SCENESETTER FOR CORFU OSCE MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000146


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2010
TAGS: PREL OVIP OSCE XG XH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CORFU OSCE MINISTERIAL

Classified By: CDA KYLE SCOTT. REASONS 1.5 (B) (D).


1. (C) Your decision to attend this first-of-its-kind
informal OSCE Ministerial in Corfu is a strong signal of your
commitment to reinvigorate the OSCE. It marks a return to
high-level American engagement at the OSCE after a four-year
absence by the U.S. Secretary of State from ministerial-level
meetings. European countries have taken note and appreciate
the renewed engagement on European issues they have seen from
the new Administration. Your attendance at Corfu will send a
strong signal of our continuing commitment to keep European
affairs high on our national agenda.


2. (C) Your Greek hosts, and FM Bakoyannis in particular,
view your attendance as a hopeful sign for the success of
this meeting. In fact, other than ensuring broad high-level
participation in the meeting, Greece's goals for Corfu are
extremely modest. They see a risk that the NATO-Russia
Council session immediately prior to the OSCE meeting will
set the political tone for the broader OSCE discussions to
follow, so will want a good NRC as well. The Chairmanship
seeks no concrete outcomes -- but does hope to gain credit
for launching "The Corfu Process" of dialogue on European
security. For Greece, it seems, the meeting is the message.

OSCE: Barometer of Relations with Moscow
--------------


3. (C) Your goal of reinvigorating the OSCE remains a
challenge. The OSCE has always been a barometer of relations
with Moscow, and in recent years it has been in the
crosshairs of Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy.
Russia's frustration with its declining influence in European
affairs has been magnified by waves of NATO and EU
enlargement, the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and subsequent
development of new missile defense plans on European soil,
the stalemate in progress toward an adapted CFE agreement on
conventional arms control, NATO's refusal to engage on
Russia's other proposals for confidence-building measures,
Western actions in Kosovo, and increasingly close NATO, EU,
and bilateral relations with Russia's immediate neighbors.


4. (C) When ODIHR monitoring confirmed reports of election
fraud in Ukraine and Georgia, helping to spark color
revolutions along Russia's immediate borders, Moscow's
resentments boiled over. Russia has ratcheted up efforts to
curtail OSCE autonomy ever since. We spent several years
beating back Moscow's efforts to "reform" the OSCE -- a
transparent effort to hamstring the Organization and limit
its freedom of action. Moscow suspended its participation in
the CFE agreement 18 months ago. While holding the key to
resolving the protracted conflicts, Moscow passively or
actively resisted efforts to reach a settlement. Russia uses
its veto over budgetary decisions to stunt necessary growth
for ODIHR and OSCE Missions in the former Soviet Union, and
consistently opposes efforts to apply OSCE resources to the
growing tensions in Georgia. Sadly, the OSCE's military
monitoring operation along the South Ossetian conflict line
will conduct its final patrol just as ministers gather in
Corfu, while the all-encompassing OSCE Mission to Georgia
will cease operations at the end of the month -- in both
cases at Russia's insistence alone.

What Does Russia Really Want?
--------------


5. (C) Renewed OSCE engagement on Moscow's security concerns
could play a role in "pressing the reset button" with Moscow,
although the new spirit this Administration has brought to
Russian affairs has so far not resulted in any noticeable
change to Russia's belligerent approach in the OSCE. Russia's
antipathy to the OSCE's comprehensive security approach is
evident in Medvedev's ideas on a new model for discussion of
security in Europe -- one that focuses only on "hard"
security, and that calls for bringing in all players and
organizations under one big tent rather than concentrating
efforts in the OSCE. Your Greek hosts hope Corfu will
establish the OSCE as center stage for any overarching
security dialogue.


6. (C) Medvedev's appeal for a treaty-based system remains
vague and ill-defined. Many delegations hope FM Lavrov's
appearance at the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference
immediately prior to the Trieste G-8 meeting will provide
greater detail, but there are no indications he will offer
anything more substantial than the generalities we have heard
to date. For many of our European partners, Russia's ideas
sound unworkable, and even smack of hypocrisy in light of
Russia's August war with Georgia, which openly violated key
principles and OSCE commitments on sovereignty, non-use of
force, and host-country consent for the stationing of foreign
troops.


7. (C) They suspect Russia's real goal is to foment
disagreement among the nations of the West, and eventually
undermine NATO solidarity, while seeking a Russian veto over
NATO or EU strategic steps, particularly further expansion.
A more charitable view is that Russia would eventually be
satisfied with a bigger voice in decision-making on security
in Europe -- something they believe has been denied them in
the last decade. A healthy dose of skepticism is prudent:
from what we have heard thus far, Russia seems to have more
grudges than goals, and is using this process to air its
insecurities, drive wedges between trans-Atlantic allies, and
justify its aggression in Georgia. In order for the process
initiated at Corfu to have content, the burden should be on
Russia to demonstrate that it really seeks an agreed outcome.


What Others Want
--------------


8. (C) Russia's view of the security challenges in Europe is
completely different from that of most of the rest of the
OSCE:

-- Moscow focuses on NATO and EU encroachment on their
immediate neighborhood, but the rest of Europe considers
these steps benign or beneficial for security in Europe.

-- Moscow worries about our missile defense system; some in
Europe may be ready to abandon the project, but Europeans
still cast a wary eye at the missile capabilities being
developed in Iran and North Korea.

-- Russia seeks to downplay the importance of human rights,
while we and our EU partners worry about the slow reversal of
the gains of the 1990's in the post-Soviet space.

-- Moscow wants to keep the focus on hard security, while
Europeans are most concerned about the possible impact on
their lives of terrorism, energy security and climate change.

-- Russia seeks progress toward an "Adapted Adapted-CFE,"
while we and our allies worry about Moscow's abandonment of
the CFE treaty in force right now.

-- Russia sees 21st century threats of WMD, terrorism,
extremism, cyber-crime and narcotics trafficking as marginal
issues in the expected European security dialogue; our allies
see them as the looming threats that must play a central role
in discussions.


9. (C) For many of Russia's neighbors, the biggest security
concern is -- Russia. Its aggression in Georgia, energy
policies meant to monopolize transit corridors, and
manipulation of ethnic politics and other instabilities in
the post-Soviet space as it seeks to carve out spheres of
influence are seen as threats to their security and
prosperity.


10. (C) With the European security perceptions of most of the
OSCE and Russia apparently co-existing in parallel universes,
our partners and allies are eager to engage in this dialogue
-- mainly just to placate Russia. The West is generally
satisfied with the current institutions that govern security
in Europe, and there are few ideas for positive action.
Europeans are ready to listen to Russia's ideas, but join us
in the view that security in Europe should remain based on
existing institutions and principles, and that the OSCE's
comprehensive concept of security, including human rights and
economic prosperity as well as political-military security,
must be preserved.


What We Can Accomplish in Corfu
--------------


11. (C) The Greeks have designed Corfu to maximize informal
exchanges. It will kick off with a mixer (including
spouses),followed by a dinner restricted to delegation
heads. That dinner will set the stage for the next day's
discussions. We can expect FM Lavrov to lay out Russia's
views early, and your Greek hosts hope you will use the
dinner to review our key goals as well. You will find many
listeners receptive to American leadership along these lines:

1) Demonstrating a readiness to engage in long-term dialogue
anchored in the OSCE and based on a comprehensive concept of
security that embraces economic, environmental, and human
rights concerns as well as "hard security" issues.

2) Pressing the need for confidence-building steps by Russia
to give impetus to the dialogue, underscoring in particular
the importance of getting CFE back on track, addressing the
protracted conflicts more effectively, and finding a way
forward on Georgia.

3) Challenging Russia to turn away from the zero-sum
bogey-man of NATO/EU enlargement and instead toward the
broader security challenges facing Europe: terrorism,
radicalization, WMD, missile proliferation, economic
dislocation, energy security, environmental degradation,
trafficking in persons and drugs, regional conflicts, and
spillover impacts from Afghanistan or other unstable regions
bordering on the OSCE region; and

4) Seeking to reinvigorate the OSCE as an effective tool --
not just for dialogue, but for practical results.


12. (C) In the end, expectations for an outcome at Corfu are
low. We do not anticipate major breakthroughs, nor an effort
to draft an agreed final communique or manifesto. Greece
would like to get commitment to a more substantial agreement
by the OSCE Ministerial meeting in Athens December 1-2, but
we would be wise to remain cautious, allowing the discussions
to dictate the pace of any final product rather than setting
an artificial deadline or pre-ordained outcome. Even so,
expanding the areas of agreement on the issues that are at
stake in European security would still be an important
take-away. Your Greek hosts will want to control how this is
presented publicly, and I believe they will see much synergy
between their desire to launch the "Corfu Process" and our
own goal of establishing an agenda for dialogue. Whether
Russia will play along is uncertain, however. If they do,
Corfu could well set the stage for a much more intense and
active discussion on these issues in the fall leading up to
the Athens Ministerial.


13. (C) In addition to the OSCE's approach supporting our
human rights and democracy agenda, one of its greatest assets
is its broad geographic membership. On the margins, I am
sure you will also be able to take advantage of the Corfu
gathering to establish contacts with counterparts you may
have less contact with in other fora.


Scott