NATO SENIOR DEFENCE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000057 SIPDIS STATE FOR T, EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, AND AC/SEA DEFENSE FOR GSA (BENKERT, GROSS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: MARR MCAP MNUC NATO PARM PREL SUBJECT: NATO SENIOR DEFENCE GROUP ON PROLIFERATION (DGP) PLENARY MEETING, JANUARY 14, 2009 Classified By: DEFAD BRUCE WEINROD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) held a Plenary meeting at NATO HQ on 14 Jan 09. The meeting was co-chaired by Mr. Joe Benkert of the U.S. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs) and Mr. John Laugerud of the Norwegian MOD. Major items discussed during the meeting included the drafting of &NATO,s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD and Enhance the Alliance,s CBRN Defence8; the DGP,s work on maritime interdiction of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery; cooperation between the DGP and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee; preparations for the 2009 DGP Seminar; the status of the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force in the NATO Response Force; the Romanian CBRN Surveillance, Warning and Reporting System; and preparations for the 2009 International Partners Outreach Event. The next meeting of the DGP will occur at Steering Committee-level at NATO HQ on 11 Feb 09. ¶2. (C) The Chair (Mr. Laugerud, of Norway) initiated discussion on the Comprehensive CBRN Policy by noting that the objective is to have the policy ready for endorsement at the 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg in April. In order to accomplish this, the DGP will need to finish its work by early March, so that the document can be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council for approval. The Chair explained that in his view the main issues of concern fell into three areas: utilizing NATO,s capabilities to &prevent8 or &counter8 proliferation, and specifically, the use of the term &counter-proliferation8; the role of NATO,s civilian expertise for purposes other than WMD consequence management; and the characterization of NATO,s relationship in this area with non-NATO entities. He went on to say that new terminology on intelligence offered by the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) had been incorporated into the draft verbatim. Germany stated that completion of the document in March was possible but with caveats. They prefer to see it as a living document needing periodic revisions. They are concerned that the goal of having a policy document is diminishing with the inclusion of some input that makes the document sound more like a &terms of reference8 for various committees than strategic level guidance. Germany stated that they could support the document in its current form but will offer some recommendations for improvement. Germany indicated a desire to complete the document through closer cooperation with the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and the SGP, by using a Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP)-plus venue. Canada fully supported the goal of the document as it naturally followed from the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). They wished to see non-state actors emphasized in certain paragraphs to highlight the full spectrum of those involved in proliferation. Because of the classification, an executive summary was recommended to facilitate work with other players. The UK noted difficulty with the use of the term &state8 with reference to intervention. Intervention with a state during crises had an established basis but no acceptable precedents as part of counter-proliferation. There were resource and legal concerns as well, and they felt that the document was too long. Italy pointed out that the focus should remain on capabilities, that existing tools should be used and that cooperation with the European Union (EU) should be encouraged. Without questioning the goal of the work, France felt that the document was not mature yet. Their inputs to the document had not been fully incorporated and progress was not apparent. The existing SGP text on intelligence was not acceptable. The Chair proposed that work on the document continue in the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP) and that the co-chairs would work with nations to seek consensus. The WMD Centre agreed to chair weekly meetings of the JCP in order to accelerate the work. ¶3. (C) The Chair then turned his attention to continued DGP work on the topic of maritime interdiction. By way of background, the Chair reminded the group that the DGP issued policy guidance in July 2007 which called for the development of a legal analysis and a set of options for NAC consideration for actions that could be undertaken by the Alliance to stem the trafficking of WMD by sea. He recalled that following NAC approval of the July 2007 policy, the DGP established a working group to implement the guidance and that during the working group,s deliberations, the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) requested further information on the types and scope of possible NATO action for analysis. The Chair noted that there were currently two documents under review within the DGP, a draft legal analysis produced by the Netherlands and a &Courses of Action8 food-for-thought paper by the United States which responds to the NMA,s request for additional information. He thanked nations that have contributed comments to both documents and noted that regarding the legal analysis, the DGP has requested that the issue be taken up by the Ad Hoc Working Group of NATO Legal Advisors. Regarding the courses of action paper, the Chair opened the floor to comments. Canada noted their appreciation for the work done on the courses of action paper and the legal analysis, however, they stated that Canada felt the option on opposed boarding went beyond the scope envisioned in the original guidance. Canada also stated, regarding the legal analysis, that it would utilize its own legal authorities to govern any action by Canada in this realm. France stated that the current version of the options paper had not substantially changed and their comments had not been included (they remain bracketed). Paris has serious legal and political problems with the paper, since in their view NATO has no mandate to conduct maritime interdiction. NATO should also not be directly involved with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). They also complained that not enough thought had been given to maritime security as a whole. France could not agree to further progress on the paper. While recognizing the importance of PSI, the UK agreed with France that should NATO not be involved. The Chair requested comments by 28 Jan 09. ¶4. (C) The Chair (Assistant Secretary Benkert) turned to the next agenda item and announced that, as a result of a Norwegian food-for-thought paper presented at the October DGP Plenary meeting, a joint DGP-SCEPC meeting would take place later in the day. The agenda for the meeting had been agreed by both committees and focused on civil-military cooperation in CBRN defense. This would be an opportunity for an exchange of information and to discuss possibilities for further joint work. ¶5. (C) The Chair then introduced a speaker from the NATO Office of Resources to explain the basics of NATO Common Funding, a long-standing interest of the DGP. The briefer noted that ninety-five percent of NATO funding remains under national control ) common funding is miniscule. Multinational and Joint Funding are used to cover a gamut of projects but are not NATO Common Funding. The eligibility for Common Funding was established in 1993 and is simply those items that can't reasonably expect national funding. The Strategic Commands establish and prioritize the requirements for common funding. The speaker pointed out where common funding was already being used today to support CBRN requirements. ¶6. (C) The Chair (Mr. Laugerud) then discussed the annual DGP summer seminar that will take place this year in Oslo, June 17-19. The general theme will be further work on civil-military cooperation. The layout of the seminar will be similar to those in the past and will feature syndicates on policy, capabilities and intelligence sharing. The UK wished to thank Norway for their typical Nordic generosity and pointed out that previous seminars have been the opportunity to tease out themes for the annual NAC WMD seminar later in the year. We should expect as much this year. ¶7. (C) Allied Command Operations (ACO) then provided an update on the Combined Joint CBRN Task Force. Although NRF 13,s CBRN Task Force had been imperiled by lack of a lead nation, personnel from the CBRN Center of Excellence (CoE) and the U.S. have since offered to complete the requirements. There is one caveat however: the notice to move requirement will be set at thirty days rather than five. Planning for NRF 14 will take place the third week of January. Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples provided details on the manning problems of CBRN billets in their area of operations. The CBRN Task Force will be integrated into the operational organization and this arrangement will be tested for the first time as part of Exercise Steadfast Joist later this year. The Chair (ASD Benkert) requested that the NMA brief the DGP after the exercise on how well the deployment and use of the Task Force assets worked. ¶8. (C) Romania offered the DGP a briefing on national capabilities, specifically its CBRN Surveillance, Warning and Reporting System. A special emphasis was given to the location of and risks from nuclear power plants. The mobile and fixed radiological and chemical sites form an important part of the Romanian Emergency Management Process and the integration of metrological data is planned for the future. ¶9. (C) The NMA reported progress on plans for the second annual DGP International Partners Event, which is scheduled to take place at the Belgian CBRN CoE in Namur on 29 Apr 09. The event will feature a demonstration of Alliance CBRN capabilities in the various areas as outlined in the Comprehensive Policy. The Main Planning Conference will be held in Namur on 2-3 Feb 09. The invitees list for the event has passed silence and will be the same as last year plus Singapore and selected international organizations. Six scenarios will be used to display equipment and procedures with assets provided by nine nations. Invitations for other contributors to the event have been extended, including the participation of industry as a national contribution. ¶10. (C) Mr. Laugerud closed the meeting with Any Other Business, during which he reviewed the calendar of upcoming events: January 19-23, Trip of a DGP advisory group to Ukraine February 11, DGP Steering Committee March 23-25, Away-day and Plenary in Bulgaria April 29-30, International Partners Event and DGP Steering Committee May 12-15, DGP-Ukraine Plenary and DGP-EAPC Plenary in Ukraine June 17-19, DGP seminar in Norway October 28 or November 25, tentative dates for the 2009 NAC WMD Seminar ANDRUSYSZYN