NATO-RUSSIA: RUSSIA "BRIEFS" NRC ON MILITARY EXERCISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000581



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, NATO, RS

SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: RUSSIA "BRIEFS" NRC ON MILITARY

EXERCISES



REF: USNATO 546



Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d).



1. (C) Summary: Russia harshly criticized NATO and

individual Allies during a NATO-Russia Council meeting on the

Russian military exercises Zapad and Ladoga, while managing

to avoid giving any details on the exercises themselves. The

Russian Ambassador to NATO did not discuss the provocative

scenario for the exercises and criticized NATO for holding

its own exercises in the former Soviet space. He complained

that the response to the Russian exercises by some Allies

smacked of Cold War rhetoric. Allies asked that Russia use

"common sense" when planning its exercises and took exception

to the Russian Ambassador's tone, prompting an even harsher

Russian rebuke. The NATO Secretary General asked the Russian

Ambassador to convey to Moscow Allied concern over the

exercises, the size and nature of which were contrary to the

spirit of NATO-Russia cooperation. End summary.



Russia's "Brief"

--------------



2. (C) Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin briefed the

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on November 25 (at Allied request)

on the recent Russian-Belarussian military exercises Zapad

and Ladoga (reftel). He provided no substantive information

on the exercises, criticizing instead those Allies that had

raised concerns about Russian intentions. Without explaining

the scenario for the exercises, Rogozin claimed they were

defensive in nature and did not include the simulated use of

nuclear weapons. He argued that Russia had been transparent

by inviting international observers although it was not

legally required to do so. NATO countries were involved in

many more exercises than Russia, he said, including exercises

held in the "former Soviet space" that used an enemy clearly

modeled on Russia. He claimed that in 2010, Ukraine would

hold eight exercises involving more than 7,000 troops each,

and that exercises would continue in Georgia, which Rogozin

called "a favorite baby of some NATO countries."



3. (C) Rogozin made much of a recent statement by the Polish

Foreign Minister that while Poland did not fear Russia, NATO

still had plans to defend itself against a Russian threat.

Rogozin asked for a briefing on this plan, and commented that

reaction to the Russian exercises had the "smell of the Cold

War."



Allies React

--------------



4. (C) The Polish PermRep said it was troubling that Russia

refused to discuss Zapad and Ladoga in an open manner, even

after NRC members had asked it to do so. He noted that NATO

used artificial scenarios in its exercises, whereas Russia

seemed set on making its exercises politically provocative.

Lithuania said that it did not feel any kind of threat from

Russia, but was disappointed that Russia chose to conduct its

largest post-Soviet exercise along the Lithuanian border.

Estonia asked that Russia simply use "common sense" when

planning its exercises.



Rogozin Over-Reacts

--------------



5. (C) Rogozin responded to the Allies by complaining that

the entire discussion was "insanity" and blamed the media in

Allied countries for incendiary reports on the Russian

exercises. If NATO wanted to discuss the demilitarization of

Russia's western frontiers, this would require the same of

the Baltic countries. However, if a country had armed

forces, they needed to be on "combat alert," thus the need

for the Russian exercises. Rogozin directed questions to

specific Allies, such as asking Lithuania what it had done in

a "positive, constructive way" to further bilateral ties with

Russia. He then launched into a monologue on the need to

create conditions that would foster partnership and

cooperation and abandon "far fetched ideas and rhetoric."



6. (C) Rogozin's harsh tone prompted more Allied responses.

Romania suggested that Rogozin did not understand the Polish



USNATO 00000581 002 OF 002





FM's comments and other Allied concerns, while Lithuania

implored Rogozin to "hear what we say and take it into

account."



7. (C) NATO Secretary General Rasmussen concluded by asking

that Russia understand why NRC members wanted to raise the

recent exercises in this forum. The SecGen requested that

Rogozin convey to Moscow that the scale and scenario of the

exercises did not correspond to the spirit of the NRC, and he

hoped that similar exercises would not be held in 2010.

Rogozin came back a final time to assert that if he had

thought the exercises would have had a "detrimental impact"

on NATO-Russia relations, he would have avoided "briefing"

the NRC.



Comment

--------------



8. (C) The Alliance has had several discussions on the Zapad

and Ladoga exercises, stemming from some Allies' deep concern

over Russian intentions and methodology. Rogozin's behavior

and unwillingness to listen to Allied concerns did little to

assuage and much to further frustrate Allies just as

improving NATO-Russia relations was in the spotlight. The

latest episode feeds the belief of several Allies that the

real signal of Russia's intention to engage seriously with

NATO would be to send a more politically astute Ambassador.

DAALDER