Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USOSCE127
2009-05-18 13:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Mission USOSCE
Cable title:
REDESIGNING EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - IT'S ALL
VZCZCXRO6907 PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHYG DE RUEHVEN #0127/01 1381305 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 181305Z MAY 09 FM USMISSION USOSCE TO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6386 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0150
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000127
SIPDIS
EUR, EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: REDESIGNING EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - IT'S ALL
ABOUT MAKING RUSSIA FEEL COMFORTABLE AGAIN1.
SUMMARY. Most speakers agreed that the real value of
the discussions on European security is in the process, not
the outcome. The emphasis is on restoring trust among the
participating States rather than any specific outcome. END
SUMMARY
2. In an effort to help frame the evolving discussion on
European Security Architecture, the Austrian Foreign Ministry
hosted an expert meeting May 8 to consider various notions of
security and look at specific concepts that have worked
effectively in the past. The OSCE's Greek Chairmanship
actively participated, seeing the meeting as an important
step on the way to the June 27-28 Corfu informal Ministerial
meeting. They dampened expectations for Corfu, or even the
Athens Ministerial, and cautioned that this is only the start
of what will probably be a marathon process.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. The meeting's first session focused on the notion of
"indivisibility of security", and how it relates to the
discussions on European security. Dmitry Suslov, Deputy
Director of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in
Moscow, believes that the main challenge facing Europe today
is Russia's role in the European security system. Suslov
stated that there are different types of indivisible
security, depending on whether it refers to security within
an alliance (citing NATO's Article V, and CSTO commitments)
or between security systems, where mutual vulnerability
creates interdependence. This can be either negative, as
during the Cold War, or positive, such as during the 1990s.
The positive version doesn't just avoid confrontation, but
actively seeks to increase security through cooperation.
Power is shared equally, and none of the States makes a
decision without first consulting the others. Wolfgang
Zellner, Director of the Center for OSCE Research in Hamburg,
agreed and noted that this type of positive cooperation
exemplifies the concept of indivisible security as created by
the Helsinki process in the early 1970s and confirmed in the
1990 Charter of Paris.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Adam Rotfeld, former Foreign Minister, now with the
Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw,
confirmed the inclusiveness of the 1990 Charter adopted by
all participating States, and believes it is up to Russia to
decide if it wants to play by these rules, or go its own way.
In his opinion, Russia is undermining the current system and
also seeking changes. The two preferred Russian
"solutions" to the current crisis of European security -
a return to the bipolar order of the late 20th century or the
establishment of a new concert of power - are not viable
and have no place in the 21st century. Andrei Zagorski,
Leading Researcher at the Center for War and Peace Studies
and the Moscow State Institute for International Relations,
painted a slightly different picture. He explained that
Russia has learned to hate many of the tremendous changes of
the past 20 years, as they have meant a decrease in its
strength and influence while that of the West has expanded.
In Zagorski's opinion, the more NATO and the EU determine
European security, the more marginalized Russia feels.
Jacques AndrQani, President of the Association
France-AmQriques in Paris, indirectly agreed with Zagorski's
analysis. He argued that the root of the problem is
political, not ideological. The current struggle is
therefore about power and the ability to shape security.
5. Despite the political changes, speakers agreed on the
continuing importance and validity of the OSCE's common
values, principles and commitments. The problem is in how
these commitments are implemented or enforced. The OSCE is
not the cause of discord, but it feels the effects. Key
norms like democracy and territorial integrity are being
neglected or even openly violated. This has been accompanied
by growing resentments on each side. In Zellner's view,
European security has in the past 10 years been dominated by
unilateral decisions by a number of participating States.
This has poisoned the atmosphere and led to a dramatic loss
of confidence and good will that will take years to overcome.
Adding to the problem, there is currently a deadlock in
international law, an irresolvable tension between various
principles that has brought the participating States into
USOSCE 00000127 002 OF 003
conflict.
- - - - - - - - -
RECOMMENDATIONS
- - - - - - - - -
6. Panelists agreed there was a certain crisis of trust,
due in part to failure to implement OSCE commitments.
Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, stated
that although trust was not a precondition for entering into
a dialogue on European security, it was certainly a
precondition for its success. In the absence of
implementation of existing agreements, we have no confidence
that future agreements will be respected. A Georgian
representative therefore recommended approaching
implementation of existing commitments - including the
6-point ceasefire and renewal of the OSCE mandate in Georgia
- in parallel with discussions on European security in order
to increase confidence and trust of the parties in the
process.
7. The failure to implement commitments impacts not only
on relations between States, but also on the situation within
States. Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
lead to instability within States, which can cause regional
security problems. Many panelists noted the preeminent
importance of arms control and conflict prevention and
resolution for the future of European security. Several
stated that resolution of the impasse on CFE is key to
progress on European security.
8. In regard to the protracted conflicts, Oksana
Antonenko, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, urged participants to think how
to manage conflict long-term and prepare the ground for a
comprehensive solution. She encouraged more focus on the
hard security agenda to keep conflicts from escalating.
Zagorski urged the OSCE participating States to look at what
went wrong in Georgia and what we can do better. In order to
avoid a repeat of August 2008, we need to strengthen the OSCE
and give it the means to take timely action to prevent
conflict. He made a very unorthodox suggestion - from the
Russian point of view - that the participating States create
an urgent action mechanism that would give the OSCE the
authority to take such preventive action even before
consensus has matured. He acknowledged the difficulties
inherent in agreeing upon such a mechanism derogating from
the OSCE's strict consensus rule, but believes it would also
be in Russia's long-term interest to have the OSCE - as
opposed to NATO - be involved in conflict prevention in the
wider European region.
9. What should the parameters of this process be? There
was across the board agreement among panelists that European
security discussions should build on the achievements of the
past. Talks should include all three OSCE dimensions, and
take the preservation of existing norms, principles and
commitments as a point of departure. The OSCE should be the
locus as it can be a forum for discussion as well as a tool
for implementation. The vast majority of participating States
think the OSCE is sound, useful and should continue to play a
major role in European security.
10. Most speakers did not see the need for new security
architecture per se, but acknowledged that it bodes poorly
for European security if Russia is unhappy with the current
system. There is a hope that through this process, States
will be able to recreate a sense of trust, and that this
increase in confidence will lead to improved cooperation and
security in the region. Zagorski spoke of the need to return
a feeling of ownership without compromising our achievements.
The true value in the European security dialogue for the
speakers seems therefore to lie in the process itself, rather
than the outcome.
11. What does Russia want to gain from this process?
According to Suslov, Russia wants the current discussions to
lead to a restoration of bipolarity in Europe, with the U.S.
and Russia as the poles. The Russian representative, when
given an opportunity to ask questions, chose to focus on what
he characterized as the West's double standards on
territorial integrity in Kosovo and Georgia.
12. Comment: The main problem facing European security is
political, not structural. Russia wants a seat at the table,
to be bound into decision-making procedures and power-sharing
USOSCE 00000127 003 OF 003
in Europe. The Russian representative's only comments
during the whole meeting focused on the unfairness of the
West and the current security system, and did not touch on
either the parameters or the goals of the European security
discussions.
SCOTT
SIPDIS
EUR, EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: REDESIGNING EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - IT'S ALL
ABOUT MAKING RUSSIA FEEL COMFORTABLE AGAIN1.
SUMMARY. Most speakers agreed that the real value of
the discussions on European security is in the process, not
the outcome. The emphasis is on restoring trust among the
participating States rather than any specific outcome. END
SUMMARY
2. In an effort to help frame the evolving discussion on
European Security Architecture, the Austrian Foreign Ministry
hosted an expert meeting May 8 to consider various notions of
security and look at specific concepts that have worked
effectively in the past. The OSCE's Greek Chairmanship
actively participated, seeing the meeting as an important
step on the way to the June 27-28 Corfu informal Ministerial
meeting. They dampened expectations for Corfu, or even the
Athens Ministerial, and cautioned that this is only the start
of what will probably be a marathon process.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. The meeting's first session focused on the notion of
"indivisibility of security", and how it relates to the
discussions on European security. Dmitry Suslov, Deputy
Director of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in
Moscow, believes that the main challenge facing Europe today
is Russia's role in the European security system. Suslov
stated that there are different types of indivisible
security, depending on whether it refers to security within
an alliance (citing NATO's Article V, and CSTO commitments)
or between security systems, where mutual vulnerability
creates interdependence. This can be either negative, as
during the Cold War, or positive, such as during the 1990s.
The positive version doesn't just avoid confrontation, but
actively seeks to increase security through cooperation.
Power is shared equally, and none of the States makes a
decision without first consulting the others. Wolfgang
Zellner, Director of the Center for OSCE Research in Hamburg,
agreed and noted that this type of positive cooperation
exemplifies the concept of indivisible security as created by
the Helsinki process in the early 1970s and confirmed in the
1990 Charter of Paris.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Adam Rotfeld, former Foreign Minister, now with the
Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw,
confirmed the inclusiveness of the 1990 Charter adopted by
all participating States, and believes it is up to Russia to
decide if it wants to play by these rules, or go its own way.
In his opinion, Russia is undermining the current system and
also seeking changes. The two preferred Russian
"solutions" to the current crisis of European security -
a return to the bipolar order of the late 20th century or the
establishment of a new concert of power - are not viable
and have no place in the 21st century. Andrei Zagorski,
Leading Researcher at the Center for War and Peace Studies
and the Moscow State Institute for International Relations,
painted a slightly different picture. He explained that
Russia has learned to hate many of the tremendous changes of
the past 20 years, as they have meant a decrease in its
strength and influence while that of the West has expanded.
In Zagorski's opinion, the more NATO and the EU determine
European security, the more marginalized Russia feels.
Jacques AndrQani, President of the Association
France-AmQriques in Paris, indirectly agreed with Zagorski's
analysis. He argued that the root of the problem is
political, not ideological. The current struggle is
therefore about power and the ability to shape security.
5. Despite the political changes, speakers agreed on the
continuing importance and validity of the OSCE's common
values, principles and commitments. The problem is in how
these commitments are implemented or enforced. The OSCE is
not the cause of discord, but it feels the effects. Key
norms like democracy and territorial integrity are being
neglected or even openly violated. This has been accompanied
by growing resentments on each side. In Zellner's view,
European security has in the past 10 years been dominated by
unilateral decisions by a number of participating States.
This has poisoned the atmosphere and led to a dramatic loss
of confidence and good will that will take years to overcome.
Adding to the problem, there is currently a deadlock in
international law, an irresolvable tension between various
principles that has brought the participating States into
USOSCE 00000127 002 OF 003
conflict.
- - - - - - - - -
RECOMMENDATIONS
- - - - - - - - -
6. Panelists agreed there was a certain crisis of trust,
due in part to failure to implement OSCE commitments.
Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, stated
that although trust was not a precondition for entering into
a dialogue on European security, it was certainly a
precondition for its success. In the absence of
implementation of existing agreements, we have no confidence
that future agreements will be respected. A Georgian
representative therefore recommended approaching
implementation of existing commitments - including the
6-point ceasefire and renewal of the OSCE mandate in Georgia
- in parallel with discussions on European security in order
to increase confidence and trust of the parties in the
process.
7. The failure to implement commitments impacts not only
on relations between States, but also on the situation within
States. Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
lead to instability within States, which can cause regional
security problems. Many panelists noted the preeminent
importance of arms control and conflict prevention and
resolution for the future of European security. Several
stated that resolution of the impasse on CFE is key to
progress on European security.
8. In regard to the protracted conflicts, Oksana
Antonenko, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, urged participants to think how
to manage conflict long-term and prepare the ground for a
comprehensive solution. She encouraged more focus on the
hard security agenda to keep conflicts from escalating.
Zagorski urged the OSCE participating States to look at what
went wrong in Georgia and what we can do better. In order to
avoid a repeat of August 2008, we need to strengthen the OSCE
and give it the means to take timely action to prevent
conflict. He made a very unorthodox suggestion - from the
Russian point of view - that the participating States create
an urgent action mechanism that would give the OSCE the
authority to take such preventive action even before
consensus has matured. He acknowledged the difficulties
inherent in agreeing upon such a mechanism derogating from
the OSCE's strict consensus rule, but believes it would also
be in Russia's long-term interest to have the OSCE - as
opposed to NATO - be involved in conflict prevention in the
wider European region.
9. What should the parameters of this process be? There
was across the board agreement among panelists that European
security discussions should build on the achievements of the
past. Talks should include all three OSCE dimensions, and
take the preservation of existing norms, principles and
commitments as a point of departure. The OSCE should be the
locus as it can be a forum for discussion as well as a tool
for implementation. The vast majority of participating States
think the OSCE is sound, useful and should continue to play a
major role in European security.
10. Most speakers did not see the need for new security
architecture per se, but acknowledged that it bodes poorly
for European security if Russia is unhappy with the current
system. There is a hope that through this process, States
will be able to recreate a sense of trust, and that this
increase in confidence will lead to improved cooperation and
security in the region. Zagorski spoke of the need to return
a feeling of ownership without compromising our achievements.
The true value in the European security dialogue for the
speakers seems therefore to lie in the process itself, rather
than the outcome.
11. What does Russia want to gain from this process?
According to Suslov, Russia wants the current discussions to
lead to a restoration of bipolarity in Europe, with the U.S.
and Russia as the poles. The Russian representative, when
given an opportunity to ask questions, chose to focus on what
he characterized as the West's double standards on
territorial integrity in Kosovo and Georgia.
12. Comment: The main problem facing European security is
political, not structural. Russia wants a seat at the table,
to be bound into decision-making procedures and power-sharing
USOSCE 00000127 003 OF 003
in Europe. The Russian representative's only comments
during the whole meeting focused on the unfairness of the
West and the current security system, and did not touch on
either the parameters or the goals of the European security
discussions.
SCOTT