Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO563
2009-12-03 15:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

RFG: HOW TO KEEP THE DUTCH IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR MCAP NATO AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6689
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0563/01 3371538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031538Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3682
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0735
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1310
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000563 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR MCAP NATO AF
SUBJECT: RFG: HOW TO KEEP THE DUTCH IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000563 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR MCAP NATO AF SUBJECT: RFG: HOW TO KEEP THE DUTCH IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) This is a request for guidance by OOB Brussels time on December 4. See para 7. ¶2. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On December 2, the U.S. Ambassador and NATO Secretary General (SYG) Rasmussen received a demarche from The Dutch PermRep to NATO, Frank Majoor, requesting options The Hague could pursue to keep a Dutch presence in southern Afghanistan. Majoor said that The Hague would make a decision on its future role in Afghanistan on December 7 and sought ideas that he could present to The Hague as possible alternatives to a Dutch withdrawal from Uruzgan. According to Majoor, Dutch senior leadership was interested in maintaining a military presence as part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in southern Afghanistan, but the option to stay in Uruzgan was virtually off the table. He described the political situation on this issue as increasingly complicated and hotly debated in The Hague. The NATO SYG thought that a reduction of a Dutch presence in Uruzgan would counterbalance years of efforts it undertook to build good relations with local officials and acquire an understanding of the local situation. END SUMMARY. Uruzgan Is Not An Option -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The Dutch PermRep Majoor told the U.S. Ambassador and NATO SYG Rasmussen, in separate discussions, that senior Dutch leadership would soon make a decision not to continue as the lead nation in Uruzgan province and continuation of a Dutch role in any capacity in the province was seemingly remote. Majoor also said that the continuation of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and its development activities in the province were increasingly unlikely. But...We'd Like To Stay In The South -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Majoor said, in light of the pending withdrawal, The Hague was still interested in continuing a military presence in southern Afghanistan. He sought ideas to find a coherent military solution to an imminent decision to withdraw and asked Daalder and Rasmussen what else the Dutch could do in southern Afghanistan to continue as part of the ISAF mission. Majoor noted that the Dutch Chief of Defense would consult with SACEUR directly on this same question. According to Majoor, if non-Uruzgan options were identified, it might be possible to garner support and incorporate them into Dutch senior level discussions. Majoor said that Dutch senior leadership would meet on December 7 to debate its future role in Afghanistan. The NATO SYG Takes A Tough Line -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) The NATO SYG responded to the Dutch PermRep with a stern message for The Netherlands to stay and continue as the lead nation in Uruzgan province. Rasmussen said he was investing lots of time and effort encouraging nations to increase their military and financial contributions in Afghanistan. In his view, he was asking many countries to make difficult decisions and found it contrary to his efforts to help the Dutch, simultaneously, reduce its forces. The NATO SYG thought that a reduction of a Dutch presence in Uruzgan would counterbalance years of efforts it undertook to build good relations with local officials and acquire an understanding of the local situation. Separately, the SYG told us he was content to let the Dutch continue to feel the political pressure from Allies than offer an exit strategy too early. The SYG also informed the Ambassador that he would call Prime Minister Balkenende to deliver a stern message directly. Will The U.S. Lead When We Leave? -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Majoor asked Ambassador Daalder if the U.S. would volunteer as the lead nation in Uruzgan after the Dutch USNATO 00000563 002 OF 002 stepped down. Additionally, Majoor asked the U.S. to consider providing force protection to civilian elements of its PRT, if The Hague decided to continue Dutch development efforts in Uruzgan province. Ambassador Daalder promised to refer the questions to Washington in order to get an answer before the December 7 meeting in The Hague. Request For Guidance -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Request for Guidance: Mission requests guidance for use with the Dutch senior leadership on the following questions: -- Will the U.S. volunteer to be the lead nation in Uruzgan province after the Dutch step down from the role? -- Would the U.S. provide force protection to Dutch civilian PRT elements allowed to remain in Uruzgan after a drawdown of Dutch military forces in the province? -- Is there a coherent, military role the Dutch could play within its available capacity outside of Uruzgan? DAALDER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -