NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIES UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000585 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO RS SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIES UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN TREATY PROPOSAL REF: A. USNATO 579 ¶B. STATE 127435 ¶C. MOSCOW 3003 Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Allies agreed during a December 14 NAC that the Russian proposal for a new treaty with NATO was a non-starter and affirmed that the Russian initiative would not create divisions within the Alliance. There were differences over tactics: German, the SecGen and some other Allies warned against rejecting the Russian proposal outright and proposed discussing certain elements of the Russian draft in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),while Poland and others expressed concern about holding discussions with Russia on any part of the draft treaty. Allies agreed the Russian proposal should not distract the NRC from focusing on substantive cooperation on mutual areas of concern, although some observed that the Russian draft treaty was the latest indication that Moscow was not committed to this course of action, preferring to use the NRC for discussion. End summary. ¶2. (C) NATO Secretary General Rasmussen set the tone for the first Allied discussion of the Russian proposal for a legally binding treaty with NATO during a November 14 informal North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting when he stated that the Russian proposal would give Moscow a veto on NATO enlargement and the deployment forces within the Alliance (ref A). He stated that it was "pointless" to consider a legally binding agreement when existing international arrangements could address Russian concerns. The SecGen stressed that it was crucial that NATO respond cautiously to the Russian proposal because, unlike the European Security Treaty (EST),this was aimed directly at the NRC. He thought that to reject it outright would deprive NATO of an opportunity to take the offensive by pressing Russia to explain its current proposal and larger security goals. The SecGen observed that the draft treaty drew selectively from previous NRC agreements, and proposed that NATO could offer to negotiate with Russia a new political document reaffirming a commitment to agreed principles lsited in the three key documents: the 1997 Founding Act, the 1995 OSCE Charter and the 2002 Rome Declaration. He intended to be largely in "listening mode" during his December 15-17 visit to Moscow. ¶3. (C) Allies thought Russian interest in a political document would be limited. Canada observed that the previous NRC agreements were made during the "high water mark" in NATO-Russia relations, and Moscow might not be interested in reaffirming its support for these same principles today. The UK cautioned that an attempt to re-affirm key principles might lead to a Russian attempt to dilute what was already agreed. If NATO negotiated anything with Russia, the Alliance must carefully determine what it really wanted in advance. NATO Should Take the Offensive -------------- ¶4. (C) Allies agreed with the SecGen's cautious approach in responding to the Russian initiative, observing that simply saying no to the Russian proposal would cede the momentum to Moscow. Several Allies noted the similarity between the latest Russian proposal and the draft EST, indicating that Moscow was shopping for the best format to advance its goals. Norway warned that NATO would lose the "moral high ground" by rejecting outright the Russian proposal and should at least give elements of it some consideration within the NRC. Estonia thought, however, that the only way for NATO to go on the offensive was to prepare an "equally outrageous treaty" and "throw" it at Russia, much the way Foreign Minister Lavrov did by delivering this document without comment on the margins of the December 4 NRC Ministerial. ¶5. (C) Germany advised that NATO should not be in a hurry to respond to the Russian proposal, which was an expression of Moscow's desire for its security concerns to be addressed. The German PermRep advised NATO to take the CFE "more seriously" and use it to address Russian concerns expressed in the draft treaty. Slovenia agreed it was necessary to USNATO 00000585 002 OF 002 show "sensitivity" to Russian concerns, which could be done through the existing international security architecture rather than by negotiating a new treaty. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Daalder explained that Washington had carefully studied the Russian proposal and determined clear redlines, including the basic Russian notion of the need for a new treaty (ref B). He delivered U.S. objections to specific aspects of the Russian proposal, while pointing out that certain issues raised were appropriate for discussion in the NRC. Doing so could help NATO out of the current, difficult position in which it could "not just say no to the Russian proposal, but could not just say yes either." Turkey supported the U.S. approach, which could help Allies better understand Russian intentions behind this proposal. Belgium thought the treaty demonstrated the concerns of a country that was worried about its position in Europe and was trying to "manage its decline." How to "Kill" the Treaty -------------- ¶7. (C) Poland offered the strongest reaction to the Russian proposal, stating that Russia was attempting to "outsmart NATO and destabilize the organization from within." To characterize the Russian proposal as highly problematic (as the Danish PermRep had done) was too mild, as this should be seen as a "hostile" attempt to divide the Alliance. NATO had to "kill" the Russian proposal, either now or after allowing discussion with Russia in the NRC. The Polish PermRep was concerned that if there was an open discussion in the NRC, where certain Allies would present a very "tough" position, there was a real chance that Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin would tell the press about the proceedings, as he had done several times previously. ¶8. (C) Estonia feared that NATO would go "wobbly" if it left open the option to discuss certain parts of the treaty. Lithuania warned that we should not let Russia succeed in undermining the Alliance by discussing the proposal. Portugal stressed that "nothing" could create division between the newer and older Allies. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The latest Russian proposal, coming on the heels of the EST, demonstrates the need for an in-depth, interagency discussion to devise a comprehensive U.S. response to these Russian initiatives. We need to assure Allies that may be concerned the U.S. and NATO will go "wobbly" of our ability to lift some aspects of the Russian draft treaty from this document and discuss them within the NRC without compromising our principles. We also need to determine an appropriate mechanism by which to coordinate consideration of the EST in the OSCE while holding complimentary discussions in the NRC. DAALDER