons 1.4(B)&(D)

Below are highlights from the Daily Digest of the U.S.
Mission to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe. These and other articles can also be found on
Intelink at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/
Portal:Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Georgia: CiO Fears Disrupting Geneva Discussions


1. (SBU) At the weekly U.S.-CiO meeting September 1, Greek
PermRep Marinaki reaffirmed the ChairmanshipQ,s intent to
delay its decision on opening the proposed two-person Office
of the Special Representative in Tbilisi until after the
September 17 round of Geneva discussions. Marinaki said
Athens had concluded the office might give the South
Ossetians (and the Russians) an excuse to boycott the talks,
and was reluctant to do anything to jeopardize the
discussions. Turning to another threat, Marinaki mentioned
Russia had linked the Geneva discussions to GeorgiaQ,s draft
UNGA resolution on IDPs, stating in an August 31 non-paper
circulated in New York that the resolution, if adopted, would
be Q&harmfulQ8 for the Geneva talks. ChargQ Fuller
acknowledged the GreeksQ, concerns about the September 17
Geneva talks, but urged them to move forward afterwards with
the Office, and to find creative ways to continue OSCE
engagement in Georgia. On a related note, Marinaki reported
that representatives of the Tagliavini Commission
investigating the August 2008 war had interviewed four former
OSCE military monitoring officers in Vienna August 18, but
Q&had broken no new ground.Q8 Marinaki said the Chairmanship
likely would invite Tagliavini to address the Permanent
Council after the anticipated late-September release of the
CommissionQ,s report.

Corfu: CiO Outlines Possible Ministerial Decision


2. (SBU) At the same meeting, Marinaki suggested this
fallQ,s Corfu meetings could lead to a detailed Ministerial
Council decision providing for the continuation of the
process during KazakhstanQ,s 2010 OSCE Chairmanship and
beyond. The Greeks would like the decision to include a
short list of future discussion topics and key logistical
parameters to Q&lock inQ8 the process. On the subject of
KazakhstanQ,s occasional mention of a possible Corfu-like
informal ministerial next year, Marinaki said she had made
clear such a meeting was not feasible, and had encouraged the
Kazakhs to lower their expectations. She added, however,
that Athens was vaguely considering preempting the KazakhsQ,
proposal for an autumn meeting of the secretaries general of
the Q&Big FiveQ8 regional security organizations (the OSCE,
the CSTO, the CIS, the EU, and NATO) by organizing an
informal meeting in Vienna or on the margins of the Athens
Ministerial. According to Marinaki, the EU might be
receptive to such an idea, but NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen reportedly had encouraged a more cautious approach
in a recent conversation with his OSCE counterpart. The
ChargQ cautioned that any decision on the future of European
security discussions should be driven by substance, and urged
the Greeks to avoid any implication of an equivalency between
NATO and the CSTO.

Russia to Send Reps from Moscow to Corfu Process Discussions


3. (C) Russian Ambassador Azimov told ChargQ dQ,affaires
Carol Fuller during her initial courtesy call August 31 that
Russia intended to bring officials from Moscow for at least

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half of the ten scheduled Q&Corfu ProcessQ8 discussions of
European Security scheduled for this autumn. MFA European
Security Director Voronkov would attend the meeting of
September 15 that will include a joint FSC/PC review of the
ASRC recommendations. DFM Grushko is slated to attend the
November 24 Reinforced Permanent Council dedicated to
preparation of an Athens Ministerial decision. Russia will
seek, per Azimov, to put the focus more on arms control,
confidence building measures, and CFE in the Corfu
discussions, and will seek a separate FSC decision to this
effect. Russia also has urged the CiO to invite CSTO, CIS,
NATO, and EU delegations to the Corfu discussions.
Separately, Greek/CiO Ambassador Marinaki told ChargQ
September 1 that this proposal had been rejected. Azimov
also said Russia would continue to argue for, but not insist
on, the proposed high-level meeting of CSTO, CIS, NATO, EU,
and OSCE. AzimovQ,s welcome to ChargQ Fuller was old-school
charming and intentionally calculated to Q&disarmQ8 US
concerns about a Russian hard lineQ*just as he had done in a
courtesy call on former Ambassador Finley in August 2008
before becoming RussiaQ,s Q&attack dog.Q8 Privately,
Marinaki advised ChargQ that Azimov did seem to have softened
his tone a bit this week, but doubted this reflected any
policy changes.

NATO Caucus on Corfu Process


4. (SBU) At the Sept. 2 NATO Caucus, Greek/CiO Ambassador
Marinaki commented on the CiOQ,s goals and the process of the
scheduled Corfu discussions. The Greeks are working toward
an outcome at the Athens Ministerial that would include a
decision providing a list of topics for future work and a
structure for the future discussions. They will also seek a
political declaration on European Security that sends a
strategic message. Marinaki qualified these objectives by
noting that the purpose is to Q&identify shortcomings and
address if and when a dialogue will take place after
Athens.Q8 The next three months of discussions will include
at least the scheduled 10 meetings at Permrep level, with
support from capitals as desired. She noted that Russia has
indicated it would have support from capitals for most of the
meetings. She said Russia accepted the list of topics,
though it had lobbied for others (including, no doubt, a
charter and OSCE Q&reformQ8) and was gearing up in the MFA to
support the discussions. Marinaki said there will be no
participation from other international organizations or, with
a few exceptions, from academic experts. The meeting on
Sept. 15 was in three parts, and included a separate FSC/PC
meeting that would feature Russian MFA European Security
Director Voronkov presenting Russian views on follow-up to
the ASRC conclusions. Lithuanian Ambassador Norkus cautioned
that we needed to ensure that European Security would not
proceed on two tracks, with the FSC discussions running
parallel to the Corfu Process. Turkish Ambassador Buluc
noted that review of CFE and Open Skies problems could only
be done in the treaty-defined bodies (JCG for CFE) and were
not the domain of the Corfu Process.

Corfu: EU Plans Q&Message of Common DirectionQ8


5. (SBU) Sweden/EU Ambassador Bard-BringQus outlined
September 2 the EU approach to the Corfu meetings, saying the
EU would seek to deliver a Q&message of common direction,Q8
while permitting national delegations to state individual
view. This would be facilitated through a series of internal
meetings: September 7 on First Dimension issues; September
14 on the Human Dimension; and September 22 on the Economic

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and Environmental Dimension. Bard-BringQus agreed that
continued EU-U.S. coordination would be essential throughout
the process. ChargQ noted that Greek/CiO Amb. Marinaki had
told her Greece was considering holding an informal meeting
of the secretaries general of the Q&Big FiveQ8 regional
security organizations (the OSCE, the CSTO, the CIS, the EU,
and NATO) either before Athens or on the margins of the
ministerial; this caught Bard-BringQus by surprise. She said
unilateral Greek approval of such a meeting Q&would pose
difficulties for the EU familyQ8 given the EU decision-making
process.

Georgia: EU Laments Russian Threats to Geneva Talks


6. (SBU) In ChargQ FullerQ,s first weekly meeting with the
EU Troika September 2, Swedish PermRep Bard-BringQus said the
Greek Chairmanship had reaffirmed its fears Russia would use
GeorgiaQ,s draft UNGA resolution on IDPs to Q&kill the Geneva
talks.Q8 Bard-BringQus noted Russia had asked Germany,
Belgium, Greece, and Cyprus to vote against the resolution,
and said CyprusQ, decision to abstain had Q&severely
damagedQ8 hopes for a united EU statement. Turning to the
ChairmanshipQ,s proposed Office of the Special Representative
in Tbilisi, Bard-BringQus reaffirmed that Russian threats to
cancel the Geneva discussions if an Office were established
had led the Chairmanship to Q&suspendQ8 further efforts to do
so. ChargQ Fuller reminded Bard-BringQus that the United
States sees a need for an OSCE presence in Georgia and wants
to see the topic raised again after the September 17 Geneva
discussions.

Georgia: Russia Urges Less Rhetoric, More Pragmatism


7. (SBU) In his response in the September 3 Permanent Council
meeting to EU and U.S. statements outlining well-known
positions on Georgia, Russian PermRep Azimov declared that
Russia was Q&getting tired ofQ8 hearing the same rhetoric
Q&over and over,Q8 and urged a more Q&pragmaticQ8 approach to
the Q&new situationQ8 in Georgia. Later, following a
Georgian intervention detailing the deteriorating security
and humanitarian situation, Azimov shifted emphasis, focusing
on GeorgiaQ,s domestic political situation and Q&appealingQ8
to Representative on Freedom of the Media Harazsti to Q&take
the necessary stepsQ8 following Georgian authoritiesQ,
September 2 denial of entry to two Russian journalists.
Separately, the Greek CiO made clear that South Ossetian de
facto authorities had denied access to Tskhinvali to Special
Representative ChristopoulosQ, vehicle Q) not the special
representative himself Q) on August 12, and added that
alternative transportation arrangements had been made for the
Geneva co-chairsQ, September 9-11 trip to Georgia.

Violence against Human Rights Defenders and Journalists in
Russia


8. (SBU) The United States, Sweden (on behalf of the EU and
associated states),Canada, and Norway expressed serious
concern about the spate of violent attacks on human rights
defenders and journalists in Russia and called on Russia to
undertake immediate, full, and transparent investigations
into these crimes in order to counteract the prevailing
climate of impunity. Russian PermRep Azimov offered his
condolences to the families of the victims and insisted that
his government is taking the investigations seriously. He
then deplored the fact that this issue was raised in the PC
in what he termed a Q&confrontationalQ8 manner. He
questioned whether this poisoning of the atmosphere, coming

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as it does on the eve of discussions on European security,
was intentional, part of the Q&political gamesQ8 played by
some participating States.

U.S. and EU Criticize Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on Media
Freedom


9. (SBU) The United States and the EU expressed deep concern
about the conviction of Kazakh journalist Ramazan Yesergepov
on charges of disclosing state secrets, and called on
in-coming Chair Kazakhstan to fulfill its OSCE commitments on
media freedom. Kazakhstani PermRep Abdrakhmanov defended the
conviction, asserting that Yesergepov had consciously
violated Kazakh law and was held accountable in accordance
with domestic legislation. According to Abdrakhmanov, the
case has nothing to do with media freedom; Yesergepov is
merely using his status as a journalist to attempt to escape
punishment for his crimes. Similarly, the United States and
the EU criticized the conviction and sentencing of Uzbek
journalist Dilmurod Sayid for extortion and forgery. Both
statements drew attention to what the EU called Q&a
disturbing patternQ8 in using the criminal justice system to
silence political opponents in Uzbekistan. In response, the
Uzbek PermRep professed surprise at othersQ, Q&selective
approachQ8 in singling out his country. He cited a new
attitude by Q&certain countriesQ8 to use human rights issues
as a pretext for interfering in UzbekistanQ,s internal
domestic affairs. In a somewhat curious defense of the GOU,
he said Sayid was convicted not as an individual, but as a
member of a group.

HoM Ashgabat Cites Improvements in Turkmenistan


10. (SBU) In his address to the Permanent Council, Head of
the OSCE Center in Ashgabat Ambassador Zekolli highlighted
increasing contacts with the Government of Turkmenistan
(GOTX),citing Q&first everQ8 projects in trafficking in
persons; training for prosecutors, judges, and defense
lawyers; penitentiary reform; and training for Turkmen and
Afghan border and customs officials. Zekolli lamented as
Q&significantly unchangedQ8 conditions facing the media and
identified limits on student travel as a worrisome matter
warranting further attention. Nonetheless, he said the
prevailing view in Ashgabat is that the situation is
Q&greatly improved.Q8 While the EU strongly rebuked
Turkmenistan for its lack of progress on human rights issues,
Russia urged that future reports Q&focus more on practical
issues and less on the political situation in the host
country.Q8 Turkmen PermRep Aydogdyev publicly (and
privately) thanked the United States for recognizing positive
developments. He glossed over the issue of student travel by
pointing to bilateral agreements with other governments as an
apparent solution. He also said so-called human rights
prisoners incarcerated in Turkmenistan were, in reality,
terrorists and criminals, and warned that the GOTX would not
participate in the HDIM if three previously identified
individuals representing Turkmen NGOs were admitted.

Russia Criticizes European Parliament Elections


11. (SBU) Russian PermRep Azimov criticized the June European
Parliament (EP) elections and the perceived bias of ODIHR
toward Western European countries. Azimov stated that the EP
elections should not be a benchmark in how to conduct
elections, Q&but rather the opposite.Q8 He pointed out that
there is no single election control body and alleged that
different national legal standards and norms within the EU

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create problems. He also noted that differences between the
applicability of the Nice and Lisbon Agreements (the Lisbon
Agreement not yet being in force) have created Q) and will
continue to create Q) inequalities between EU member States.
Azimov implied that ODIHR is biased in favor of Western
European countries, and applies different standards for
different elections. The Chair noted that ODIHR was not
present to respond.

Response to ODIHRQ,s Preliminary Findings on the Kyrgyz
Presidential Election


12. (SBU) Delegations from Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus
responded critically to the July 24 preliminary findings and
conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission.
The Kyrgyz PermRep urged that the Kyrgyz Central Election
Committee (CEC) should work together with ODIHR in order to
have a more Q&impartial and accurateQ8 assessment of the
election proceedings. He alleged that the elections were
conducted in accordance with the Copenhagen Agreement, and
called for some of ODIHRQ,s findings to be revised. He
claimed Q&technical problemsQ8 with some election monitors,
and said Q&professionalQ8 monitors should be utilized in
order to respect the sovereignty and laws of the host State.
As part of RussiaQ,s continued assault against ODIHR election
observation, Ambassador Azimov said there should be new rules
for election observation missions. Belarus added that ODIHR
election monitoring during the Kyrgyz presidential election
was Q&very transparent,Q8 but alleged that standards differ
for election observation missions, depending on where they
are.
FULLER