FORGING A BROADER NATO-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000075 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, SCA/FO, SCA/PB, SCA/INS, AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: NATO MOPS PREL MARR MCAP ELTN KPAO PK AF IN SUBJECT: FORGING A BROADER NATO-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP? REF: A. SG(2009)0065(INV) ¶B. SG(2006)2060 USNATO 00000075 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides food-for-though for the Afghanistan/Pakistan Strategic Review, as seen from USNATO, on whether and how NATO could respond to Pakistan's interest in a broader relationship with NATO. We would of course welcome in particular Embassy Islamabad and Embassy New Delhi views on these ideas as seen from their perspectives. ¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: NATO's current relationship with Pakistan consists mainly of exchanges of high-level visitors and military coordination between the Pakistani military and ISAF. During these meetings, however, Pakistani counterparts - well aware of NATO's partnerships with Afghanistan and Central Asian states - have expressed interest in building their own broader relationship with NATO. Building such a relationship with Pakistan could be part of helping NATO develop a more regional approach in Afghanistan. The lack of such a partnership with Pakistan limits NATO's ability to pursue such a regional approach. ¶3. (S/NF) Such a NATO-Pakistan partnership could include: the opening of select NATO partnership tools (courses and exercises) to Pakistan, political dialogue such as an exchange of views with Allies within appropriate NATO committees, and possibly the designation of a NATO Contact Point Embassy in Islamabad. ¶4. (S/NF) Outside of the partnership track, we believe that NATO needs to move quickly to conclude the legal arrangements for an ISAF Liaison Element in Pakistan, as was agreed by Allies. It should also seek expansion of the existing border cooperation regime. ¶5. (S/NF) We should manage Indian reaction to any NATO-Pakistan partnership by being transparent with New Delhi on the partnership and being open to the possibility of a similar program with India should it desire one. If Washington wishes to proceed, we should seek Allies' agreement to develop such a partnership at NATO's April Summit, tasking the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to develop a modalities document which could be discussed with Islamabad. END SUMMARY A NATO-Pakistan Partnership? -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) As a part of the evolving U.S. and Allied regional approach to the war in Afghanistan, we believe that the time is ripe to consider a more structured partnership with Islamabad. Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have been members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (PfP/EAPC) since the partnership was created in the early post-Cold War days. Since Afghanistan falls outside the geographically-defined boundaries of the PfP/EAPC partnership, NATO agreed to create a distinctive partnership, the Afghan Cooperation Program. The lack of a partnership relationship with Pakistan, however, undermines NATO's ability to develop a more robust regional approach to the war in Afghanistan. ¶7. (S/NF) Furthermore, while NATO has engaged in limited ISAF-related cooperation with Pakistan, Islamabad has repeatedly indicated that it would like to develop a relationship with NATO that goes beyond direct support to ISAF. They have signaled that they need politically to show their public that the relationship with NATO is a two-way USNATO 00000075 002.2 OF 004 street and that they are getting something out of the relationship. Moreover, a NATO-Pakistan partnership now could be seen as a reward for the steps Pakistan has recently taken toward democratic reforms--steps which have resulted in Freedom House moving Pakistan from the "not free" to "partly free" category in its most recent report. Development of such a partnership program would, therefore, not only make achieving some of our other goals more likely, it would also send an important political signal that the west will reward Pakistan for its movement along the reform path. What Would a NATO-Pakistan Partnership Look Like? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) A NATO-Pakistan partnership could be structured along the lines of the Afghan Cooperation Program, the more recent Structured Cooperation Framework with Iraq, or the Tailored Cooperation Programs (TCPs) we have developed for Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea (i.e. NATO's "other partners across the globe," that are working with the Alliance in Afghanistan.) Such a partnership would likely be composed of the following elements: -- Practical cooperation: The heart of any partnership program would be in the realm of practical cooperation, particularly through the opening of select "partnership tools" to Pakistan. These tools include NATO courses on subjects such as civil-military relations which were initially developed to help NATO's post-Soviet partners transform their military and defense structures into more democratically-controlled institutions. Other courses which could be made available touch on subjects ranging from defense planning to the law on armed conflict, from border security to civil emergency planning, and from medical services to public diplomacy. These tools should not be seen as competing with ongoing U.S. bilateral assistance to Pakistan, rather they should be seen as a useful complement to the U.S. efforts; -- Political dialogue: Political dialogue in the NATO context should be distinguished from "negotiations," which we recognize Washington understandably does not want NATO to be engaged in. Under most circumstances, political dialogue would mean having a Pakistani official brief and/or exchange views with Allies in an appropriate NATO committee. This dialogue could be at the level of NATO Permanent Representatives in the North Atlantic Council or it could be with a subordinate committee such as the Political Committee or Policy Coordination Group. Similarly, senior NATO officials--such as the Secretary General--may travel to Islamabad for discussions with Pakistani officials. NATO may also wish to invite Pakistan to relevant ministerial-level meetings; -- Designation of a Contact Point Embassy (CPE): NATO could agree to designate the Embassy of a NATO Ally in Pakistan as NATO's Contact Point Embassy. A CPE's primary role is a public diplomacy one, explaining NATO to host publics. They also provide a point of contact that local officials can use if they need to pass information back to Brussels. Similarly, they can play an important role in providing to Brussels an understanding of the situation on the ground, particularly in the case of breaking events. And finally, they provide logistical support during the travel of NATO officials. ¶9. (S/NF) NATO is already engaging in some of these activities on a limited basis. For example, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer was in Pakistan in late January. NATO has also opened, on an ad hoc basis, a limited number of partnership courses to Pakistan; Islamabad has yet to take USNATO 00000075 003.2 OF 004 advantage of these openings. In his report on his trip to Pakistan (ref A),however, the Secretary General said that Islamabad made clear that it would like to "enhance Pakistan's relationship with NATO" and had provided a list of courses it would like to participate in in 2009. By tying these activities into a coherent partnership document which could be agreed with the GoP, we can satisfy this demand for an enhanced relationship. Other Areas for Enhanced NATO/ISAF-Pakistan Cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) In addition to the partnership, NATO should act to expeditiously complete negotiations with Islamabad on the legal status of a NATO ISAF Liaison Element in Pakistan, consistent with the Allied agreement in ref B. Among other roles, the Liaison Element would help facilitate the transit of ISAF-related material. ¶11. (S/NF) NATO should also seek to expand the existing border cooperation regime along the Peshawar-Jalalabad axis (between Afghan RC-East border provinces and Bajaur, Mohmand, and Khyber tribal agencies),creating similar centers surrounding the Quetta-Kandahar axis (between Afghan RC-South border provinces and Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan tribal agencies). There is an appetite for this initiative among RC-South contributors. At least partly because of the increased intelligence sharing such cooperation brings, the Pakistani military has seemed amenable to exploring the possibility of further cooperation in this area. The India Dimension -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) While recognizing that New Delhi's reaction must be kept in mind when discussing engagement with Pakistan, we believe that engagement with Pakistan can no longer be seen as a luxury. Success in Afghanistan, however defined, will require broader engagement with Pakistan. At a minimum, NATO will need continued access to Pakistan transit routes, regardless of our efforts to diversify into other routes. We can try to manage India's reaction if we take the following steps: -- first, we should be transparent with the Indians on our Pakistan engagement. We should make clear that the engagement is a necessary part of our shared goal of successfully prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, while also arguing that such engagement may--over the long run--also help transform the Pakistan security forces in a positive direction (such as accepting the primacy of democratic control over the military). NATO's transparency should continue over the long-term and not be limited to the initial start-up period of a NATO-Pakistan partnership; -- second, Allies will need to consider New Delhi's legitimate security concerns as the partnership is developed, vetting cooperation proposals to make sure that the Alliance is not inadvertently enhancing capabilities which could be used to threaten India; and -- third, the Alliance should make clear its willingness to also explore the possibilities for an enhanced NATO-India relationship. (Note: India has had limited engagement with the Alliance via NATO's Contact Country policy.) Timing -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) We could use the upcoming NATO Summit to get USNATO 00000075 004.2 OF 004 agreement on moving forward on a NATO-Pakistan partnership document. The Summit communique could task the development of a modalities paper to be discussed with authorities in Islamabad. ¶14. (S/NF) We would welcome the views of Embassies Islamabad and New Delhi on this matter, as well as the views of other concerned actors such as CENTCOM. VOLKER