Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO596
2009-12-22 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
WAY FORWARD ON SUPPORTING EUPOL EXPANSION
VZCZCXRO3082 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0596/01 3561513 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 221513Z DEC 09 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3753 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1323 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000596
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV EUN MARR AF PINS
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON SUPPORTING EUPOL EXPANSION
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1684 (NOTAL)
B. KABUL 3557
C. BRUSSELS 1505
D. BRUSSELS 1566
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000596
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV EUN MARR AF PINS
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON SUPPORTING EUPOL EXPANSION
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1684 (NOTAL)
B. KABUL 3557
C. BRUSSELS 1505
D. BRUSSELS 1566
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: We believe there may be an opportunity to
enhance ISAF support for the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL). Turkey and EU officials have indicated privately
that they might be open to engaging on such an initiative.
Unless instructed otherwise, USNATO intends to work
informally to try to find a formula that would gain consensus
support at NATO and be acceptable to the EU. We understand
the EU may have insufficient personnel to deploy to U.S.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) due to force
generation problems but should the EU resolve these
difficulties, such a potential deployment could have broader
positive effects for our efforts in Afghanistan and NATO-EU
relations in general. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Way Forward on EUPOL Expansion
--------------
2. (C) USNATO endorses Embassy Kabul's views regarding the
utility of facilitating EUPOL expansion into RC-E and
appreciates its concern to find a way forward that preserves
our standing NATO default policy (reftel B). We note as well
that, as NATO has moved into aspects of police training and
towards a Comprehensive Approach to the effort in
Afghanistan, both NATO and the EU stand to gain from
formalizing their working relationship. Allied Chief of
Plans Brigadier General Porter on November 18 told Allies and
non-NATO ISAF contributors of the need to maximize unity of
effort and transparency between NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A),the European Gendermarie Force,
and EUPOL to ensure that the training effort for the Afghan
National Police has the right level of expertise operating in
a coherent, synchronized manner. For these reasons, we
believe it would be preferable to take another shot at
enhancing ISAF-EUPOL cooperation and support.
-------------- --------------
Positive Trajectory to NATO-EU Cooperation in Afghanistan
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The previous effort in 2007 to secure a formal NATO-EU
agreement for ISAF support to EUPOL failed. At that time, the
EU sent letters to the SYG, SACEUR, and COMISAF requesting
extensive support from NATO in the areas of force protection,
food and accommodation, logistics, airlift, medical
treatment, medical evacuation, information sharing, in
extremis support, and incorporation into NATO's blue-force
tracker system to facilitate in extremis support. NATO
agreed informally to provide in extremis support based on
ISAF's agreed operations plan, but the NAC was otherwise
unable to consider the requests officially due to
disagreements concerning the use of existing NATO-EU Berlin
Plus arrangements. As a result, NATO has not formally
responded to the EU request.
4. (C) We note a positive trend on NATO-EU cooperation since
2007, however, that gives rise for some optimism. Beyond the
informal agreement on the provision of in extremis support,
ISAF and EUPOL are working well together on the ground,
although ISAF commanders say having political cover would
enhance the possibilities for cooperation.
5. (C) Work also has proceeded quietly under the management
of DSACEUR--who wears both NATO and EU hats--on the EU's
request for inclusion into NATO's blue-force tracker system.
NATO Private Office Deputy Director Bertolotti told us
recently that NATO is now ready to honor the request once the
EU procures the necessary equipment to participate.
6. (C) Likewise, the Private Office, with U.S. assistance,
was able to mediate with Turkey and the EU for ISAF to
provide in extremis and medical evacuation support to the EU
USNATO 00000596 002 OF 002
Election Observer Mission in August 2009. The key to success
in these cases was that discussions were handled quietly, and
no one did anything to create unpleasant surprises.
--------------
Opportunity for ISAF Support
--------------
7. (C) We believe there may now be an opportunity to enhance
ISAF-EUPOL cooperation in Afghanistan that would enable
EUPOL's eventual deployment to RC-E and have broader,
positive effects for our efforts in Afghanistan and NATO-EU
relations in general. NATO SYG Rasmussen on November 16 told
EU counterparts at the EU General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) that EUPOL and ISAF should have a
more direct relationship. The Swedes and other EU member
states have been supportive as well. We advised that it would
be best to work on this collectively, focusing on how to
engage Turkey informally in order to enable a constructive
political dialogue. In recent weeks, we have begun a private
dialogue with Turkish counterparts on the possibility of
facilitating such ISAF-EUPOL cooperation. EU officials
involved with the EUPOL mission have likewise indicated a
willingness to work informally to enhance cooperation.
8. (C) Rather than reiterating a formal EU request at this
time, there may be an opportunity to develop ISAF-EUPOL
cooperation in conjunction with broader ISAF support to
international civilian organizations, provided pursuant to
ISAF's Operations Plan (OPLAN). Security events such as the
recent attack on the UNAMA guest house could provide the
basis for an ISAF response that would use existing NATO
documents and procedures to provide support to the UN, EU,
NGOs and other international entities operating in
Afghanistan. Such an arrangement could include ISAF-EUPOL
cooperation.
9. (C) Finding acceptable language will take time but we
believe that there is no rush. We understand the EU would be
unable to fulfill a formal arrangement with the U.S. to
deploy into RC-E due to significant problems with force
generation for the 400-person EUPOL. There would be little
utility in making such an agreement with the EU until member
states demonstrate they will actually be able to deploy the
personnel.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, USNATO intends to
attempt to facilitate an arrangement that would allow
ISAF-EUPOL cooperation. We would pursue this by working
informally first to see if we can find a formula that would
be acceptable to both organizations. Should the effort fail
and the EU decide it will go forward with a deployment into
RC-E, we should consider moving forward with a bilateral
U.S.-EU agreement at the operational level to provide the
necessary support to facilitate EUPOL deployment to U.S.
PRTs. However, we should make explicit to the EU that this
would be an exception to our NATO default policy and not a
new rule or precedent. Further, we should not pursue a
bilateral agreement until the EU has come up with the
personnel to staff the mission and is ready to deploy.
HEFFERN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV EUN MARR AF PINS
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON SUPPORTING EUPOL EXPANSION
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1684 (NOTAL)
B. KABUL 3557
C. BRUSSELS 1505
D. BRUSSELS 1566
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: We believe there may be an opportunity to
enhance ISAF support for the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL). Turkey and EU officials have indicated privately
that they might be open to engaging on such an initiative.
Unless instructed otherwise, USNATO intends to work
informally to try to find a formula that would gain consensus
support at NATO and be acceptable to the EU. We understand
the EU may have insufficient personnel to deploy to U.S.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) due to force
generation problems but should the EU resolve these
difficulties, such a potential deployment could have broader
positive effects for our efforts in Afghanistan and NATO-EU
relations in general. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Way Forward on EUPOL Expansion
--------------
2. (C) USNATO endorses Embassy Kabul's views regarding the
utility of facilitating EUPOL expansion into RC-E and
appreciates its concern to find a way forward that preserves
our standing NATO default policy (reftel B). We note as well
that, as NATO has moved into aspects of police training and
towards a Comprehensive Approach to the effort in
Afghanistan, both NATO and the EU stand to gain from
formalizing their working relationship. Allied Chief of
Plans Brigadier General Porter on November 18 told Allies and
non-NATO ISAF contributors of the need to maximize unity of
effort and transparency between NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A),the European Gendermarie Force,
and EUPOL to ensure that the training effort for the Afghan
National Police has the right level of expertise operating in
a coherent, synchronized manner. For these reasons, we
believe it would be preferable to take another shot at
enhancing ISAF-EUPOL cooperation and support.
-------------- --------------
Positive Trajectory to NATO-EU Cooperation in Afghanistan
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The previous effort in 2007 to secure a formal NATO-EU
agreement for ISAF support to EUPOL failed. At that time, the
EU sent letters to the SYG, SACEUR, and COMISAF requesting
extensive support from NATO in the areas of force protection,
food and accommodation, logistics, airlift, medical
treatment, medical evacuation, information sharing, in
extremis support, and incorporation into NATO's blue-force
tracker system to facilitate in extremis support. NATO
agreed informally to provide in extremis support based on
ISAF's agreed operations plan, but the NAC was otherwise
unable to consider the requests officially due to
disagreements concerning the use of existing NATO-EU Berlin
Plus arrangements. As a result, NATO has not formally
responded to the EU request.
4. (C) We note a positive trend on NATO-EU cooperation since
2007, however, that gives rise for some optimism. Beyond the
informal agreement on the provision of in extremis support,
ISAF and EUPOL are working well together on the ground,
although ISAF commanders say having political cover would
enhance the possibilities for cooperation.
5. (C) Work also has proceeded quietly under the management
of DSACEUR--who wears both NATO and EU hats--on the EU's
request for inclusion into NATO's blue-force tracker system.
NATO Private Office Deputy Director Bertolotti told us
recently that NATO is now ready to honor the request once the
EU procures the necessary equipment to participate.
6. (C) Likewise, the Private Office, with U.S. assistance,
was able to mediate with Turkey and the EU for ISAF to
provide in extremis and medical evacuation support to the EU
USNATO 00000596 002 OF 002
Election Observer Mission in August 2009. The key to success
in these cases was that discussions were handled quietly, and
no one did anything to create unpleasant surprises.
--------------
Opportunity for ISAF Support
--------------
7. (C) We believe there may now be an opportunity to enhance
ISAF-EUPOL cooperation in Afghanistan that would enable
EUPOL's eventual deployment to RC-E and have broader,
positive effects for our efforts in Afghanistan and NATO-EU
relations in general. NATO SYG Rasmussen on November 16 told
EU counterparts at the EU General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) that EUPOL and ISAF should have a
more direct relationship. The Swedes and other EU member
states have been supportive as well. We advised that it would
be best to work on this collectively, focusing on how to
engage Turkey informally in order to enable a constructive
political dialogue. In recent weeks, we have begun a private
dialogue with Turkish counterparts on the possibility of
facilitating such ISAF-EUPOL cooperation. EU officials
involved with the EUPOL mission have likewise indicated a
willingness to work informally to enhance cooperation.
8. (C) Rather than reiterating a formal EU request at this
time, there may be an opportunity to develop ISAF-EUPOL
cooperation in conjunction with broader ISAF support to
international civilian organizations, provided pursuant to
ISAF's Operations Plan (OPLAN). Security events such as the
recent attack on the UNAMA guest house could provide the
basis for an ISAF response that would use existing NATO
documents and procedures to provide support to the UN, EU,
NGOs and other international entities operating in
Afghanistan. Such an arrangement could include ISAF-EUPOL
cooperation.
9. (C) Finding acceptable language will take time but we
believe that there is no rush. We understand the EU would be
unable to fulfill a formal arrangement with the U.S. to
deploy into RC-E due to significant problems with force
generation for the 400-person EUPOL. There would be little
utility in making such an agreement with the EU until member
states demonstrate they will actually be able to deploy the
personnel.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, USNATO intends to
attempt to facilitate an arrangement that would allow
ISAF-EUPOL cooperation. We would pursue this by working
informally first to see if we can find a formula that would
be acceptable to both organizations. Should the effort fail
and the EU decide it will go forward with a deployment into
RC-E, we should consider moving forward with a bilateral
U.S.-EU agreement at the operational level to provide the
necessary support to facilitate EUPOL deployment to U.S.
PRTs. However, we should make explicit to the EU that this
would be an exception to our NATO default policy and not a
new rule or precedent. Further, we should not pursue a
bilateral agreement until the EU has come up with the
personnel to staff the mission and is ready to deploy.
HEFFERN