FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000138 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI JCS FOR J-5 OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) NSC FOR HAYES USUN FOR LEGAL, POL EUCOM FOR J-5 CENTCOM FOR J-5 UNVIE FOR AC GENEVA FOR CD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG SUBJECT: FSC JUNE 3: ALLIES COOL TO RUSSIAN NAVAL CSBMS REF: A. 98 STATE 156529 ¶B. FALLON-SILBERBERG JUNE 2 EMAIL ¶1. (SBU) Summary: France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. reacted skeptically to Russia's renewed call for naval CSBMs in the OSCE "maritime area." The U.S. said the measures were unnecessary given Russia's ready access to naval exercises in international waters and the high level of routine cooperation among the Russian, U.S., and other navies. Germany suggested existing CSBMs, the Global Exchange of Military Information and Vienna Document Chapter IV on "contacts," provided ample scope for further transparency and confidence-building in the naval theater. In the Security Dialogue, Finland described the history and outcome of "Multinational Experiment Five" conducted by the U.S., several other countries, NATO, and the EU to test new approaches to crisis management. ¶2. (SBU) In the working groups, Britain and Russia are preparing a revision of their Best Practices Guide for Vienna Document Chapter IV "contacts" visits. The U.S. provided textual edits to the draft decision to hold a meeting of heads of verification in December 2009. Turkey's Food-for-Thought paper on liberalizing use of digital cameras and GPS during Vienna Document inspections received some tentative support. The chair will soon distribute a draft decision on the agenda and modalities of a special meeting in September 2009 to review the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Sensing tacit support, Germany requested its proposal for an annual assessment of Code of Conduct implementation be issued as a draft decision. Slovenia and Norway joined the list of co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought paper on an OSCE strategy for implementation of UNSCR 1540. End summary. Allies Nix Russian Naval CSBMs -------------- ¶3. (SBU) France (Simonet) reported Russia's renewed proposal for naval CSBMs was being seriously studied in the capital, but also confirmed its opposition to the concept. Simonet suggested Russia's concerns might be answered by "improved" information exchange on naval forces (under the GEMI) without the creation of separate CSBMs. The UK (Hartnell) also reported analysis in capital, but warned it was unlikely to change its opposition to the proposal. Germany (Schweizer) said that it was not prepared to reject in principle the Russian proposal, but still needed to find the added value in it when the OSCE already had the GEMI and Vienna Document Chapter IV contact visits that could facilitate transparency for maritime forces. ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour),drawing from standing guidance (ref A),did not see any need for naval CSBMs, noting the proposal has been repeatedly rejected because of a high level of stability in the maritime environment and Russia's failure to identify a maritime regional security problem that required additional measures. Neighbour said that naval activities usually occur in international waters where there are no bars to observation, unlike military activities on the ground that occur on sovereign territory and require international agreements to allow access by observers. Neighbour noted that NATO Allies have engaged with Russia on naval issues, including maritime search and rescue. USOSCE 00000138 002 OF 005 ¶5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) responded that the proposal for naval CSBMs will remain on the table. Ulyanov said he would wait for other delegations to receive further instructions and hoped for a more focused discussion. He wanted to hear "specific" reasons for rejecting naval CSBMs. It was true the GEMI provided for exchange of some naval information: why could participating States (pS) not go farther? Ulyanov said the U.S. position was unclear. Did the U.S. believe naval CSBMs were not needed because there was nothing of interest in naval activities? This was not so. Did existing CSBMs for ground forces reflect, for example, some particular U.S. concern over artillery in the OSCE area? Why did the OSCE insist on maximum transparency on land but not on water? ¶6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) repeated that artillery and other ground-based forces were situated on sovereign territory and could not be accessed without OSCE transparency measures, unlike naval forces in international waters that can be easily observed by other vessels or aircraft. Ulyanov replied that the U.S. had not explained its concern over artillery as reflected in existing CSBMs. Besides, Russia's proposals envisioned more than just observation of naval forces. ¶7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) said its general position was that new proposals must have added values for the Euro-Atlantic region and need to be examined in the context of existing commitments and obligations. Under the current circumstances, Nilsons said, when a "major commitment is not being observed," there was a low prospect of success for new obligations. Ulyanov warned it was wrong to try to link different issues: this could be "a slippery path for Riga." ¶8. (SBU) Belarus (Krayushkin) offered unconditional support for Russia's proposal, citing a "serious transparency gap" in the naval area. Multinational Experiment Five -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Finnish Captain (navy) Erkki Platan and Lieutenant Colonel Mikko Lappalainen described the history and outcome of Multinational Experiment Five (MNE5),an "extensive research and development" effort to develop new crisis management concept conducted by a "community of interest" that included Finland, Sweden, the U.S., and other NATO members. The 2006-2008 MNE5 sought improved methods in conducting interagency and multinational planning and enhancing civil-military cooperation through better information sharing and logistics planning. A multinational steering group, managed by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, led interagency delegations from 16 countries, NATO, and the EU trough an "effects-based approach" to multinational operations in an African crisis scenario. Participants focused on the implementation of new approaches. ¶10. (SBU) A seminar hosted by Finland at the conclusion of MNE5 discussed development of more comprehensive approach to crisis prevention and management based on national best practices and multinational approaches. MNE6, planned for 2009-2010, will focus on complex crises that include "irregular actions," non-permissive environments, and transitions of responsibility from military to civilian USOSCE 00000138 003 OF 005 actors and from multinational programs to local authorities. ¶11. (SBU) In response to questions from Germany and Austria about an OSCE role in the MNE process, Platan said that OSCE SYG Perrin de Brichambaut participated in the comprehensive approach seminar in Helsinki and the OSCE would likely be invited to participate in MNE6. Answering UK and Swedish requests for examples of practical application of MNE lessons learned, Platan said that some of the concepts developed through the MNE for operations planning, intelligence, information sharing, and logistics were already being used in Kosovo and Afghanistan by NATO and EU forces. Contact Visits -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Hungary (Haupt) announced successful Vienna Document Chapter IV contact visits to a military facility and airbase and the demonstration of new equipment, ambulance and CBW variants of the BTR-80 vehicle, in May. Sixty-six representatives of 32 participating States, the OSCE Conflict Prevent Center, and the RACVIAC Center for Regional Security attended. Contacts BPG -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The UK announced that it was preparing with Russia a revised draft of the Best Practices Guide for Vienna Document Chapter IV contact visits. HOV Meeting -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The U.S. proposed, per ref B, edits to the text of the draft decision to hold a heads of verification meeting on December 14, 2009: - deletion of "in order to prepare subjects for discussion at that meeting" from the preamble paragraph that reads "Recognizing the advantages to holding a Heads of Verification Center meeting outside the framework of the AIAM in order to prepare subjects for discussion at that meeting." - substitution of "on improving implementation of VD99" for "on further ways and means to improve implementation of VD99" in operative paragraph 3 that currently reads "Exchange of views on further ways and means to improve implementation of VD99." The draft decision will remain on the working group agenda. Digital Cameras and GPS -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Germany and Sweden gave tentative support to Turkey's Food-for-Thought paper to permit during Vienna Document inspections the use of digital cameras and GPS devices (FSC.DEL/124/09). Russia (Ulyanov) reported that the paper was being studied by Moscow but it might take some time before guidance was developed. Russia had no firm views as yet, one way or the other. Ulyanov suggested an important use for the GPS devices would be determining the coordinates of the inspectors within the area of inspection. He also USOSCE 00000138 004 OF 005 suggested using different nomenclature to describe the "GPS devices," as that phrase "created the impression that only U.S. models" are used. Turkey (Begec) replied it would consider amplifying the list of uses for GPS and alternate language for "GPS devices" to describe what was meant to be a generic description. SALW Review -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The chair of the Informal Group of Friends of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Schweizer, Germany) reported that he had prepared a draft decision for the chair on the agenda and modalities of a September 2009 special meting to review the OSCE Document on SALW. Schweizer warned the decision would need to be adopted before the summer recess at the end of July if the meeting were to occur in September. He called for substantive discussion on the decision at the June 17 working group in light of the expected absence of many delegates from the June 10 working group because of the conventional arms control meetings in Berlin. The chair (Georgia, Giorgadze) said he hope to distribute the decision by June 5. Code of Conduct -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) announced that it inferred from the absence of comment "tacit support" for its proposal for annual assessment of Code of Conduct implementation (FSC.DEL/437/07/Corr.1). Schweizer said he would ask the chair to issue a draft decision. Russia (Ulyanov) confirmed that it was considering the proposal, noting that the criterion of "added value applies not just to naval CSBMs." UNSCR 1540 -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Croatia, France, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia have become co-sponsors of the U.S.-authored Food-for-Thought paper on an OSCE strategy for UNSCR 1540 (FSC.DEL/25/09/Corr.3). The U.S. (Silberberg) called for further discussion of the paper and hoped other pS would join the existing co-sponsors. Silberberg reminded delegations of 1540 Committee chairman Urbina's address to the FSC in December 2008, encouraging the OSCE to provide leadership of regional implementation efforts, including low cost steps such as Best Practices Guides, lists of technical assistance experts, and national points of contact. ¶19. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reported it had, as promised, consulted with the U.S. over the OSCE 1540 strategy and tried to point out factual errors and weaknesses in the text. Ulyanov asked if "complete information" will be included in the paper. Silberberg replied that another approach would be to address Russia's concerns in more specific proposals to implement some of the measures suggested in the strategy, such as the technical assistance roster. Italy (Negro), responding to Turkish concerns over the strategy's proposal to use OSCE field missions to assist 1540 implementation, assured that any involvement of the missions would not exceed their mandates as determined by the pS. Negro added that the FFT was ultimately meant to lead to specific FSC decisions. USOSCE 00000138 005 OF 005 Next Meeting -------------- ¶20. (U) The next FSC meeting will be on June 10. Scott