FSC-PC JUNE 17: GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA; OSCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000145 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG SUBJECT: FSC-PC JUNE 17: GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA; OSCE UNSCR 1540 STRATEGY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The OSCE, EU, and UN co-chairs of the Geneva talks on Georgia lauded the ongoing discussions, but called for concrete results and limited institutionalizing of the process with detailed agendas and regular meetings, particularly in light of the closing of UNOMIG and the OSCE Mission to Georgia due to Russian vetoes. The EU Monitoring Mission head commended Georgia for its MOU on troop movements near the administrative border, and urged Russia to reciprocate. The OSCE Conflict Prevention Center director reported security in Georgia had deteriorated and regretted the closing of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and the withdrawal of the OSCE military monitors. Russia claimed to be confused by the discussion: the Geneva co-chairs sounded reasonable, but delegations were just repeating the same old arguments. There would be no real progress in Geneva until the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized as necessary outcomes of the process. ¶2. (SBU) The U.S. called for further discussion support of its Food-for-Thought paper on next steps in OSCE implementation of UNSCR 1540 at the June 17 joint Forum for Security Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting. Russia criticized some of the paper's proposals, finding they "invaded the competency" of the UN 1540 Committee or lacked any "added value," but clearly supported a Best Practice Guide and hoped that the first, U.S.-drafted chapter would be quickly adopted. Italy, a co-sponsor of the Food-for-Thought, reminded that the 1540 Committee had invited regional organizations to assist with implementation of the resolution and that the Committee's 2009 Program of Work recommended some of the proposals contained in the paper. ¶3. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of verification centers on December 14, 2009, was adopted. In the working groups, Belarus and Kazakhstan supported the Russian proposals for naval CSBMs modeled on the Vienna Document provisions for ground-based forces. Italy questioned the practicability of the proposals and warned they would impose added financial burdens that would be borne unequally by participating States. Several pS announced their support for the Turkish proposal to liberalize use of digital cameras and GPS devices, although Belarus opposes at least the GPS provisions. ¶4. (SBU) Support is growing for the German proposals for guidelines for briefings conducted during Vienna Document verification events, although Austria is concerned that the guideline could be used to refuse requests for information not mentioned in the guidelines. The draft decision on the agenda and modalities for a special meeting in September to discuss review of the OSCE Document on SALW received immediate support from Finland, Ireland, the UK, and Belarus. Several states, including the U.S., lack any instructions. Please see paras 26 and 28. End summary. Geneva Talks on Georgia -------------- ¶5. (SBU) At the June 17 joint Forum for Security Cooperation-Permanent Council meeting, the OSCE, EU, and UN co-chairs of the Geneva talks stressed that the process was USOSCE 00000145 002 OF 007 working. OSCE Special Representative Christopoulos highlighted the establishment of the incident prevention and response mechanisms as a tangible achievement, and added that the OSCE had played a critical role in facilitating the resolution of outstanding gas and water supply issues in Georgia. ¶6. (SBU) EU Special Representative Morel lauded the Geneva process as the only forum in which all parties to the conflict were represented, and argued that this gave the process a unique role in resolving outstanding security and humanitarian issues. Acknowledging that the situation remained "fragile" and that trust and confidence remained weak, Morel called for "creativity, flexibility, and pragmatism" and urged a step-by-step, progressive approach to stabilization and normalization, temporarily putting aside status issues and focusing instead on security arrangements. ¶7. (SBU) Noting the need to ensure that the Geneva process was both credible and sustainable, UN Special Representative Verbeke urged concrete results, and encouraged all parties to look to the August 12 cease-fire agreement as the Geneva talks' foundation. Verbeke urged renewed political signals showing all parties' commitment to the process, suggesting that presidents or ministers could convene to reiterate their support, and encouraged parties to consider "slightly institutionalizing" the process, perhaps by circulating background notes and introducing agreed, annotated agendas. Above all, Verbeke said, it was important to avoid re-negotiating every session as if it were the first. He proposed regular meetings as a means of establishing a minimal procedural framework. ¶8. (SBU) Verbeke argued that the Geneva process was now even more important given the expiration of the UNOMIG mandate and the impending closure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia. He also made clear that the end of UNOMIG was not the end of the UN in Georgia, and asserted that the UN and the OSCE would continue to play active roles in Geneva, as their participation was not predicated on having field presence in Georgia, but was based on their identities as security organizations. EU Monitoring Mission -------------- ¶9. (SBU) EU Monitoring Mission Head Haber commended the Georgian government for its adherence to the obligations of its MOU on troop movements, noting that all minor infractions had been corrected, adding that as long as the MOU was observed, no Georgian offensive action against the separatist regions was possible. Haber urged Russia to reciprocate in order to boost confidence in the region and lower tensions. Haber acknowledged that the EUMM's coordination with Russian forces had improved, thanks in part to frequent use of the hotline established under the incident prevention and response mechanism for South Ossetia, but said freedom of movement across the administrative boundary lines remained an obvious problem, and criticized Russia for refusing to provide access to the separatist regions. ¶10. (SBU) Haber concluded that the end of UNOMIG and the OSCE Mission to Georgia would deprive the region of years of USOSCE 00000145 003 OF 007 experience and expertise, as well as valuable monitoring of the situation north of the Abkhaz administrative boundary line. In the short term, however, the EUMM would not be affected, as the three bodies' mandates had been conceived independently, and the EUMM would continue to operate. CPC on OSCE in Georgia -------------- ¶11. (SBU) OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Director Salber noted that OSCE monitors had lately assessed the overall security situation in the region as increasingly tense, particularly near Perevi, and said Russia's deployment of FSB border guards to the administrative boundary lines would undermine stability and complicate cross-boundary movements. Salber lamented the failure of participating States to extend the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, and regretted that the departure of the Mission's monitoring officers would deprive the region of uniquely military expertise, noting that the EUMM was largely staffed by civilian police. Salber said the monitors' operations were severely curtailed and the forward monitoring base at Karaleti closed June 6),but the monitors will continue to patrol and report as long as possible. Russia Responds to EU and Allies -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The EU, through its Czech (Reinohlova) presidency, the U.S. (Scott),Turkey (Begec),Norway (Vik),and Canada (Gregory) expressed support for the Geneva process and again called for Russia to honor its commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements. Russia (Azimov) responded that it was left with "confused impressions." On the one hand, Azimov said, were the relatively balanced statements from the five ambassadors who had addressed the Council, while on the other were the same old arguments from the delegations around the table. As all were probably "weary" of all this, Azimov urged delegations to look to the future, bluntly stating that there was no longer a single Georgia, a reality all parties should take into account. ¶13. (SBU) Azimov expressed sadness at the closure of UNOMIG and the OSCE Mission to Georgia, but said Russia had done its best to avoid this outcome, but had been rebuffed "by others" despite presenting "mutually acceptable solutions. Azimov declared that Russia would like to maintain international observers in the region, but said this must be worked out with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities, something that "would not be a matter of bargaining in any way." Azimov said Russia believed the Geneva process was important, but described its "main purpose" as the working out of security guarantees for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including legally binding non-use of force agreements and an embargo on arms for Georgia. Azimov closed by stating Russia would continue to ensure security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and would take up "further measures" if necessary: Russia was not interested in further conflict, but must protect the two new "states." UNSCR 1540 at the OSCE -------------- USOSCE 00000145 004 OF 007 ¶14. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) called for discussion in both the FSC and Permanent Council, through its Security Committee, on OSCE support for further implementation of UNSCR 1540. Scott noted the expertise available on non-proliferation in the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit and the CPC's Borders Team. Scott highlighted the specific proposals made in the U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought paper that proposes an OSCE UNSCR 1540 strategy. This includes an information exchange on national implementation efforts, identification of technical assistance resources in the OSCE, a Best Practices Guide, and continuing reporting on implementation. Scott observed that while "some in the room" doubted the capacity of the OSCE to contribute, the UN 1540 Committee had specifically asked regional organizations like the OSCE to help with implementation. ¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted it was one of the "initiators" of 1540 and generally welcomed the efforts of the U.S. and other co-sponsors of the FFT paper to further implementation of the resolution. These efforts, however, should: not interfere with the competence of the 1540 Committee; not exceed the actual requirements of the resolution; be based on a recognition that the OSCE's potential is not that great; and contain clear added value. ¶16. (SBU) Ulyanov, turning to the FFT paper, said it was "rather raw," raises several questions, and needs substantial further work. Addressing the specific proposals, he said: - information exchange: Where is the added value in the proliferation of reports already provided to the Committee in New York? Discussion of just a few would overwhelm the Security Dialogue; how would we handle 56 reports? How would these discussions further implementation? In any case, the reports are beyond the competence of the OSCE, dealing with WMD, associated delivery systems, and export controls. There were no experts on the delegations or even the Secretariat on these matters. - identification of technical assistance resources: Similar concerns apply to this proposal. Why should pS submit this information to the OSCE instead of directly to the 1540 Committee, although it is important for pS to help others who need it. - Best Practices Guide: No disagreement with this proposal; the Guide would be useful. - continuing reports on implementation: This misrepresents the requirements of UNSCR 1810, which calls for continued efforts by states who have not yet reported to the Committee; yet there are none of these at the OSCE. Follow-up reports, per 1540 and 1810, are purely voluntary. - sharing work between the FSC and the PC Security Committee: This has dubious value as the work of implementing the resolution "requires a single master." The FSC can always call on the ATU or Borders Team, if they actually have any expertise. - enlisting the OSCE field missions: It was "unclear" that the field missions had any contribution to make. How much would it cost to involve them in the work of implementing USOSCE 00000145 005 OF 007 1540? Who will pay? Will the mandate of the missions need to be changed? - partnership with other IOs: The 1540 Committee has already made direct contact with the IAEA, NATO, OPCW, and Interpol, among others. Why should the OSCE then duplicate these efforts. ¶17. (SBU) Ulyanov said he had already shared his doubts with the U.S. and now awaited a response. He was open to other ideas on 1540, subject to the caveats he had provided. Useful work was still needed, he added, and the U.S. Best Practices Guide should be completed and adopted soon. ¶18. (SBU) The UK (Cliff),a co-sponsor of the FFT paper, supported further work as outlined by the U.S. and planned to take the strategy forward under its chairmanship of the FSC in the autumn. Italy (Negro),on behalf of the co-sponsors, said in the working group that there was no intention to trespass on the "competency of the 1540 Committee" but instead to fulfill the mandate in UNSCR 1810 for regional organizations to engage actively with the Committee to share lessons learned and cooperate on the implementation of the resolution. ¶19. (SBU) Negro said that the proposals contained in the FFT were not very detailed yet, but were meant to be points of departure for further work. He noted, with regard to Ulyanov's and others' concerns about extending the mandate of the field missions, that they already had some guidance in the OSCE Principles of Nonproliferation (1994). HOV Meeting -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The decision to hold a meeting of heads of verification agencies on December 15 was adopted without comment. Naval CSBMs -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked delegations to comment in detail on the first section of its naval CSBMs paper, proposing an information exchange modeled on the Vienna Document provisions for land-based forces. Kazakhstan (Asanov) supported the paper, although it lacked final instructions. ¶22. (SBU) Italy (Negro) was not ready to discuss in detail the paper, but for the time being would refer to its 2008 comments. Negro said these included questions about provisions for activities in international waters. For instance, who would be the receiving state when vessels were outside territorial waters? The area of application proposed by Russia was too broad, he added, and would include the Red Sea and North Atlantic, not waters "adjacent to the OSCE area." Negro said the Russian measures lack reciprocity, which is a major attribute of extant CSBMs that apply to all pS. There would also be additional costs associated with the Russian proposals. ¶23. (SBU) Austria (Eischer) wondered what kind of information USOSCE 00000145 006 OF 007 would be expected from land-locked state lacking naval forces. Geyvandov replied that, as with ground forces, some pS would simply provide "nil" reports. As to the unequal burden of reporting note by Italy, Geyvandov said this, too, was the case with current Vienna Document reporting. He said Russia was prepared to reconsider the area of application if pS found it too broad. Digital Cameras and GPS -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) reported that use of GPS devices on its territory was strictly controlled and it routinely denied request for GPS use by visiting inspector; it could not support at least the GPS provisions of the Turkish paper that would liberalize use of digital cameras and GPS devices in Vienna Document verification activities. Austria, Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Kazakhstan Canada, and Georgia supported the proposal. VD99 Briefing Guidelines -------------- ¶25. (SBU) Serbia, Italy, and Turkey announced support for Germany's proposed guidelines for Vienna Document verification briefings by military commanders. Belarus generally supported, but said it would provide some edits to Germany. Greece and France reported they had earlier provided edits to Germany, but lacked final instructions. Austria (Eischer) feared that the guidelines might be interpreted as bright-line norms and would inhibit the free exchange of information in the spirit of the Vienna Document. Germany (Schweizer) replied the guidelines were just that and should not prove a constraint in pS wanted to provide more information. The guidelines would not be politically binding. ¶26. (SBU) Subject to additional edits expected from Belarus, the proposal is gaining broad support. Mission understands that the U.S. remains unopposed so long as the guidelines remain voluntary. Review of OSCE SALW Document -------------- ¶27. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends on SALW (Schweizer, Germany) repeated his call for adoption of the draft decision on the agenda and modalities of a special meeting in September to discuss review of the OSCE Document on SALW and related decisions, as required by the 2008 Ministerial decision. Schweizer said the agenda reflected the influence of the third Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Program of Action on SALW in 2008. The decision is needed soon to begin preparations for the meeting. Germany, Ireland, Belarus, and the UK, under whose FSC chairmanship the meeting would occur, echoed Schweizer's urgency. Finland (Kangaste) supported the draft decisions, and is considering helping to finance the meeting and sending a moderator. In response to the chair's (Georgia) question, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, and the U.S. reported they lacked instructions. ¶28. (SBU) Mission understands that the U.S. is not opposed to the meeting and will not block consensus unless instructed USOSCE 00000145 007 OF 007 otherwise. This is likely to move forward at the FSC on July ¶1. COMMENT: As was the case with the March 2009 cyber security workshop, active participation by U.S. experts as moderators and keynote speakers may be the most effective way of influencing the outcome of the meeting. End comment. Departures -------------- ¶29. (SBU) Brigadier Marjan Grabnar of Slovenia announced his departure from Vienna after five and a half years at the OSCE. Next Meeting -------------- ¶30. (U) The next regular meeting of the FSC will be on July ¶1. The Annual Security Review Conference will be held on June 23 and 24. Scott