5 FEB 2009 VVC AND EXPERTS: TURKEY NEARLY SCUTTLES 2009 VD 99 VERIFICATION COORDINATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000062



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: 5 FEB 2009 VVC AND EXPERTS: TURKEY NEARLY SCUTTLES

2009 VD 99 VERIFICATION COORDINATION



REF: STATE 9988



Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).



1. (C/NOFORN) Summary. Implementation coordination for 2009

dominated

discussions in the 5 February 2009 VCC and Experts, with

Turkey raising

unexpectedly strong objections to provisions that dictate

which Ally loses

in the event a non-Ally preempts an Allied verification

activity.

Turkey's objections seemed linked to the fact that under the

draft, which

most other Allies understood would be agreed, Turkey would

lose its

passive quota for an inspection to the Russian Federation as

a result of a

recent notification of intent to inspect Russia by

Switzerland. Turkey

finally consented to move the draft along, but resumed its

opposition in

the VCC. The paper has since been placed under silence which

ends

close of business, 16 February.



2. (SBU) Allies indicated their intention to table national

papers at the

AIAM, which will likely not mirror the papers discussed in

the Experts

meeting, and which are expected to be disseminated within a

week or two

prior to the AIAM.



3. (C) On the margins, France and Hungary indicated they had

already

consulted with Georgia on their upcoming VD 99 evaluation

visit and

inspection respectively, while France indicated some support

for the idea

of including Russian inspectors if the logistics could be

worked out in

short order. France also noted that it was considering

proposing in

Vienna a new CSBM consisting of reciprocal visits to Russia

and Georgia by

a team lead by mutually agreed neutral state. End Summary.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Implementation Coordination

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -



4. (SBU) Much to the surprise of Allies, discussion on the IS

working

paper on Implementation Coordination

(AC/319-WP(2008)0009-Rev7) dominated

the VCC and meeting of experts.



5. (SBU) Background note. Implementation coordination is a

NATO attempt

to mitigate the effects of the so-called "quota race," which

historically

resulted in participating States (pS) exhausting the limited

number of

passive quotas for VD 99 evaluation visits and inspections

within the

first few months of the calendar year. In late 2007 Allies,

who

historically conduct the largest number of inspections to pS

of interest

such as Russia, agreed to coordinate the allocation and

scheduling of

NATO VD 99 inspections for 2008. Most Allies were satisfied

with the

results of this experiment, agreeing to coordinate activities

for 2009.

During an extended review of the modalities for NATO

coordination, debate

has centered on provisions in paragraph eight of the

coordination paper,

which addresses the loss of an available passive quota in the

event a



non-NATO pS preempts a coordinated NATO activity. Despite the

extended

debate on paragraph eight, Allies allocated and deconflicted

the 2009

schedule in accordance with this IS working paper. End

background note.



6. (C/REL NATO) Turkish rep (Yuksel) opened the experts

meeting in strong

opposition to the compensation provisions found in paragraph

8 of the IS

working paper. Yuksel explained that Turkey considers

"something missing"

from the current version. Yuksel recalled that Turkey had

lost an

inspection to a non-Ally in 2008, and that since the last VCC

in January

2009, Switzerland had notified an inspection to the Russian

Federation.

Since Turkey was scheduled to inspect Russia in February,

according to the

provisions in revision seven, Turkey would lose an inspection

again.

(Note. Over the last several months, experts have debated

which Ally

should lose its quota in the event of an unplanned

inspection, but settled

on the following construction: "the Ally next scheduled after

a 4-week

period will lose its inspection/evaluation, unless otherwise

agreed

amongst affected Allies or unless otherwise coordinated

through the VCC."

The four-week period was added to protect an Ally that had

already

committed resources to an upcoming inspection. End Note)

Yuksel noted

that while Turkey had fully complied with IS instructions to

provide

locations, dates and guest inspectors for its desired

inspections and

evaluations, some Allies had not provided dates and are

listed on the

schedule in a column labeled "not fixed." As revision seven

calls for the

"next scheduled" Ally to lose its quota, Allies listed in the

category of

"not fixed" fall outside the provisions and are protected

from losing a

quota.



7. (C) Comment. To say that Allies where surprised with the

Turkish

position would be an understatement. Most Allies, including

USDel,

understood that experts had agreed in January to use the

paper, including

the text of paragraph eight, provisionally as a guide until

it was

formally approved in the VCC. Since Allies had only proposed

two minor

edits to revision six that fell outside paragraph eight, most

expected

revision seven to reach consensus in the experts meeting with

minimal

discussion. End Comment.



8. (C/REL NATO) Norway, the sole "unscheduled" Ally holding a

passive

quota for the Russian Federation, rejected Turkey's position,

repeating

its long standing position on the purpose of VD 99

inspections--that

inspections should be used to verify military activity.

Acknowledging the

fact that other Allies have different points of view, Norway

argued that

it cannot schedule an inspection until such time as it

receives

indications of military activity or suspects such activity.

Despite the

fact that the IS requested inspections dates from Allies,



Allies are under

no obligation to pre-schedule VD 99 inspections.



9. (C/REL NATO) An unmoved Yuksel reminded Allies that

coordination of VD

99 activities is optional, and that the VCC is not mandated

to deconflict

VD 99 scheduling. Furthermore, according to NATO procedures

the VCC, not

experts, may approve a working paper and then only after it

is placed

under silence. Therefore, Yuksel argued, the current paper

remains under

discussion, and any Ally has the right to introduce edits at

any time.



10. (C/REL NATO) Norway, Belgium, Spain, Canada, France,

Denmark, Italy,

Romania, and the U.S. attempted to placate Turkish concerns

by offering

potential compromises. Several Allies emphasized that the

provision for

the loss of a quota would only take effect in a case where

consultations

between affected Allies and within the VCC fail to address

the problem

equitably. Canada posed that if Turkey was concerned that

some Allies

where technically unscheduled, then those Allies could be

moved from the

"not fixed" column to week 52 as a place holder. Finally,

U.S. rep

(Meyer) proposed that Allies approve revision seven at

experts' level in

order to move the paper forward to the VCC. In turn, experts

could take up

Turkey's concerns at the next meeting as a preliminary

discussion for

revising coordination for 2010. The Chair finally called for

a recess so

the affected Allies (those holding passive quotas--Turkey,

Spain and

Norway) could attempt to find an equitable solution to

Turkey's quota

loss.



11. (C/REL NATO) Despite these attempts, Turkey held fast.

Yuksel opposed

Canada's proposal to move Allies on the schedule from the

"not fixed"

column to week 52 because Norway would still consider itself

free to move

forward if it received indications of military activity.

Likewise, Yuksel

rejected outright the idea of forwarding revision seven to

the VCC without

addressing Turkey's loss this year. Finally, Yuksel lamented

that the

three affected Allies could not agree to a specific solution

since there

are only two remaining quotas for three Allies and Turkey had

already

bought tickets and invited guest inspectors.



12. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion wound down in the experts

meeting, the

Chair indicated that there was no consensus to move the paper

forward to

the VCC. Belgium then questioned whether Allies would be

using procedures

from the new paper or from last year. Canada reminded Allies

that, if the

current paper was not approved, Allies would be back to

announcing

inspections on a first-come-first-served basis two meetings

in advance of

the desired period of inspection. After another round of

aggravated

interventions from Allies, Yuksel finally relented,

announcing that Turkey

would not block a decision to move the paper to the VCC.

However, he



cautioned that if it got that far, Allies could expect Turkey

to place

conditions on silence procedures; for example, an extended

silence of one

to two months. The Chair reissued the paper with one minor

uncontested

edit as revision eight and forwarded it to the VCC.



- - - - - - -

Into the VCC

- - - - - - -



13. (C/REL NATO) During the VCC Turkey reignited its

opposition to the

provisions in paragraph eight. USDel asked Turkey to clarify

its claim

that the provisions were unfair, to which Turkey repeated its

talking

points regarding "unscheduled" Allies. Finally Italy,

stating what all

seemed to be thinking, alleged that Turkey simply resented

the fact that

it would lose its passive quota to Russia and was trying to

stall the

paper just long enough to notify its inspection. Turkey

could do this

either by blocking the paper or by placing it under silence

for an

extended period or until it sent its notification. (Note.

According to

the deconflicted schedule, Turkey is scheduled for an

inspection in week

8, 16-20 February, and would therefore send its notification

the week

prior, 9-13 February.)



14. (C/REL NATO) Yuksel flatly denied that Turkey was basing

its objection

on its inspection schedule, and noted that the length of time

for silence

procedures could be one week, one month, or two months for

that matter.

In audible rumblings around the table, Allies complained that

any length

was fine, as long as it was long enough to allow Turkey to

notify its

intent to inspect. Turkey then said it only objected to

paragraph 8, and

that Allies could put paragraphs 1-7 and 9-11 under silence.



15. (C/REL NATO) In another twist, Canada said that it could

not accept

placing only part of the paper under silence and asked the

Chair

(Wiederholtz) whether the position taken by Turkey implied

that none of

the provisions in the paper were valid. (Note. The VCC Chair

Miggins was

recovering from a bout of the flu.) Wiederholtz conceded

that Turkey's

interpretation of the status of the paper was correct, that

the paper was

indeed not agreed, and that as a result none of the paper's

provisions

were agreed, to include those for allocating and

deconflicting schedules.

The implication, Wiederholtz lamented, was that Allies would

have to

re-bid for verification activities in accordance with

pre-2007 procedures.



16. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion vacillated back and forth

over which

procedures are in force, and whether Allies would have to

re-bid for

allocations, a determined Belgium provided some comic relief

by attempting

to align with the general discussion its position on whether

it would or

would not inspect Serbia. (Under the procedures proposed in

revision

seven Belgium would lose its quota to Serbia due to an



unscheduled

inspection by Austria. Under the old procedures Slovakia

would lose the

inspection.) With each new claim that the old/new procedures

were in

effect, Belgium intervened to make known its position,

indicating its

intent to conduct/lose its passive quota to Serbia.



17. (C/REL NATO) Norway lamented that it seemed the issue

could not be

resolved and expressed frustration over the expenditure of

time and

resources over the last several months in revising this

paper. U.S. rep

(Meyer) empathized with Norway, stating that the U.S. would

also be

extremely disappointed if all of the work and resources

expended by Allies

in December and January were now voided and wasted as a

result of Turkey's

position. Meyer proposed that, regardless of the final

status of revision

seven in the VCC, Allies agree to adhere to the published

2009 scheduled,

which was deconflicted in accordance with the new procedures

in December

and January. Despite some caution expressed by the Chair,

Allies rallied

in agreement to continue to execute the deconflicted 2009

schedule, at

least until the next VCC.



18. (C/REL NATO) Feeling the pressure of isolation, Yuksel

finally agreed

to return to capital to get permission to place the document

under silence

for one week. Yuksel asked the Chair to give him until the

following day's

close of business to get his instructions. (Note. While the

Chair and

several Allies understood this to be a formality, and stated

that the

paper would be placed under silence Friday, 6 February, USDel

understood

that Turkey would need the day to get instructions, and that

only with

Turkey's final approval would the paper go under silence. In

a follow up

call on Friday, the IS confirmed that this was indeed the

case as Turkey

agreed to place the paper under silence, but not until the

close of

business the following Friday, February 13. In the end, the

working paper

was placed under silence on Monday, 9 February for a period

of one week.

Turkey did not indicate whether it expected to break silence.

End Note.)



19. (C/NOFORN) Comment. Yuksel was visibly stressed, stating

that he was

under strict instructions from Ankara and that he had no room

to

maneuver. Ankara, who's position seemed clearly linked to

avoiding the

loss of its inspection quota for Russia, may resent the loss

of

inspections two years in a row, while perceiving that Norway

and other

"unscheduled" Allies remain exempt from losses by hiding in

the "not

fixed" column. If so, this position ignores the fact that

Allies who

remain unscheduled incur greater risk with each passing month

that an

unscheduled inspection from a non-NATO partner will exhaust

another

passive quota. As such, an Ally waiting for indications of

military

activity before scheduling its inspection is at greater risk

of losing its



quota than it would be if it schedule the inspection in the

first few

months of the year. Turkey's argument also makes light of

Norway's

long-standing minority, but technically valid position on the

purpose of

VD 99 inspections. Therefore, Turkey's claim that some

Allies are

protected from the loss of inspections is largely muted by

long-standing

national policy and the practical realities of implementing

VD 99

inspections.



20. (C/NOFORN) Turkey also seemed intent on delaying the

approval of

revision seven in order to preserve its inspection to Russia.

In response

to questions from Allies on why Turkey did not raise its

objections

earlier, Yuksel stated that the situation had changed since

January--in

other words; Switzerland had notified an inspection to

Russia, thus

placing Turkey's inspection at risk. Yuksel admitted that

Turkey had no

alternative proposals or edits, except to add a line to the

text

indicating that its provisions be considered for 2010

inspection/evaluation coordination. Finally, Yuksel stated

repeatedly in

the experts meeting that Turkey saw no reason for Allies to

rush to adopt

the document. In contrast to Allied calls to forward a good,

albeit

imperfect paper to the VCC, Yuksel held that the paper

contained a

significant gap and that it was the responsibility of the VCC

and experts

to ensure the paper was as perfect as possible. End Comment.



- - - - - - - - - - -

Implementation Papers

- - - - - - - - - - -



21. (C/REL NATO) As discussion on implementation coordination

consumed

most of the experts meeting, there was little time for

discussion of

AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, on Implementation Issued for the

2009 AIAM.

Canada announced that it would table a Food for Thought paper

at the AIAM

on Force Majeure. Canada noted that its FFT would be based on

the paper it

developed for the VCC, but that the Canadian delegation in

Vienna was

consulting with several delegations and would incorporate

additional

comments and suggestions into the final draft. Canada also

noted that,

despite France's stated opposition to the paper the French

delegation in

Vienna had responded to the paper positively. Nevertheless,

in the VCC,

French rep said he had checked with the MFA and with the

French Del in

Vienna and he reaffirmed France's opposition to the Canadian

paper.



22. (SBU) Denmark also noted it would table a paper on the

size of

evaluation and inspection teams, as would Norway on the quota

calculation

system. Denmark and Norway also indicated their papers would

not be

identical to the papers developed for the VCC. Finally, all

three

indicated they expected their papers to be completed and

distributed one

to two weeks in advance, although Denmark noted it would

forward its paper



to the CPC and leave the timing of distribution up to them.



23. (SBU) Turkey noted that it was still considering whether

to table a

paper on digital cameras, and Germany, who drafted the paper

on Briefings

for Military Commanders, did not have instructions indicating

whether

Berlin would table naything at the AIAM.



24. (C) As it was obvious that Allies were no longer inclined

to discuss

the details of AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, USDel took the

opportunity to

make the following points in both the experts meeting and the

VCC:



-- U.S. understands that the papers tabled at the AIAM will

be national

submissions. While we welcome the papers, we want Allies to

understand

that they should not consider the papers annexed to

AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4 to be agreed, because they are not.



-- The U.S. understands that Allies are agreed that we do not

want to open

VD 99. The papers, as drafted in AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4,

did not make

that clear. We would encourage those Allies tabling papers

to ensure that

their submissions and presentations clearly indicate that any

proposed

suggestions are voluntary standards or voluntary approaches

for the

proposes of transparency. Allies could expect the U.S. to

make comments

along these lines on any paper or presentation that does not

adequately

make this point. (Note. Allies seemed receptive to this

point; however,

some Allies are leery of "voluntary" measures, arguing that

many of the

existing voluntary measures are simply ignored by

participating States.

Therefore, in preparing U.S. guidance for the AIAM, it would

be helpful to

differentiate between the need to protect a specific U.S.

equity (i.e. a

measure we may choose not to implement) and the need to

preserve the

integrity of VD 99 (i.e. the text clearly indicates the

measure is

voluntary, but we would generally agree to implement it under

normal

circumstances.) End note.)



-- The U.S. would also encourage Allies for the purposes of

clarity to

ensure the language used in the papers remains consistent

with that found

in VD 99 (i.e. Use the specific term "specified area" vs.

"area" when

appropriate.)



25. (SBU) During the VCC, Turkey asked whether the U.S.

intended to raise

the issue of Russia's new visa procedures at the AIAM. U.S.

rep (Meyer)

said that while the U.S. would raise the issue if needed, the

U.S. was

under the impression that other Allies in Vienna had

indicated initially

their intent to bring this up either at the AIAM or in the

VCC.



- - - - -

Schedules

- - - - -



26. (C/REL NATO) U.S. announced its VD 99 evaluation to the

Russian

Federation had been rescheduled from week 5 to week 7, and



that its CFE

inspection for the Russian Federation in the 13th residual

year had been

moved from TB 48 to TB 50.



27. (C/REL NATO) Other changes to the deconflicted CFE

schedule for the

next treaty year are as follows:



-- Germany's bilateral inspection to Ukraine has been

rescheduled from TB

53 to TB 1.



-- Germany's paid inspection in Ukraine has been rescheduled

from TB 26 to

TB 51.



-- Portugal's inspection to the Russian Federation has been

rescheduled

from TB 53 to TB 6.



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

About Georgia on the Margins:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



28. (C/REL NATO) USDel relayed the talking points ref

guidance regarding

Georgia's request for the U.S. to conduct a verification

activity in

Georgia soon to the VCC representatives of Hungary, Spain and

France.

Hungary, scheduled to conduct an inspection in week 12,

indicated that it

had already consulted with Georgia on its inspection. The

Hungarian

Verification Agency representative noted Georgia's

flexibility in allowing

Russian inspectors to accompany other teams, but was cool to

the idea of

the U.S. informing Georgia that it had consulted Allies

regarding

inspections. (Note. While he did not say why he was

hesitant, perhaps he

was taken off guard, it could be that since the NATO schedule

is already

agreed, it would be disingenuous to imply that Allies had

adjusted their

schedules to accommodate Georgia's request. End Note.)



29. (SBU) The Spanish representative, a Lieutenant Colonel

fresh from

their verification agency, was new to the VCC. He noted U.S.

points and

was ambivalent. He did not think Spain had discussed its

intentions with

Georgia and did not have an opinion on discussing our

consultations with

Georgia.



30. (C/REL NATO) The French rep (Paeyn) indicated that France

had already

requested to bring auxiliary personnel on their inspection

and had

consulted with Georgia. Georgia agreed to the French request

at no

additional cost to Georgia. Payne was intrigued by Georgia's

willingness

to take a Russian inspector, but said it was likely too late

for France to

arrange for a Russian guest inspector. Payne had no opinion

on whether

the U.S. should discuss Allied consultations with Georgia.



31. (C) Payne also reported that France was considering

proposing a CSBM

based on reciprocal visits between Georgia and Russia.

France would

request Russia and Georgia provide a list of pS that each

felt could serve

as a neutral observer. France would approach a mutually

acceptable

country and ask them to lead reciprocal visits in Georgia and



Russia with

their teams composed of observers from the neutral state and

an

unspecified number of Russians to Georgia and Georgians to

Russia. Payne

did not indicate when France might propose this new measure.

VOLKER