Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO593
2009-12-18 13:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
NATO-RUSSIA: NUCLEAR EXPERTS CAUTIOUS ABOUT
how-toVZCZCXRO0369 PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0593 3521306 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181306Z DEC 09 ZDK FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3747 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000593
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC MOPS NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: NUCLEAR EXPERTS CAUTIOUS ABOUT
POSSIBLE NRC EXERCISE INVOLVING AN IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE
REF: DAILEY-SPARKES EMAIL 12/17/09
Classified By: Charge John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000593
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC MOPS NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: NUCLEAR EXPERTS CAUTIOUS ABOUT
POSSIBLE NRC EXERCISE INVOLVING AN IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE
REF: DAILEY-SPARKES EMAIL 12/17/09
Classified By: Charge John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) On December 17, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Nuclear
Experts considered a proposed table top exercise (TTX)
involving a response to an improvised nuclear device (IND) in
2010. The Chair proposed that the TTX could be a stand alone
event or serve as an initial planning conference for a
follow-on field training exercise (FTX) in late 2010 or early
2011. The Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany had offered
to host the TTX. NRC representatives did not have
instructions, but offered opinions regarding the proposed
exercise. The Russian rep thought it useful to use the TTX
as a planning conference for a future live exercise, whereas
the French rep said that the TTX might be acceptable, but not
as a planning exercise for a FTX. Any TTX should be followed
by an assessment before a future FTX was considered. Per
instructions, the U.S. rep explained that Washington was
still considering potential U.S. participation in any
exercise (ref).
2. (C) Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy identified
problems with the proposed TTX scenario based upon the likely
national response to an explosion of a non-state IND. They
explained that in their countries local governments would
have the lead in responding to such an event and federal
response would come primarily from interior and environment
ministries rather than defense ministries, creating
difficulty getting experts from capitals for a NRC exercise.
Furthermore, the German rep pointed out that if this was a
NATO event it would be dealt with by the NATO Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation and the Senior Civil Emergency
Planning Committee rather than a nuclear experts committee.
3. (C) In conclusion, the Chair explained that the proposal
for the TTX would be reworked and distributed in advance of
the next NRC Nuclear Experts meeting on January 22, 2010.
The Chair inaccurately characterized the committee as
supporting the TTX as a precursor to a follow-on FTX,
prompting the U.S. rep to reiterate that the U.S. had not
agreed to any exercises at this stage and was awaiting
further guidance from Washington.
HEFFERN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC MOPS NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: NUCLEAR EXPERTS CAUTIOUS ABOUT
POSSIBLE NRC EXERCISE INVOLVING AN IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE
REF: DAILEY-SPARKES EMAIL 12/17/09
Classified By: Charge John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) On December 17, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Nuclear
Experts considered a proposed table top exercise (TTX)
involving a response to an improvised nuclear device (IND) in
2010. The Chair proposed that the TTX could be a stand alone
event or serve as an initial planning conference for a
follow-on field training exercise (FTX) in late 2010 or early
2011. The Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany had offered
to host the TTX. NRC representatives did not have
instructions, but offered opinions regarding the proposed
exercise. The Russian rep thought it useful to use the TTX
as a planning conference for a future live exercise, whereas
the French rep said that the TTX might be acceptable, but not
as a planning exercise for a FTX. Any TTX should be followed
by an assessment before a future FTX was considered. Per
instructions, the U.S. rep explained that Washington was
still considering potential U.S. participation in any
exercise (ref).
2. (C) Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy identified
problems with the proposed TTX scenario based upon the likely
national response to an explosion of a non-state IND. They
explained that in their countries local governments would
have the lead in responding to such an event and federal
response would come primarily from interior and environment
ministries rather than defense ministries, creating
difficulty getting experts from capitals for a NRC exercise.
Furthermore, the German rep pointed out that if this was a
NATO event it would be dealt with by the NATO Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation and the Senior Civil Emergency
Planning Committee rather than a nuclear experts committee.
3. (C) In conclusion, the Chair explained that the proposal
for the TTX would be reworked and distributed in advance of
the next NRC Nuclear Experts meeting on January 22, 2010.
The Chair inaccurately characterized the committee as
supporting the TTX as a precursor to a follow-on FTX,
prompting the U.S. rep to reiterate that the U.S. had not
agreed to any exercises at this stage and was awaiting
further guidance from Washington.
HEFFERN