NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIES AGREE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000562

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA: ALLIES AGREE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSALS
FOR NRC

REF: USNATO 559

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Seeking to force Russia into a position
where it must agree to cooperate with NATO or be exposed as
unwilling, Allies agreed on December 2 to accept all of
Russia's proposed changes to three key NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) documents that are potential deliverables for the NRC
Ministerial on December 4. The matter was considered during
a North Atlantic Council meeting, during which both the
Secretary General and U.S. suggested to Allies that the
Russian proposals did not significantly change the documents
under consideration. Two Allies expressed potentially
deal-breaking concerns that Russia intended take this
opportunity to try to move discussion of its proposed
European Security Treaty into the NRC. However, the U.S.,
Germany, Canada, and others recalled that NATO was already
unified and had a policy in place to oppose such a Russian
tactic. Following the meeting, all three documents were put
under silence and the Russian Ambassador was informed of the
Allied decision. Allies are now waiting to see if Russia was
serious about its proposals, or whether it will find a reason
once again oppose a way forward for the NRC. End summary.



2. (C) On December 2, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen
provided the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with new Russian
proposals for the three potential deliverables for the
December 4 NRC Ministerial, the reform document "Taking the
NRC Forward," the NRC Work Plan for 2010, and a tasking to
launch a Joint Review of common security challenges. The
SecGen explained that following the NAC meeting of December
1, he asked Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin to provide the
latest Russian proposals in writing (reftel). Rogozin did so
after reportedly speaking with Foreign Minister Lavrov about
this issue. The SecGen thought the Russian proposals not
unrealistic, and implored Allies to consider them since the
NRC was close to agreement on the three documents.

Opposition to Russian Language
--------------


3. (C) The Czech Republic came out first to argue that
Russia's proposed language for the NRC Work Plan could
provide an opening for Moscow to insert its draft European
Security Treaty (EST) into the NRC. Romania supported the
Czech position, and thought it necessary to change the
Russian language to state clearly that the EST would not be
negotiated at NATO.

U.S. Provides the Way Forward
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Daalder observed that the Russian proposals
would have minor effects on all three NRC documents, and
urged the NAC to accept the changes. This action would
either allow the NRC to approve the documents and move
forward, or call Russia's bluff. He expressed appreciation
for the Czech position, but cautioned that changing the
proposed Russian language would allow Moscow the opportunity
to oppose the documents. The Ambassador stressed that Allies
agreed the NRC was not the forum to discuss the EST, and
accepting the Russian language to include "an exchange of
views on issues relevant to Euro-Atlantic security" would not
alter this fact. To further ease Allied fears and foster
consensus, the Ambassador proposed including in the NATO
Ministerial communique language reiterating that the EST
should be discussed in the OSCE rather than the NRC. This
proposal drew wide support from subsequent speakers. The
Ambassador also proposed text on interoperability, which
Russia asked be included in "Taking the NRC Forward" but
offered no drafting suggestion.


5. (C) Germany offered strong support for the U.S. proposal,
and made it clear that that Berlin had no intention of
negotiating the EST in the NRC. Germany cautioned, however,
that NATO would appear "ridiculous" if it ruled out any
discussion of the Russian proposal, and said NATO was not
required to react to the draft EST text just days after it
had been released by Moscow.

USNATO 00000562 002 OF 002




6. (C) Canada thought the U.S. proposal would test Russia's
political will to engage in substantive cooperation with
NATO, and agreed there was agreement among Allies not to
negotiate the EST in the NRC. Canada also asked the Allies
to consider censuring Rogozin for holding a December 1 press
conference at which he divulged NRC deliberations to the
media and criticized Canada by misrepresenting statements
made in the NRC.

The Ball is in Russia's Court
--------------


7. (C) The SecGen concluded that the NAC had agreed to accept
the Russian language, and said he would make the necessary
changes to all three NRC documents and place them under
silence. He intended to inform Rogozin of this development.


8. (C) The SecGen placed "Taking the NRC Forward," the NRC
Work Plan for 2010, and the NRC Ministerial Tasking on
launching a Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges
under silence on December 2. Unless he hears to the contrary
by 1400 Brussels time on December 3, the SecGen intends to
transmit the three documents to NRC Ministers for approval at
their meeting on December 4.
DAALDER