FORGING A BROADER NATO-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000075

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, SCA/FO, SCA/PB, SCA/INS, AND
EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS: NATO MOPS PREL MARR MCAP ELTN KPAO PK AF IN
SUBJECT: FORGING A BROADER NATO-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP?

REF: A. SG(2009)0065(INV)

B. SG(2006)2060

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Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) This cable provides food-for-though for the
Afghanistan/Pakistan Strategic Review, as seen from USNATO,
on whether and how NATO could respond to Pakistan's interest
in a broader relationship with NATO. We would of course
welcome in particular Embassy Islamabad and Embassy New Delhi
views on these ideas as seen from their perspectives.


2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: NATO's current relationship with Pakistan
consists mainly of exchanges of high-level visitors and
military coordination between the Pakistani military and
ISAF. During these meetings, however, Pakistani counterparts
- well aware of NATO's partnerships with Afghanistan and
Central Asian states - have expressed interest in building
their own broader relationship with NATO. Building such a
relationship with Pakistan could be part of helping NATO
develop a more regional approach in Afghanistan. The lack of
such a partnership with Pakistan limits NATO's ability to
pursue such a regional approach.


3. (S/NF) Such a NATO-Pakistan partnership could include: the
opening of select NATO partnership tools (courses and
exercises) to Pakistan, political dialogue such as an
exchange of views with Allies within appropriate NATO
committees, and possibly the designation of a NATO Contact
Point Embassy in Islamabad.


4. (S/NF) Outside of the partnership track, we believe that
NATO needs to move quickly to conclude the legal arrangements
for an ISAF Liaison Element in Pakistan, as was agreed by
Allies. It should also seek expansion of the existing border
cooperation regime.


5. (S/NF) We should manage Indian reaction to any
NATO-Pakistan partnership by being transparent with New Delhi
on the partnership and being open to the possibility of a
similar program with India should it desire one. If
Washington wishes to proceed, we should seek Allies'
agreement to develop such a partnership at NATO's April
Summit, tasking the North Atlantic Council in permanent
session to develop a modalities document which could be
discussed with Islamabad. END SUMMARY

A NATO-Pakistan Partnership?
--------------


6. (S/NF) As a part of the evolving U.S. and Allied regional
approach to the war in Afghanistan, we believe that the time
is ripe to consider a more structured partnership with
Islamabad. Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) have been members of NATO's Partnership for Peace
and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (PfP/EAPC) since the
partnership was created in the early post-Cold War days.
Since Afghanistan falls outside the geographically-defined
boundaries of the PfP/EAPC partnership, NATO agreed to create
a distinctive partnership, the Afghan Cooperation Program.
The lack of a partnership relationship with Pakistan,
however, undermines NATO's ability to develop a more robust
regional approach to the war in Afghanistan.


7. (S/NF) Furthermore, while NATO has engaged in limited
ISAF-related cooperation with Pakistan, Islamabad has
repeatedly indicated that it would like to develop a
relationship with NATO that goes beyond direct support to
ISAF. They have signaled that they need politically to show
their public that the relationship with NATO is a two-way

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street and that they are getting something out of the
relationship. Moreover, a NATO-Pakistan partnership now
could be seen as a reward for the steps Pakistan has recently
taken toward democratic reforms--steps which have resulted in
Freedom House moving Pakistan from the "not free" to "partly
free" category in its most recent report. Development of
such a partnership program would, therefore, not only make
achieving some of our other goals more likely, it would also
send an important political signal that the west will reward
Pakistan for its movement along the reform path.

What Would a NATO-Pakistan Partnership Look Like?
-------------- --------------


8. (S/NF) A NATO-Pakistan partnership could be structured
along the lines of the Afghan Cooperation Program, the more
recent Structured Cooperation Framework with Iraq, or the
Tailored Cooperation Programs (TCPs) we have developed for
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea (i.e. NATO's
"other partners across the globe," that are working with the
Alliance in Afghanistan.) Such a partnership would likely be
composed of the following elements:

-- Practical cooperation: The heart of any partnership
program would be in the realm of practical cooperation,
particularly through the opening of select "partnership
tools" to Pakistan. These tools include NATO courses on
subjects such as civil-military relations which were
initially developed to help NATO's post-Soviet partners
transform their military and defense structures into more
democratically-controlled institutions. Other courses which
could be made available touch on subjects ranging from
defense planning to the law on armed conflict, from border
security to civil emergency planning, and from medical
services to public diplomacy. These tools should not be seen
as competing with ongoing U.S. bilateral assistance to
Pakistan, rather they should be seen as a useful complement
to the U.S. efforts;

-- Political dialogue: Political dialogue in the NATO context
should be distinguished from "negotiations," which we
recognize Washington understandably does not want NATO to be
engaged in. Under most circumstances, political dialogue
would mean having a Pakistani official brief and/or exchange
views with Allies in an appropriate NATO committee. This
dialogue could be at the level of NATO Permanent
Representatives in the North Atlantic Council or it could be
with a subordinate committee such as the Political Committee
or Policy Coordination Group. Similarly, senior NATO
officials--such as the Secretary General--may travel to
Islamabad for discussions with Pakistani officials. NATO may
also wish to invite Pakistan to relevant ministerial-level
meetings;

-- Designation of a Contact Point Embassy (CPE): NATO could
agree to designate the Embassy of a NATO Ally in Pakistan as
NATO's Contact Point Embassy. A CPE's primary role is a
public diplomacy one, explaining NATO to host publics. They
also provide a point of contact that local officials can use
if they need to pass information back to Brussels.
Similarly, they can play an important role in providing to
Brussels an understanding of the situation on the ground,
particularly in the case of breaking events. And finally,
they provide logistical support during the travel of NATO
officials.


9. (S/NF) NATO is already engaging in some of these
activities on a limited basis. For example, NATO Secretary
General de Hoop Scheffer was in Pakistan in late January.
NATO has also opened, on an ad hoc basis, a limited number of
partnership courses to Pakistan; Islamabad has yet to take

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advantage of these openings. In his report on his trip to
Pakistan (ref A),however, the Secretary General said that
Islamabad made clear that it would like to "enhance
Pakistan's relationship with NATO" and had provided a list of
courses it would like to participate in in 2009. By tying
these activities into a coherent partnership document which
could be agreed with the GoP, we can satisfy this demand for
an enhanced relationship.

Other Areas for Enhanced NATO/ISAF-Pakistan Cooperation
-------------- --------------


10. (S/NF) In addition to the partnership, NATO should act to
expeditiously complete negotiations with Islamabad on the
legal status of a NATO ISAF Liaison Element in Pakistan,
consistent with the Allied agreement in ref B. Among other
roles, the Liaison Element would help facilitate the transit
of ISAF-related material.


11. (S/NF) NATO should also seek to expand the existing
border cooperation regime along the Peshawar-Jalalabad axis
(between Afghan RC-East border provinces and Bajaur, Mohmand,
and Khyber tribal agencies),creating similar centers
surrounding the Quetta-Kandahar axis (between Afghan RC-South
border provinces and Kurram, North Waziristan, and South
Waziristan tribal agencies). There is an appetite for this
initiative among RC-South contributors. At least partly
because of the increased intelligence sharing such
cooperation brings, the Pakistani military has seemed
amenable to exploring the possibility of further cooperation
in this area.

The India Dimension
--------------


12. (S/NF) While recognizing that New Delhi's reaction must
be kept in mind when discussing engagement with Pakistan, we
believe that engagement with Pakistan can no longer be seen
as a luxury. Success in Afghanistan, however defined, will
require broader engagement with Pakistan. At a minimum, NATO
will need continued access to Pakistan transit routes,
regardless of our efforts to diversify into other routes. We
can try to manage India's reaction if we take the following
steps:

-- first, we should be transparent with the Indians on our
Pakistan engagement. We should make clear that the
engagement is a necessary part of our shared goal of
successfully prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, while also
arguing that such engagement may--over the long run--also
help transform the Pakistan security forces in a positive
direction (such as accepting the primacy of democratic
control over the military). NATO's transparency should
continue over the long-term and not be limited to the initial
start-up period of a NATO-Pakistan partnership;

-- second, Allies will need to consider New Delhi's
legitimate security concerns as the partnership is developed,
vetting cooperation proposals to make sure that the Alliance
is not inadvertently enhancing capabilities which could be
used to threaten India; and

-- third, the Alliance should make clear its willingness to
also explore the possibilities for an enhanced NATO-India
relationship. (Note: India has had limited engagement with
the Alliance via NATO's Contact Country policy.)

Timing
--------------


13. (S/NF) We could use the upcoming NATO Summit to get

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agreement on moving forward on a NATO-Pakistan partnership
document. The Summit communique could task the development
of a modalities paper to be discussed with authorities in
Islamabad.


14. (S/NF) We would welcome the views of Embassies Islamabad
and New Delhi on this matter, as well as the views of other
concerned actors such as CENTCOM.
VOLKER