DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 3, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000571 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL NATO MARR MOPS BK SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 3, 2009 MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL Classified By: Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. R eason 1.4(d) ¶1. (U) December 3, 2009; 1500; Brussels, Belgium. ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Deputy Secretary James Steinberg Amb. Ivo Daalder EUR A/S Phil Gordon EUR Deputy A/S Robert Wood Special Assistant Amy Scanlon USNATO PolAd Kelly Degnan (notetaker) NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero Director of the Private Office Jesper Vahr NATO Spokesman James Appathurai Political Advisor Jeff Rathke ¶3. (C) Summary. Deputy Secretary Steinberg discussed Afghanistan and Bosnia's pending Membership Action Plan (MAP) application with NATO SecGen Rasmussen in a December 3 signals check meeting at NATO Headquarters. Rasmussen called President Obama's strategy on Afghanistan "the right one," predicting that it will create new momentum. He raised Bosnia's MAP application -- a central topic of the December 3-4 Foreign Ministers' meeting -- noting his view that NATO's response to Bosnia must be crafted carefully. End Summary. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary thanked Rasmussen for his leadership and outreach efforts in support of the President's December 1 Afghanistan announcement. The SecGen said the steps announced by President Obama will generate new momentum, leading to increased contributions of forces, development funds and commitment by the Afghan government. Italy planned to announce an increase in troops, he said, and seven other countries had publicly announced troop increases since the President's speech. ¶5. (C) Rasmussen asked Steinberg for his assessment of Bosnia's MAP application, noting NATO's Open Door policy would be the main topic of the Foreign Ministers' dinner that evening. Steinberg said the SecGen's November 27-28 visit to the Balkans was an important display of NATO's interest and engagement, as well as a reminder that NATO membership is a serious step that requires a serious and functioning government. Bosnia's future is in NATO, Steinberg stressed, but Bosnia must first demonstrate the capacity to function as a state. Granting Bosnia's MAP application because of the past, as many Bosniaks expect, would send the wrong signal. If they conclude they don't have to take action to get MAP, it would only further Bosnia's dependency on the international community. They need to take basic decisions toward governance and not leave it to MAP to carry them forward. Steinberg told Rasmussen he was concerned by the Bosniaks' (other than Tihic) declining willingness to engage. In his view, a strong message had to be sent that they need to take positive steps to show they want to be part of the solution. Without this message, Steinberg was confident the Bosniaks would not engage, noting that some in Bosnia want fundamental changes to the Dayton Accord, not modest reforms. "We need to make clear that we expect them to do better." ¶6. (C) The SecGen agreed on the need to send a clear message, adding that he had found little enthusiasm for reform or the political process among Bosnian leaders he met during his visit. He admitted he had been persuaded to soften his initial skepticism by Bosnian arguments that MAP would create a more positive atmosphere for reform efforts. The question now was whether denial of a MAP invitation would create an incentive or discouragement for Bosnian reform. Rasmussen was concerned that rejecting MAP might embolden radical elements in Bosnia and fuel accusations that the international community was destabilizing Bosnia's internal situation. Granting MAP would support moderates without guaranteeing membership within a particular timeframe. Bosniaks did not appear prepared to engage now in a political process of reform, but they would have to do so if they were in MAP. ¶7. (C) Rasmussen said he hoped ministers would reach a decision on the issue at the Ministerial dinner. He agreed that Bosnia's IPAP process offered a constructive mechanism for encouraging reforms; Bosnia needed to use this process to USNATO 00000571 002 OF 002 move forward in order for its MAP application to be reviewed positively in the spring. The Foreign Ministers Statement to be issued following the Ministerial should convey an encouraging message that NATO will keep Bosnia's MAP application under active consideration for review in spring, but that Bosnia still has more work to do. DAALDER