OSCE: LAVROV AT ASRC ADDS LITTLE ON NEW SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000147 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG SUBJECT: OSCE: LAVROV AT ASRC ADDS LITTLE ON NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Addressing the opening session of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) June 23, Russian FM Lavrov ploughed familiar ground in terms of the rationale and outline of the Russian proposals to strengthen European security architecture. He attributed much of the deterioration of Europe's security over the past decade to NATO enlargement, which has splintered any chance for a common commitment to indivisible security across all of the OSCE area. He argued there were three factors contributing to impaired security: lack of trust between governments, risks of internal ruptures, and the inability of the international community to respond. Lavrov urged participating States to recommit to non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, renounce the use of force to settle conflicts, adhere to international mechanisms for regulating conflict and provide support for international organizations dedicated to preventing conflict. He said a new security architecture would have four major building blocks: interstate relations, arms control, conflict management, and new threats. ¶2. (SBU) In response, many delegations raised the protracted conflicts, citing the Georgia case in particular and urging Russian agreement to re-establish an OSCE and UN presence in the disputed territories and respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. The Georgians expressed concerns about the security situation within Russia, citing Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, and cited inconsistencies between Russia's professed respect for territorial integrity and last summer's war in South Ossetia. In addition to the prepared statement, the U.S. also responded to Lavrov by defending NATO enlargement as a bottom-line contributor to enhanced European security and involving willing states on all sides. In response, Lavrov defended Russia's actions leading to the war with Georgia and in trying to secure a "status-neutral" continuation of the international presence. End summary. Lavrov Opens ASRC -------------- �00A; ¶3. (SBU) At the opening session of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference on June 23, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the first ASRC was held at the request of the U.S. in the months after 9/11 to address the threat of terrorism. In 2009, the OSCE was again confronting threats and problems as profound as terrorism, including shortcomings in the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security. Although the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had disappeared, Europe has yet to establish a common system of security. Some states continue to pursue their own security at the expense of the security of others, he argued, in violation of the NATO Charter and even Kant's categorical imperative to treat others as one would want to be treated, a principle reflected in President Obama's recent speech in Cairo and Article IV of the French Declaration on the Rights of Man from 1789. ¶4. (SBU) Although Russian president Medvedev had already proposed a new concept for European security, the devil would be in the details. This proposal would be based on existing institutions: NATO would not be dismantled and the OSCE would become a full-fledged, UN Chapter 8 regional organization. USOSCE 00000147 002 OF 005 It was too bad, then, that Russia's Western partners persist with plans for NATO expansion; quoting George Kennan, Lavrov termed enlargement "the Allies' greatest mistake in the last 50 years." This expansion was destabilizing and had led to the military gambles of some states on Russia's borders. The choice was between a common, indivisible security or the mere illusion of security. ¶5. (SBU) How could the common security be obtained? How should Russia react to NATO expansion? How can the needs of individual states be reconciled with the needs of the Euro-Atlantic area? Lavrov argued that the OSCE reflects a political commitment; NATO a legal one. A new security arrangement for the pan-Euopean area should be based on legal commitments by all Euro-Atlantic states. Threats to Address -------------- ¶6. (SBU) A new security arrangement will need to respond to a range of threats: traditional interstate tensions resulting from a lack of trust; internal threats within states resulting from religious and ethnic clashes; non-state problems that transcend national borders, including organized crime, drugs, and trafficking. Within the OSCE's area at present these threats were addressed by several different sub-regional groups with overlapping agendas that lacked focus. Yet the framework to address this range of threats, which had been developed at Istanbul in the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, has not been fully employed. There has been no long-term response to the need for a commonly accepted security architecture. Lavrov argued the CFE Treaty was an urgent priority when it led to the disarming of Russia and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, but the adapted treaty has now languished for ten years after Russia disarmed and Eastern Europe joined NATO. Another instrument to address common security concerns, the Vienna Document, was now only half-functioning, and many of its still effective measures were not implemented in good faith. New Architecture's Building Blocks -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Lavrov explained the Medvedev proposal for a new European security architecture would contain four major building blocks: - basic principles of state relations, including sovereignty, territorial integrity, restraint from use of force, and right to choose allies while eschewing the formation of military alliances, rejection of single state guarantors of the international system; - arms control and confidence-building measures, including non-aggressive defenses and non-stationing of substantial combat forces on foreign territory - conflict management principles based on a common approach, including the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, non-use of force, international mediation, protection of civilians, non-interference with peacekeeping forces, non-isolation of conflict zones USOSCE 00000147 003 OF 005 - new threats, such as proliferation of WMD, organized crime, and trafficking ¶8. (SBU) Russia had no ulterior motives in making these proposals. There was no need to worry: a common approach would be developed through the same process of dialogue and consensus that worked for Europe and Russia even during the Cold War. The discussions should take place in the NATO-Russian Council, EU-Russia consultations, and even bilaterally: Germany, France, and Finland had already made significant contributions to the dialogue. As few were satisfied with the current situation, Russia expected all pS would work together, without undermining the current institutions, to get beyond the "era of alliances." ¶9. (SBU) Lavrov proposed as a next step to convene a meeting of the heads of leading international organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, the EU, the CIS, and CSTO, on the basis of the Platform for Cooperative Security accepted by the OSCE. The discussion should focus on a comparative review of the organizations' different security strategies and the creation of a reliable architecture to meet the demands of "hard" security, without which "soft" security will never be tenable. The Medvedev proposal gives Europe another chance to "get it right." Failure to engage with the proposal would lead to a reversion to national approaches to security with negative consequences for the OSCE area. Lavrov warned against linking engagement with a new treaty for hard security with resolution of certain soft security concerns: "it would not be wise," he concluded. Lavrov on Georgia -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In response to interventions from Georgia and other delegations, Lavrov said Russia had circulated many documents at the OSCE explaining its position on Georgia; he urged delegations to read them for a full understanding of the Russian position. They contained facts, not allegations. While Russia had always supported the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity for the states of the South Caucasus, it was Georgia's President Saakashvili who launched the attack on South Ossetia after affirming as late as July 2008 that he would refrain from the use of force to resolve this territorial dispute and who told French President Sarkozy that the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should not be subject to an international discussion. ¶11. (SBU) Lavrov argued Russia supported pragmatic approaches to the problems of the South Caucasus that would include consultations with the authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia could again support an OSCE mission to the region, but it required consent from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and needed to recognize "realities on the ground." Lavrov said the UN still maintained a presence in the region, with representatives of UNICEF and the UNHCR in Abkhazia. Unlike some of Russia's partners, who were taking a non-pragmatic, ideological approach to issues in the South Caucasus and Kosovo, Russia preferred a common path to solving the problems of both these regions that emphasized fairness. Lavrov noted that an international police presence in the South Caucasus was rejected by EU High Representative USOSCE 00000147 004 OF 005 Solana, although Russia could still accept this. U.S. and Others Criticize Russia -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The keynote address by Lavrov on a new European Security Treaty was nearly overshadowed by participating States' general concern over the marked erosion of the security atmosphere since the last ASRC in 2008. Beginning with the Greek CiO's introduction, interventions repeatedly identified the August 2008 conflict in Georgia as the cause of a significant degradation in confidence within the OSCE region. Nearly all registered regret that pS could not reach consensus over the Greek CiO's compromise plan to extend the OSCE presence, including military monitors, in Georgia. Among others, the EU, Georgia, France, and the U.S. criticized Russia's recognition of Georgia's separatist regions. In a similar vein, most interventions admonished Russia for blocking a technical extension of UNOMIG. Nearly all agreed that the August crisis underscored the need for pS to reaffirm basic principles and improve the OSCE's conflict prevention and crisis response mechanisms. The U.S. also defended NATO enlargement as contributing to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and involving willing states on all sides. ¶13. (SBU) Aside from the August crisis, pS also reiterated concerns over the state of conventional arms control, specifically the lack of movement on CFE. Several noted that pS respect for existing commitments was a necessary precursor for successful discussions on future commitments and called on Russia to return to full implementation of its obligations under CFE. Others mentioned additional measures, such as the recent high-level meeting of experts in Berlin, as welcome steps in attempting to break the impasse. ¶14. (SBU) New and emerging threats also were raised in the opening session. Georgia expressed concern over the security situation within Russia, citing Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia as flash points that could impact security throughout the region. Several pS listed narco-trafficking, terrorism, nonproliferation, cyber crime, energy and environmental security, and illegal immigration as among the emerging threats. Kazakhstan and OSCE Asian Partner Mongolia noted the importance of stability in Afghanistan and proposed increased OSCE efforts to build security in the region. ¶15. (SBU) Despite these concerns, pS welcomed Minister Lavrov's presence as a clear sign that Russia is serious about improving security in the region. Several interventions noted the timeliness of a discussion of European security given the current state of affairs. Many identified the OSCE as the most appropriate venue for future discussions on European security. While Lavrov referred repeatedly to the Russian proposal on "hard security," many pS reinforced the view that any discussion should be multidimensional. Looking Forward to Corfu -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Finally, a number of pS welcomed the CiO Corfu USOSCE 00000147 005 OF 005 initiative as a logical next step to the assessment that pS would attempt over the course of the review conference. Belarus characterized the informal Ministerial as a logical link between the ASRC and the next Ministerial in Athens and expressed hope that pS would come to Athens with specific proposals. The CiO and Switzerland hoped that Corfu could result in a decision on how to proceed with dialogue. Scott