CFE/JCG:JUNE 30:RUSSIA REPEATS ACCUSATIONS OF NATO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000153 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL SUBJECT: CFE/JCG:JUNE 30:RUSSIA REPEATS ACCUSATIONS OF NATO VIOLATIONS AND MOVING GOALPOSTS; QUOTES BIBLE TO JUSTIFY POSITIONS ¶1. (SBU) Summary. In a relatively lengthy JCG meeting, Canada refuted Russia's 16 June claim that Canada did not understand Russia's views on actions versus words. Russia commented on its Aide-Memoire, stating that the Parallel Actions Package requires considerable work to flesh out necessary details which should be done in Vienna. Russia said it requires a clearly defined timeline for all States Parties on ratification and urged provisional application. Russia also said following A/CFE signing in 1999, NATO referred to only one condition for ratification -- this being that Russian forces in the flank be reduced to within A/CFE limits. Once Russia drew down its forces there and met NATO's one condition, NATO Allies allegedly created new conditions that Russia had to meet before they would submit A/CFE for ratification. These were new "political" conditions. ¶2. (SBU) The U.S. and other Allies declined to debate history with Russia, but did refute its allegations in general terms and referred to the high-level bilateral talks and the package as the way forward. Subsequently, ten Allies took turns criticizing Russia in support of a French intervention condemning Russia for rejecting a CFE inspection by France. In reply, Russia accused NATO of seriously breaching the CFE Treaty as a consequence of enlargement, which in turn prompted charged replies from Turkey and Italy. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - It all starts out normally with Canada Pushing Back... - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) At the 30 June 2009 JCG, Canada (Linteau) refuted Russia's 16 June JCG charge that Canada did not understand Russia's claim that the Parallel Actions Package consists of "Russian actions for NATO promises." Linteau thanked Russia for the Aide-Memoire and reassured Russia that the Aide-Memoire was being carefully studied in its capitol. Linteau said that Canada fully supports the Parallel Actions Package as the best way forward for progress on issues of concern to all States Parties. Furthermore, Canada very well understands Russia's positions on CFE, but agrees with the Allied position regarding when Allies will move forward on ratification of A/CFE. This is parallel actions by Allies and Russia, not "actions for promises" as alleged by Russia -- i.e., all move forward with matching steps so that all States Parties may fulfill their commitments while addressing concerns. - - - - - - - - - - - Russia Accuses NATO of Moving Goalposts on Ratification - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) thanked Canada for its support of the Russia-U.S. draft package of solutions, as well as for its "constructive" statement. However, Russia did not agree with Canada's claim that conditions need to be met in order for NATO Allies to move forward with ratification. Russia is familiar with this approach shared by all NATO states; however, the foundation for this position is political, not legal. In the 1990s, conditions were set when all committed to the Istanbul Commitments and thereby agreed to rapid ratification of A/CFE. ¶5. (SBU) Following A/CFE signing in 1999, NATO referred to only one condition for ratification -- it being that Russia was over-strength in the flank in the south. Ulyanov explained that was due to its anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya. Russia subsequently drew down its forces there and met NATO's condition. At that point, NATO Allies created new conditions, new "political" conditions. These "outside issues" have no relevance to the CFE Treaty itself. Ten years ago all the legal conditions were met for ratification of A/CFE; only political conditions prevent all from fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments, Ulyanov alleged. USOSCE 00000153 002 OF 005 - - - - - - - - - - - There seems to be a misunderstanding out there - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that in his contacts with other delegations, it was evident that there was not a clear understanding of Russia's matrix for future work. Some think that NATO and Russia must first agree on the text, and that this will then serve as a tool for negotiations with other countries. It is Russia's position that, if the U.S. speaks on behalf of all of NATO, which it seems to have a clear mandate to do, then any agreement between Russia and the U.S. will be final with no future fine tuning. ¶7. (SBU) Ulyanov then offered clarifications on Russia's Aide-Memoire. Russia wants direct reference in the Package to the necessity for States Parties to submit ratification instruments to the depository in order to prevent confusion (one country has already ratified the treaty but not yet deposited it, hence causing confusion). There also needs to be a clearly defined timeline for the schedule of all States Parties on ratification of the A/CFE. Last year Russia asked for an estimated schedule for ratification of the adapted treaty. While many countries were in the position to ratify it within 6-8 months, a number of states indicated they may require up to two years. Ulyanov noted that the accession of Albania and Croatia into NATO took less time than that; this shows the genuine priorities of NATO -- that NATO expansion has a higher priority than A/CFE. - - - - - - - - - - - Another pitch for Provisional Application of A/CFE - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Russia went on to stress that it understands that there are no absolute guarantees of having A/CFE ratified within 12 months--the executive branches can not provide a guarantee since ratification depends on the Parliaments. Therefore, in its Aide-Memoire, Russia proposed provisional application of A/CFE, similar to what was done in the beginning of the 1990s when Germany requested provisional application of the CFE Treaty. Provisional application of A/CFE could be accomplished in two stages. ¶9. (SBU) The first stage would be 6-9 months long when all states make the political commitment to act IAW the objectives of A/CFE and to comply with its limitations. In the second stage, after the majority of states have ratified the adapted treaty, then provisional application would go into effect. Russia is not asking for concessions -- provisional application provides the requisite predictability of implementation of A/CFE in addition to addressing the concerns of countries that have spoken out against the Russian moratorium. Ulyanov then promised to provide further explicatory statements on the Russian Aide-Memoire before the summer break. - - - - - - - - - - - Allied Support for Canada's Stand - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) supported Canada. Turning then to reply to Russia, Neighbour noted that the U.S. had already responded to Russia's points on a number of occasions -- we had replied in Vienna, in Berlin 3 weeks ago, and in the high-level bilateral negotiations. However there were two points that he would make in response. The first concerned Albania and Croatia--without claiming to speak for a legislative body, he observed that there was a long period of implementation of their Membership Actions Plans. This allowed parliaments to prepare for ratification so that the ratification legislation could be quickly approved. In contrast, the actions and approach of the Russian Federation USOSCE 00000153 003 OF 005 at present on CFE do not provide the encouragement for legislatures to begin anytime soon to prepare to consider ratification of A/CFE. Russia's actions, such as "suspension," have had the opposite effect. Second, while saying his delegation had no intention of debating historical details, Neighbour observed that the Istanbul Commitments were part of the package in Istanbul that enabled the signature of all parties to A/CFE. He emphasized that "host nation consent" was an integral part of the package deal then, and is in both A/CFE and CFE. It is also part and parcel of the Parallel Actions Package, which is the best way forward. ¶11. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova),Germany (Schweizer) and the UK (Gare) similarly expressed support for the Canadian statement. Schweizer (stressed that at the highest levels, NATO has made it perfectly clear that it has a great interest in the CFE regime and in ratifying A/CFE. Agreeing with the UK, Schweizer reiterated that it was not political promises for political promises, but political intent. Here in the JCG we can only talk about formulations because we're not Parliaments and we're not ratifying. It is a question of pre-conditions and the Parallel Actions Package. Germany agrees with Russia when it says the Package can't be opened again, but we must establish a precondition of negotiations so that we can move forward to ratification of A/CFE. - - - - - - - - - - - Can we have that in writing? - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) The UK expressed gratitude to Russia and the U.S. for their statements and asked whether Russia would append its comments -- both today's and its promised future clarifications -- to the journal. To the surprise of many delegates, Ulyanov stated that he would refrain from appending his statement, that his oral statement was sufficient. He explained that the statement would first need to be agreed upon by the Russian Interagency; "comments and clarifications take time to get approved." Ulyanov stated that he intentionally spoke slowly and therefore his colleagues had ample opportunity to write down what he said. He would answer any and all questions. - - - - - - - - - - - Russia Urges Bilateral Talks on Package Details in Vienna - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov said he referenced Albania and Croatia to demonstrate that the accession of new NATO states was a greater priority than ratification of A/CFE. Albania and Croatian accession took a year, but some countries say it may take up to two years for ratification of A/CFE. Turning to host nation consent, Russia has it to be in South Ossettia and Abkhazia. States that don't agree with Russia apparently view host nation consent from a U.S. definition. However, the U.S. does not respect host nation consent. For example, U.S. forces have been in Cuba for over 50 years without host nation consent from Fidel Castro and despite Cuba having asked for the U.S. to leave. Also, the U.S. went into Iraq without host nation consent. Allies should find a country with a more honest record than the U.S. for adhering to the principle of host nation consent to argue this point for them. ¶14. (SBU) Ulyanov further amplified Russia's position. He said that on 5 May at the JCG, the U.S. delegation said first there would have to be agreement on the parallel package in the high-level bilateral track. Russia can't agree to that. The specific details are integral part of the package. If there are no details, then there is no package. Ulyanov urged his colleagues and other countries to step up this process. It is hard to negotiate such a large package with so many details at high levels. This is why Russia suggested USOSCE 00000153 004 OF 005 that to complement U.S.-Russia high-level bilateral meetings; there should also be meetings in Vienna that follow the U.S.-Russia format to work out details in support of high level talks. Both Russia and the U.S. already large delegations with instructions from their capitols here in Vienna who have the knowledge to work these details. This would help achieve a full-fledged Parallel Actions Package. ¶15. (SBU) In a brief reply, the U.S. (Neighbour) responded that a number of first order issues must be resolved in talks in the current bilateral format. Only then could talks in other venues be productive; to do otherwise this would disaggregate the Package. - - - - - - - - - - - Allies Pile-on Russia over Inspection Refusal - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (SBU) France reported that on 23 June, Russia refused a CFE inspection in the flank inspection zone. This inspection would have occurred during the timeframe of 29 June-5 July. France "condemned" Russia's refusal of the inspection and noted the consequential inability of France to use this valuable tool for transparency and verification. Turkey, the U.S., Romania, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, and Georgia expressed support for France's statement that called attention to Russia's non-compliance to the CFE Treaty. - - - - - - - - - - - Noncompliance? I'll tell you what's noncompliance... - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (SBU) In response to the Allied condemnation of Russia's refusal of France's inspection, Ulyanov said he would refrain from the ritual response regarding inspections. He pointed out that a number of delegations used the term "noncompliance," however only three weeks earlier, he had raised the serious violation of quantitative elements of the treaty and asked when they would be removed. He planned to share specifics at the next meeting of the JCG. Nonetheless, noncompliance by certain States Parties, nay, the "breach of the agreement" persists. Ulyanov demanded to know when partners intended to cease this brazen breach of the existing treaty. - - - - - - - - - - - Turkey and Italy slap Russia with legal rebuttals... - - - - - - - - - - - ¶18. (SBU) Turkey (Begec) immediately responded with a reminder that it had provided a legally-based rebuttal 3 weeks ago to this allegation of noncompliance. Obviously irritated, he explained that NATO enlargement does not equate to a breach of the treaty nor noncompliance. Ulyanov agreed that the "expansion" of NATO was not a breach of the CFE Treaty; however, he argued that breaches occurred as a result of the consequences of the expansion of NATO. Limits set forth by the existing treaty (Article IV) were breached. Begec took the floor again and pointed out that CFE divided States Parties into two groups* "Western Group" and "Eastern Group," which at the time, corresponded to the unnamed then-NATO and Warsaw Pact. Begec noted that it can't be a breach since the Treaty did not foresee a change to these groups. ¶19. (SBU) Italy (Negro) provided full support for the Turkish comments, adding that Article Two of the Treaty defined the State Parties and noting that this was not a moving article--it doesn't change with the years. Therefore, no violation could have occurred since there was no provision regarding future composition of the two groups. The U.S. (Neighbour) stated that the U.S. fully agreed with the Turkish and Italian analysis -- they are absolutely correct USOSCE 00000153 005 OF 005 that there was no violation of the treaty. However, the solution to Russia's concerns is addressed by A/CFE and the route forward to that is the Parallel Actions Package. - - - - - - - - - - - Violation of the Treaty? Let's talk about what happened a year ago... - - - - - - - - - - - ¶20. (SBU) Not missing an opportunity to remind the JCG of recent events in Georgia, Georgia (Giorgadze) highlighted that while Russia had used the term "gross violation" in its previous comments about NATO expansion, there had in fact been a violation of the Treaty that occurred only last year when Russia invaded Georgia. - - - - - - - - - - - Why are we arguing about something we agree about? - - - - - - - - - - - ¶21. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) stated he had listened attentively and was amazed at the discourse. It seemed that everyone had forgotten why in 1999 there was an attempt to achieve consensus to sign A/CFE. Political changes caused the need for changes of CFE. That's why A/CFE came about and it was determined to have national and territorial ceilings. This legalistic discussion doesn't help regarding the NATO expansion and its affects on an outdated treaty. The important aspects of the CFE regime are the matter at hand now. Ratification of A/CFE is the means of continuing the notification, verification and implementation regimes. Everyone needs to move forward on A/CFE, not look backward. - - - - - - - - - - - The final benediction... - - - - - - - - - - - ¶22. (SBU) Ulyanov asserted that everyone needed to step up their efforts to find mutually acceptable agreements. Then, in his final repartee, and seemingly as a means of summarizing and justifying his points, Ulyanov, with a straight face, quoted the Bible, "It is easier to see the splinter in another's eye than to see the log in your own eye." Scott