OSCE 2009 ASRC SESSION II, STATES WELCOME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000151 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE SUBJECT: OSCE 2009 ASRC SESSION II, STATES WELCOME INCREASED DIALOGUE ON EURO SECURITY REF: A. USOSCE 00147 ¶B. USOSCE 00150 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Session II of the 2009 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) on June 24 centered on arms control and CSBMs--in particular the status of CFE, CSBMs, Russia's European Security Initiative and the value of expanded dialogue. The keynote speakers, Klaus-Peter Gottwald of the German MFA and Russia's MGIMO Professor Kulebyakin, read familiar, but very different assessments of the causes behind the current impasse on CFE. Both, however, stressed the importance of the regime and expressed hope for progress through negotiations on the parallel actions package, positions that were universally supported around the table. Allied interventions noted the importance and complimentary relationship between of CSBMs and CFE, remaining on message. ¶2. (SBU) Kulebyakin and Russia repeatedly referred to Russia's call for a European security treaty, but did not describe Russia's proposal in detail, which was in Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's message from the previous day's opening round (reftels). Most interventions welcomed additional opportunities for dialogue on European security; Russia proposed another FSC Security Dialogue session on the future of arms control for this fall. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Same Presentations, Different Venue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) German MFA Disarmament and Arms Control Commissioner Gottwald read his statement verbatim. (Gottwald's statement was distributed as PC.DEL/478/09.) Closely following his remarks from the June 10 German MFA-sponsored meeting in Berlin on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," Gottwald underscored that arms control had played a key role in disarmament and confidence-building in an integrated security policy in the Euro-Atlantic area. He asserted that two of the three most important elements of European arms control (CFE and VD99) have suffered considerable damage in recent years and are in need of repair. He said that CFE is our greatest cause for concern and requires additional support and new (unspecified) structural elements. Gottwald linked nuclear and conventional disarmament, and opined that initial progress in U.S.-Russian 
bilateral strategic talks could pave the way for progress on conventional arms control. Finally, Gottwald predicted that military developments will have to be assessed to determine their security-related consequences; that basic calculations for force balance will have to shift from a quantitative to a qualitative focus. ¶4. (SBU) In turn, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) Professor Kulbyakin's keynote address, which he also read verbatim, seemed to be a cut-and-paste compilation of several official Russian statements and documents, including, inter alia, Russia's "aide memoire." (Kulebyakin's presentation was distributed under PC.DEL/479/09.) He recalled the hopes of Russian leaders in 1980s and 90s, regretting that their optimism turned out to be "naive illusions." ¶5. (SBU) He said that Russia's "suspension" of CFE was a logical response to CFE,s "balance principle being violated in the most brazen manner" due to three waves of NATO expansion and NATO armaments raised to levels far beyond those laid down under the 1990 treaty. He further cited NATO positioning itself as a "global corporate security organization operating outside the bloc's borders on its own discretion," and NATO's disregard for Russian calls for CFE USOSCE 00000151 002 OF 004 legal norms to be brought into alignment with the current state of affairs as justifying the Russian actions on CFE. ¶6. (SBU) As stated in Russia's aide memoire on CFE distributed in May, Kulbyakin noted that the parallel action package could become the basis for progress on ACFE, provided that the package adequately addressed Russia's concerns on: flank limitations, NATO force levels, concrete NATO actions on accession of new NATO members, definition of substantial combat forces and future modernization of the treaty after entry into force. He repeated Russia's offer to consider certain transparency measures regarding Moldova and the Trans-Caucasus, "with due account being taken of the actual circumstances in those regions." ¶7. (SBU) The remainder of Kulebyakin's address covered familiar Russian criticisms of VD99. He attempted to assuage pS concerns over opening VD99 and promoted Russian proposals for naval and international Rapid Reaction Force CSBMs. Kulbyakin refrained from re-reading Minister Lavrov's marketing pitch for a new European Security Treaty, but cautioned critics of Russia's proposal who cite its lack of specifics to put "everything in its proper order: first, questions of principle, followed by attention to detail." ¶8. (SBU) Kulbyakin closed by cautioning pS against taking unilateral actions that will create new dividing lines. He reiterated that Russia does not contemplate the dismantling of existing institutions or abandonment of agreements such as CFE, VD 99 or Open Skies. The OSCE must be one of the appropriate platforms for discussion of European Security, but not the only one. - - CFE - - ¶9. (SBU) Nearly every intervention reaffirmed the importance of CFE and the need to work on the basis of the Parallel Action Package to bring ACFE into force. Gottwald remarked that CFE is an "absolutely essential pillar of European Security," while Spain (Batanzos Roig),Greece, the U.S.(Neighbour),Lithuania (MFA Director of Tran-Atlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Department -- Leskevicius) and Poland (Gradzinski),Kazakhstan, Russia (Ulyanov), Armenia (Kirakossian),Georgia (Garprindashvili) and Belarus all confirmed the key role CFE has played since 1990. ¶10. (SBU) Poland (Gradzinski) cautioned that the current state of affairs, where one state is not fully implementing its commitments, can not continue indefinitely. Gradzinski said that loss of CFE would mean the loss of transparency and confidence, as well as the loss of information. Greece cautioned that no arms control regime can function effectively with the existence of "black holes" within its area of application. Lithuania (Leskevicius) recounted how the consequences of CFE's erosion go beyond the boarders of States Parties. He lamented the fact that its bilateral CSBM with Russia, which included information exchange on Kaliningrad, had been a casualty of Russian suspension. Leskevicius also confirmed Lithuania's intent to join A/CFE, repeating that Lithuania is ready to begin discussions on accession as soon as ACFE enters into force. He said that Lithuania "wishes to be firmly anchored into the solid European arms control structure." Leskevicius and Gradzinski emphasized that the parallel actions package represents the only credible way to move forward on ACFE. ¶11. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) submitted that the real obstacles preventing the Adapted CFE Treaty from entering USOSCE 00000151 003 OF 004 into force have been Russia's unilateral "suspension" of the CFE, its lack of respect for host nation consent, and non-fulfillment of all of its Istanbul commitments. He also reiterated the U.S. commitment to working with Russia on the basis of the Parallel Actions Package to find a solution that takes account of all treaty partners and allows all to ratify ACFE. Greece welcomed Russia's aide memoire and said it sees merit in exploring an update to A/CFE after it enters into force. Kazakhstan noted it was reviewing Russia's Aide Memoire and said Russia's proposal for provisional application was particularly interesting. Kazakhstan also opined that the JCG could play a supplemental role in A/CFE negotiations. Armenia's Kirakossian called for enhanced accountability and mechanisms to ensure compliance. ¶12. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) echoed Kulebyakin's assessment of the Parallel Action Plan, calling on Western Allies to intensify work on CFE on the basis of the package, and noting that Russia's aide memoire provides a vision for a way forward. He cited examples where Russia and its partners had overcome significant obstacles in 1990's to agree on CFE as proof that, given political will, Russia and its NATO partners could overcome any difficulty. - - - CSBMs - - - ¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov reiterated Russian views on the need to update VD99, to pursue Russian proposals on Naval and Rapid reaction Force CSBMs, and to conduct an internal inventory of current politico-military instruments available to the OSCE. Kazakhstan said it could support any measure that enhanced transparency. Noting what he characterized as the "dubious implementation of certain CSBMs," Armenia (Kirakossian) said there was a need for an enhanced role for hard security and to increase the effectiveness of the FSC's toolkit. Poland (Gradzinski) said that while soft security could assist in political solutions to security problems, soft measures could not replace CSBMs. Participating States must find a way to ensure CSBMs are "all weather" measures, and they should concentrate their efforts on conflict prevention measures. ¶14. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that despite acute challenges, overall implementation of VD99 has generally gone well. He recalled that although Russia regularly calls for updating VD99, Russia's robust application of verification activities dwarf the activity of any other pS. Finally he urged partners to make clear specific concerns, recognizing that many such issues have already been discussed within the FSC and not led to agreement. The U.S. also urged continuing efforts to address concerns stemming from 21st century threats, but said this can be accomplished without needlessly detracting from VD99, which is working well. - - - - - - - Euro-Security - - - - - - - ¶15. (SBU) Spain (Batanzos Roig) recognized five possible areas of convergence on Europeans security--the central role of the OSCE; the primacy of existing principles, organizations and agreements; the necessity of a multi-dimensional approach, the need to adjust mechanisms to address regional and sub-regional security issues; and the importance of CFE. ¶16. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reiterated its characterization of European Security as in a state of crisis. He explained that Russia's focus on hard security is based on unfavorable USOSCE 00000151 004 OF 004 trends in this area. Comparing hard and soft regimes, Ulyanov noted that some 80 conventions and agreements under the Council of Europe relate to the human dimension of security, while the collection in Europe's pol-mil sphere includes only three. Of the latter, CFE is in crisis, VD99 is outdated and functions at less than 50 percent effectiveness, and only one third of the Treaty on Open Skies works as designed. Finally, citing the "rearming of Georgia," Ulyanov lamented that other politico-military aspects of security are not fully implemented. Ulyanov stressed the importance Russia attached to a legally binding European Security Treaty. - - - - - - - - - Expanded Dialogue - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (SBU) Nearly every delegation commented favorably on the June 10 German MFA-sponsored meeting in Berlin on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe". Spain (Batanzos Roig),and Lithuania (Leskevicius) thanked Germany for their relentless efforts, while Kazakhstan welcomed the meeting. Poland (Gradzinski) proclaimed, "The main objective--to revitalize dialogue--was achieved." Spain thanked Germany and said it expected that Corfu would result in consensus on how to proceed with dialogue on European Security. ¶18. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) hailed Germany's "pan-European summit in Berlin" as an example of ways in which pS can expand dialogue. He proposed that pS maintain momentum by holding a special FSC session in November on the "Future of Conventional Arms Control." Ulyanov also suggested that the FSC begin drafting a ministerial decision for Athens, tasking the FSC to intensify its work in the area of arms control. ¶19. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that in Berlin, the Allies sent a consistent and unified message regarding CFE, which among other things, stressed the need to address first order issues before other venues for negotiations to solve the impasse can be productive. Scott