CFE/JCG: MAY 12 PLENARY - RUSSIA ADVOCATES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000122 SIPDIS STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM NSC FOR NILSSON, HAYDEN JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2013 TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: MAY 12 PLENARY - RUSSIA ADVOCATES FOR ACTIVE JCG ROLE REF: A. STATE 46848 (CFE: RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE) ¶B. STATE 47107 (COMMENTS ON DRAFT JCG CONSOLIDATED MATRIX) Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Russia cited chapter and verse of Article XVI of the CFE Treaty to support its contention that the JCG should fulfill its mandate by contributing more proactively to efforts to save the CFE Treaty. The Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate (Ulyanov) argued that the JCG historical mandate had been altered rendering the JCG ineffective. He expressed surprise that most States Parties seemed content with this, and asserted that, as a result, the CFE impasse persists and Russia is not at fault. The U.S. stressed the importance of the high-level bilateral channel and reserved the option of addressing Russia's commentary in more detail at a later date. Championing Russia's position, Belarus recalled its May 5 appeal not to "sideline" the JCG. ¶2. (SBU) On compliance issues, the U.S. and the Czech Republic (supported by six Allies) noted, for the record, two additional inspection refusals and underscored that compliance by all States Parties was essential to the viability of CFE. The JCG agreed to cancel May 26 and June 9 meetings, but deferred discussion on a draft decision on the duration of the present session to the next meeting. On the margins, the U.S. del provided input on the draft Consolidated Matrix per ref B to the Treaty Operations and Implementation (TOI) Working Group Chair (Canada, Linteau). ¶3. (C) At the May 11 JCG-T, Allies briefly discussed Russia's Aide-Memoire, which was distributed at the May 5 JCG. Netherlands (Kleinjan) and Canada (Linteau) quickly ended this unhelpful discussion by endorsing the U.S. intervention at the May 5 JCG on this issue and commenting, to no dissention, that this was a matter for detailed discussion at the HLTF "Away Day" May 26-28. However, Allies will continue to talk about the paper among themselves and with Russia, seeking to influence their capitals. Inter alia, most NATO delegations here will send a representative to the "Away Day." Requests for Washington guidance paras 8 and 18. End Summary. 
JCG PLENARY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RUSSIA INVOKES JCG MANDATE IN EFFORT TO BROADEN DIALOGUE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) During the U.S.-chaired (Neighbour) May 12 JCG Plenary, in a lengthy statement, Russia (Ulyanov) took aim at a U.S. intervention from the week prior. The U.S., among other points, had supported intensified, high-level efforts outside the JCG focused on achieving agreement on a balanced way forward on CFE. Ulyanov opined that the JCG had been reduced to a "rostrum" for speaking on refused inspections or lack of data, an "odd, if not exotic," approach that runs counter to the interests of all States Parties, the provisions of the Treaty, and the historic mandate of the JCG. He also noted that Russia had deliberately decided in the autumn of 2007 not to "suspend" its participation in the JCG with the hopes it would serve as an active channel for dialogue. ¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov argued that the JCG should focus on more than just the technical issues of implemQtation, stressing that any State Party could raise any issue. As evidence, he cited Article XVI of the CFE Treaty drawing attention to sub-paragraph 2(C),which he noted calls for the JCG to consider (and agree to) new measures to enhance the viability of the Treaty, and to paragraph 5, which provides for States Parties to propose amendments for consideration. (Note. Ulyanov conveniently did not make mention that paragraph 5 also limits the JCG in that it may only agree on improvements to the viability of the Treaty that are "consistent with its provisions." End note.) ¶6. (SBU) In addition to the JCG mandate, Ulyanov recalled the historical role of the JCG in the late 90's when, he noted, it regularly dealt with substantive matters including critical statements by Hungary and Germany as well as much of the negotiation of the Agreement on Adaptation. He suggested the U.S. delegation should confer with "long-standing diplomats" (specifying U.S. Ambassador Govan by name) to check this fact, and then expressed surprise that most delegations (except for Belarus and Armenia) seemed content with the altered role of the JCG, which does not contribute to overcoming the CFE crisis. Ulyanov's "bottom line" was that the impasse persists and Russia is not to blame. ¶7. (SBU) Similar to the week prior, Belarus and the U.S. were the only delegations to respond. Belarus (Krayushkin) noted his support for the Russian statement and reiterated his position from the previous JCG in which he called for the inclusion of all CFE States Parties. Krayushkin expressed appreciation for the senior level dialogue especially in light of the geo-political factors at play, but again pleaded - "Don't sideline the JCG." ¶8. (SBU) In a brief reply, the U.S. (Silberberg) stressed that it stood by its comments from the previous week which had emphasized the importance of the high-level bilateral channel for achieving agreement on the basis of the package. He also noted that Russia's considered statement merited a considered response and reserved the option of returning to the issue at a later date. Guidance request: Although USDel believes U.S. interventions on May 5 and May 12 sufficiently replied to Russia's assertions, greater detail to deploy at the JCG on May 19 in a detailed response would be welcomed. End guidance request. ¶9. (SBU) Ulyanov was quick to clarify his strong belief that the U.S.-Russia dialogue is a "crucial" element in the process but should not supplant other fora. In the interest of maximizing our ability to resolve the CFE impasse, he reiterated that some of the substantive issues require the consideration of all States Parties. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOR THE RECORD ) TWO MORE RUSSIAN REFUSALS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg) and the Czech Republic (Reinohlova) each noted Russia's refusal of respective CFE inspection notifications for May, underscoring the importance of compliance by all States Parties to the viability of CFE. A number of Allies (Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and the Netherlands) echoed concerns with Russia's continued noncompliance and stressed the significance of transparency and cooperation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TWO PLENARIES CANCELLED; FALL SESSION START TBD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) The Chair (Neighbour) returned to last week's suggestion for cancelling JCG meetings on May 27 and June 9 due to CFE-related, out-of-town meetings. No objections were raised and the meetings were cancelled. (Note. The June 23-24 ASRC is also cause for cancellation of another JCG (June 23). At our urging, Greece as CiO intends to raise this point with incoming Chair Armenia before the next JCG meeting. While we do not expect any objections, the Chair did not want to risk overloading the system with three cancellations at once. End note.) ¶12. (SBU) Regarding the Draft Decision on the Duration of the Present Session (JCG.DD/1/09),Russia (Ulyanov) offered a preliminary reaction noting likely support for a final meeting on July 21 but suggesting the JCG should meet on September 8 vice September 15 as proposed, reserving his position on this point. He remarked that the JCG normally resumes immediately following the first PC of the session. The Chair (Neighbour) noted Russia's comments and suggested addressing the matter at the next JCG on May 19. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ON THE MARGINS: JCG-T PLUS 6; GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA; RUSSIA; THE TOI MATRIX - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) JCG-T PLUS 6: At the May 10 JCG-T plus 6, chaired by Denmark (Petersen),the Chair raised the issue of how to respond to the Russian Aide-Memoire, in part stemming from Ambassadors' discussions at the NATO Caucus. The Netherlands (Kleinjan),backed by Canada (Linteau) and subsequently agreed by the Chair, helpfully noted there was not a need for anything beyond what the U.S. had responded at the May 5 JCG and stressed that this matter was best left for the HLTF "Away Day." The U.S. (Neighbour) noted that Russia's Aide-Memoire circulated at the JCG was the same as that given to A/S Gottemoeller on April 24 and reported per ref A that she would meet with Antonov on CFE on June 3. He also stressed again that discussion of the package and its individual elements should remain in those political channels. None disagreed. ¶14. (C) GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA: On May 11, Georgia (Giorgadze) informed the U.S. del that they were prepared to respond to elements of the Aide-Memoire in the JCG. The U.S. (Neighbour) assured him that the U.S. and Allies would not and emphasized the view that discussion of the substance of the Aide-Memoire did not belong in the JCG; Giorgadze noted that Georgia would follow the lead of the U.S. and others. On May 12 following the JCG, Moldova (Cuc) approached the U.S. del to clarify that Moldova does continue to support the Parallel Actions Package and was prepared to restate this position if raised in the JCG. He seemed concerned that some may interpret otherwise based on the Moldovan May 5 statement on Istanbul commitments which did not mention the package (JCG.JOUR/693/Corr.1). ¶15. (C) RUSSIA: Ulyanov told USDel (Neighbour) that at the June 3 U.S.-Russia bilateral in Geneva, he expects Antonov will emphasize more than before Russia's view that the JCG must have a role in solving details of the CFE impasse. He explained that Russia will never accept the Parallel Actions Package unless all details are spelled out, which he asserted would be a lengthy process since Russia will demand specifics in annexes. He claimed that Antonov and his U.S. counterpart will be absorbed by START and questioned when high-level officials would have time to hammer out details, such as a definition of "substantial combat forces." This work can only be done in Vienna, he asserted. To accept anything less than details, would be to accept vague promises, something Russia will not do. In reply, USDel explained why the USG sees this very differently. (Comment: Except for a heads up of what Antonov may raise on June 3, all dels in Vienna have heard this from Ulyanov many times before. End comment.) ¶16. (SBU) DRAFT JCG CONSOLIDATED MATRIX (JCG.TOI/1/09, 31 Mar 09): Drawing from ref B, U.S. del (Ducceschi) provided corrections to U.S. data and input on Part 4 to the TOI Working Group Chair (Linteau). He was receptive to using the 2008 format (which does not include the "version of" or "LAL based on" columns) and undertook to pass the U.S. input as well as that of others to the German delegation, the drafter of the document. Separately, Ducceschi discussed U.S. input with the German Military Advisor (Lutz Hecker) who indicated he thought the columns in question had been agreed previously, but admitted he was uncertain. Hecker noted he would relay the U.S. input to the German Verification Center as soon as the TOI Chair provided him with the final input from other SPs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Allies Will Talk about Russia's Paper, No Matter What - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (C) Comment: Delegates here, no matter what we urge, will talk among themselves and with Russia about its Aide-Memoire, seeking to influence their capitals and policymakers. Since most Allied delegations here are sending a representative to the HLTF "Away Day," these discussions may increase in the run-up to subsequent meetings related to CFE. Sharing general thoughts on the substance of the paper with Allies should help maintain Allied support for the lead U.S. role and high-level U.S.-Russia "political track". ¶18. (C) Guidance request: In the context of upcoming meetings, USDel would welcome any details on the substance of the Aide-Memoire that may appropriately be shared with Allies here (i.e., outside the JCG) to help shape their thinking to support continued backing for the U.S. approach. End guidance request. ¶19. (U) The next JCG Plenary will take place on May 19, under the chairmanship of Armenia, and will be preceded by the JCG-T on May 18, under the chairmanship of Spain. After that, there will no JCG Plenary until June 2. SCOTT